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Abstract 
 
For centuries utopian and science fiction has allowed women to engage with
dominant discourses, especially those which have been defined as the “domain” of
men. Feminist scholars have often characterized this genealogy as one which begins
with the destabilization of Enlightenment ideals of the rational subject in the
Romantic Revolution, with the publication of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) in
particular. This thesis demonstrates that there has in fact been an enduring history of
women’s cognitive and rational attempts to explore key discourses such as science,
technology and architecture through Reason, as opposed to rage. This is a genealogy
of women writing utopian science fiction that is best illuminated through Darko
Suvin’s of the novum. Chapter One reveals how the innovative utopian visions of
Margaret Cavendish (1626-1673) proffer a highly rational and feminist critique of
seventeenth-century experimental science. Chapter Two demonstrates how Sarah
Scott’s Millenium Hall (1762) explored the socio-political significance of the
monstrous-looking “human” body some fifty years before Shelley’s Frankenstein.
Following this, Chapter Three re-reads Frankenstein in light of the early nineteenth
century zeitgeist of laissez-faire economics, technological advancement and global
imperialism and argues that these were also the concerns of other utopian science
fiction works by women, such as Jane Loudon’s The Mummy! (1827). Chapter Four
analyses how the function of the novum is integral to L.T. Meade’s (1854-1915)
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depictions of male/female interaction in the scientific field. Chapter Five considers
how important it is to acknowledge the materialist concern with popular science that
informs texts such as Joanna Russ’s The Female Man (1975) and Pat Cadigan’s
cyberpunk novel Synners (1991). This is the historyof howwomen have used the form
of utopian science fiction as a means with which to present a rational female voice. In
addition to the historical works by women, it employs a range of utopian and science
fiction theory from Suvin and Fredric Jameson to historical and contemporary
feminism.
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Feminist Foundations: an Introduction to 
Utopian and Science Fiction. 
 
Born in history and judged in history, the novum has an ineluctably
historical character. So has the correlative fictional reality or possible
world which, for all its displacements and disguises, always corresponds
to the wish-dreams and nightmares of a specific socio-cultural class of
implied addressees
(Darko Suvin, Positions and Prepositions 76).
the design of a genre is meant to serve a pragmatic end
(Regenia Gagnier, Subjectivities 5).
 
Christine de Pizan’s Le Livre de la Cité des Dames’ (1405), The City of Ladies, opens with
the auto-biographical narrator Christine’s distress at the criticism which was levied at
women during the querelle de femme. Contemplating women’s marginalised place in
history and scholarly learning whilst studying, Christine falls asleep on her scripts only
to be woken by the three muses: Reason, Justice and Rectitude. Subverting literary
and ecclesiastical history’s trope of the muse as demure, the lady called Reason
proclaims: “I was commissioned […] to supply you with durable and pure mortar to
laythe sturdyfoundations” that will enable the construction of a “far stronger edifice”
than has ever been seen before (Richards 1.4.3). This edifice forms the foundations
for “building the Cityof Ladies” (3.1.1), an allegorical refuge for the ghosts of women
throughout history and myth that Christine is to construct with the aid of the muses’
technical building tools. The muse Justice challenges the idea that discourses of
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knowledge¸ such as architecture and construction, are merely a male domain,
declaring that her “measuring vessel” for the mortar is truer and more accurate than
any of “the men of the Earth”, and “nor can any man complain about [her] measure”
(1.6.1). Similarly, Rectitude gives the semi-autobiographical narrator, Christine, her
ruler so that she can “measure the edifice of the City” (1.5.1) and build an accurate
and logical foundation for Reason’s building. Like Lèvi-Strauss’s “engineer” who
“questions the universe”, de Pizan’s literary acknowledgement of women’s lives
emphasises the need to recognise their lives and work, and revise the history that
charts the “story” of woman (19).
What is also radical about The City of Ladies is that the muses instruct Christine
to utilise technological forms in order to build their (albeit allegorical) feminist utopia,
despite the fact that technology has been considered as anathema to female
subjectivities within Western history. Aptly, the feminist project of edifying a utopian
city for the virtuous women who have been recouped from male history and
literary/oral tradition can only be completed with Justice’s help. Indeed, it is in
creating this space that justice has, at last, been served for these maligned women. As
Justice suggests:
[T]o perfect and complete your City, […] my job will be to
construct the high roofs and towers and the lofty mansions
and inns […] I will turn over the City to you, completed
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with your help, fortified and closed off with strong gates
which I will search for. (1.6.1)
And so the allegorical names of the muses become even more poignant: Reason
provides the logical foundation of the City of Ladies, Rectitude ensures that the
revision of the story of women’s lives from traditional narratives form an accurate
edification, whilst Justice ensures that the ghosts of the women remain protected.
De Pizan therefore draws upon discourses of reason, justice and rectitude in
order to demonstrate how women can be logical beings, capable of “reasoned”
thought as the equals of men. Moreover, she explicitlyand neatlyconveys howwriting
is a form of social building too; when Rectitude instructs her to: “mix the mortar in
your ink bottle” (2.1.1), the literal image of mixing mortar in an ink well is conflated
with the metaphorical image of writing ink as a building material (since mortar, like
ink, is a liquid material which then dries, and sets). The image of the mortar-ink, in
turn, highlights the intertextual nature of history and literature, evoking the image of
the writer as an “engineer” of social spaces. Like The Cityof Ladies, this project tells the
story of some of those women who have made extraordinary contributions to a
history which has not been recognised – and this happens to be a history in which de
Pizan is herself a key figure. It is the history of how women have been social
engineers and experimenters through utopian and science fiction; it is the attempt to
understand and recognise howcenturies of women have, albeit inadvertently, come to
build upon what was perhaps the first explicitly feminist utopia in modern literature:
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The City of Ladies, and how, even today, this is a chronology which has remained
relativelyunacknowledged.
De Pizan’s City of Ladies is the most prominent example of the relative lack of
scholarly attention paid to women’s utopian and science fiction writing.1 Written at
the French courts a century earlier than Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), it would
nevertheless have been familiar to an English-speaking audience through its
translation by Brian Anslay in 1521: Boke of the Cyte of Ladyes (Richards xix). The
scholarly neglect of such a key text for the building of a chronology of women’s
utopian work may be due to the fact that utopian fiction is actually often defined as
“beginning” with Thomas Moore’s namesake text – Utopia (Jameson, Archaeologies 1).
It is worth noting that whilst Boke of the Cyte of Ladyes was printed only a few years
after More’s Utopia, de Pizan’s Cité des Dames was scribed a century earlier. What is the
significance of this? Its significance lies in the fact that this date indicates that there
was a correlation between the popular interest in More’s Utopia and the perceived
potential interest in Cité des Dames. Its translation was likely to have been provoked by
the success of More’s Utopia and the revival of interest in the Greek concept of
“Eutopia” or ideal place.2 In fact, Cité des Dames may have been known to some in
England as a “eutopian” text prior to Moore’s Utopia, the word “utopia” being
unknown until Moore coined the term (Manuel and Manuel 1). Cité des Dames, then,
                                                          
1 See Nicole Pohl’s Introduction to Women, Space and Utopia (2006).
2 For a discussion of the distinction between eutopia and utopia, see Manuel and Manuel Utopia Thought in the Western World
(1979) and John CareyThe Faber Book of Utopias (1999).
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maywell have been known in England as a text describing the desire for an imaginary
world for women.
Several factors indicate that Christine de Pizan was a name that either preceded
or was part of a dialogue with More’s Utopia. There had been an anonymous Flemish
translation of Cité des Dames in 1475, Englishmen spoke French at court and de Pizan
was alreadysomething of a well-known name after the 1470s translation of her Morales
Proverbes of Cristyne (Richards xxiii). The actual events surrounding The City of Ladies
first English translation are not my key concern here, however, neither is the direct
relationship between male and female utopian science fiction writers such as More
and de Pizan. Rather, the important point is to acknowledge is that the gendering of
both the creation and criticism of genre fiction can sometimes be taken as infallible, as
part of an unchallenged literary history, rather than being seen as forming a basis for
further research, exploration and revision.
De Pizan’s role as a writer is not merely significant because she wrote what is
possibly the earliest explicitly feminist utopia, she also had a certain degree of agency
for a fifteenth-century woman. She was not only perhaps the first professional female
writer in the Western world, she was also one of the first vernacular authors to
oversee the production and illuminating of her own books (Richards xxi). What is also
yet to be recognised is that because the stories of the women which bring about the
City of Ladies are de Pizan’s re-reading of male authors and bards, she performs the
same function in 1405 that Elaine Showalter and other feminist critics called for in the
Anglo-American academy in the late 1970s – the reclamation of such narratives as part
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ofthat newly-acknowledged “body”: feminist history. Indeed, the introductory setting
of Christine’s questioning of the lack of women’s achievements in history, as well as
the social realities facing women, such as access to education, is also where we first
glean the feminist importance of the muse Reason, and the significance of the most
traditional tool of the muses: the mirror. A traditional motif within allegorical writing
about women’s roles and for presenting re-readings of narratives by revising, refracting
and reflecting upon them, the “mirror image” is also a well-established paradigm in
utopian thought. It is perhaps no coincidence that it is the muse representing the
notion of female/feminist rationale, Reason, who carries this most feminist and
utopian of all the means of technology presented to Christine: in this female history,
utopia is a reflection in Reason’s mirror.
The concept of utopia as a mirror and the exploration of what precisely
signifies as “reason” for women are key concerns within this study. However, the role
of the mirror as a utopian motif is not so much a concern with how utopian and
science fiction is a mirror image of society as such, but an interrogation of what such
uncanny “mirror images” (as alternative worlds) can reveal about the issues affecting
the author’s cultural and socio-political concerns. A key idea for explicating how
utopia functions as a mirror image of historicity is Darko Suvin’s novum, which he
describes in Metamorphoses of Utopia: on the Poetics and Historyof a LiteraryGenre (1977) as
a “totalizing phenomenon or relationship deviating from the author’s and implied
reader’s norm of reality” (64). In other words, novum means the “new” in the sense
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thatit is a newprojection of an idea.3 Certainlywhat is important about his definition of
the historicity of the novum (see above) for the purposes of this feminist study is that
it both acknowledges and posits the relative nature of both historical time and
subjectivity. This is because Suvin argues that these literatures of estrangement
function through the reader’s, the author’s and the protagonists’ combined senses of
cultural identity in place and time (whether this is real or imaginary), all of which
contribute to the text’s own identity as an account of all three of these as aspects of
subjecthood as theyemerge within specific moments.
In other words, the textual identity of utopian and science fiction recapitulates
the effective practices of studying history. That is to say that the novum recapitulates
historical study when it attempts to create “tableaus” of the human subject, or, rather,
when it facilitates possibilities for imagining human subjectivity whilst remaining
aware of temporal relations. To add to this sense of the importance of conceptualising
change over time, utopian and science fiction can be seen as the presentation of more
or less temporally/spatially “estranged” novas. Through positing a sense of historicity
through its will to change history (by imagining alternatives and critiquing social
conditions), the novum constructs a sense of “ahistoricity” by creating spatially
and/or temporally alternative possibilities for “historical” subjectivities. Utopian and
science fiction, then, can be seen as the writers’ self-conscious attempts to
conceptualise, as well as reform and in some senses – step outside of – history itself.
                                                          
3 Suvin developed this term from Ernst Bloch Spirit of Utopia (1918) but it originallyappeared in Shakespeare’s Loves
Labours Lost (1598), Act V., scene II, verse 547: “Abate throwat Novum, and the whole world againe, Cannot pricke out
five such.”
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Thisis especially true for modern readers of utopian and science fiction, whose sense
of the various viewpoints created by the text will nearly always be conflated with their
awareness of its historicity even at the very moment in which the text might attempt
to be “u-chronic” (byimagining an alternative, often futuristic, temporality).  
The importance of recognising different subjectivities is also something which
has been at the core of the majorityof utopian and science fiction texts. We need only
to look at how de Pizan’s City of Ladies forms an allegorical re-writing of women in
history to see that history and its revision are integral building blocks for creating a
specific picture, that of female subjectivity. By proffering of the new or novum,
utopian and science fiction makes subjectivity its very focus because it is externalised
as much as the social structures of the “present” are: by its very definition as that
which is novel and different, the novum operates through the process of “othering”.
The historicity of the novum is integral to the recuperation of utopian and science
fictional visions of women, as revealed by The City of Ladies. It is crucial to realise the
historicity of the space which is the “City of Ladies:” it is an allegorical place precisely
because the muses have instructed Christine to build a utopia which cannot exist in real
life society due to pervading patriarchal notions of women. Moreover, the lesson that
Christine learns from the muses is that reading, writing, discussing and learning about
women throughout history is important because an awareness of these dialogues
facilitates the revision of the “construction” of patriarchal history. By corollary, the
material text of the Cityof Ladies as a utopian manuscript comes to represent the “City
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ofLadies” itself: it is a mortar-ink edification of the histories of women as they have
been revised and materially“re-constructed” bya feminist writer.
What is really useful to our understanding of The City of Ladies is Suvin’s
novum, especially because he argues that it can only be successful if it can be seen as
forming a metonymical, allegorical or metaphorical relationship between a base
“cognitive” reality (usually that of the author) and the cognitive reality of a “mental
experiment.” How Suvin would deploy the axiomatic of subjectivity, however, does
not provide an entirelyfoolproof methodologyfor reconstructing a feminist historyof
utopian science fiction. This is because Suvin’s primary focus for the novum is that it
is a device which works through estranging and defamiliarising its audience (an
amalgamation of Ernst Bloch’s novum from Spirit of Utopia (1918), Russian
formalism’s ostranenie and Bertolt Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt (Metamorphoses 13)), whilst
oscillating back to its grounding in the historical familiarity of that which is new,
which is usually defined as the recognition of the temporality of the author’s present
(Freedman 17). Ultimately, however, Suvin defines this unnerving novelty or
estrangement is the genre’s “raison d’être” (“On the Poetics” 71). Although Suvin
defines this estrangement as operating in a similar way to the “V-effect”, I am more
interested in his definition of utopia and science fiction as the interplay between the
initial defamiliarisation and the subsequent familiarisation of the new in comparison to
the author’s environment (Suvin 7-8). After all, the moral of the story in The City of
Ladies is that learning and the importance of revising history ultimately enhance one’s
sense of selfhood, rather than create a sense of Verfremdungseffekt from which one can
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never return. Given our consideration of de Pizan and how integral history and
female subjectivity are to a feminist history of writing, it may be useful at this stage to
consider how other definitions of utopian and science fiction might enrich Suvin’s
idea of the new.
Utopia and other  science fictions 
In 1890 Oscar Wilde proposed that Utopia is “the one country at which Humanity is
always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better
country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias” (“The Soul of the Man Under
Socialism”, 13). Like Wilde, the narrator of More’s Utopia claims that we would not be
able to find the real location of the island called Utopia. This is an ambiguity which is
only heightened when we consider that “utopia” was in the first place a neologism
created byMore himself, and that More and Erasmus’ working title for their book was
the Latin word “Nusquama”, meaning “no place.” “Utopia” was coined from a
transliteration of the Greek “ou” into the Latin “u” (Bloomfield 17). The Greek prefix
“ou” expresses a negative, whilst retaining the Greek word for place (“topos”) in
order to create the neologism “utopia.” But whereas the Greek term “eutopia”
specifically means “good place” or ideal place, Utopia draws on the Greek negative
“ou” more specifically: it is an island that can be found “nowhere:” it is “no place”
(Carey xi). What is useful about More’s sixteenth-century intervention into the Greek
term eutopia is that it reveals howthe utopian world cannot necessarily be considered
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tobe an ideal world; it is but an imaginary world which posits a sense of the ideal in
some form.
In many ways science fiction emerged from utopian fiction (James Utopias and
Anti-Utopias 210), and it too is seen as being “less a genre – a body of writing from
which one can expect certain plot elements and specific tropes – than an ongoing
discussion” (Mendelshon 1). Unlike the existence of the Greek “Eutopia” before
More’s “utopia”, however, when we speak of science fiction, we are specifically
referring to a term that, prior to 1929, science fiction writers themselves were almost
certainly entirely unaware of; we are applying our own twentieth-century critical
terminology to writing that was, historically speaking, not referred to as “science
fiction.” Yet like More’s transliteration of eutopia, science fiction was indeed a term
that had been plucked from history, when the US magazine Science Fiction Wonder
Stories publicised William Wilson’s relatively unknown 1851 definition of this type of
writing in 1929 (James 29). Wilson argues that it is “Science Fiction, in which the
revealed truths of Science may be given” (qtd. in James 28). This is in some senses
more helpful for defining the genre than the ubiquitous ou/eu anomaly becomes for
utopia, since a clear definition of science fiction is apparent from the coining of the
term in 185l, albeit the case that this term did not enter universal usage until at least a
century later. Of course, science fiction could arguably be seen as having developed
much earlier than this, with Johann Kepler’s Sominum, sive Astronomia Lunaris (A
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Dream,or Lunar Astronomy), which was written in 1600 but not published until 1634.4
However, this text and the accounts of lunar voyages that followed it do not provide
the explicit social or philosophical critique or innovation that readers have associated
with later science fiction works, and which I associate with Margaret Cavendish’s The
BlazingWorld (1666) in Chapter One.
The vehicular nature of science fiction is often the key concern within the
genre, such as the idea that it works as “a forum for speculations upon the nature of
reality” or, as feminist writer Joanna Russ has famously described it, the “what if?”
function (James 31). This means that both utopia and science fiction are inherently
dynamic; they use the cognitive logic of the material realities and dialogic conditions
in which they were written in order to posit a different world vision. Russ has also
defined these genres as working through a “limbo” between the “not-possible, not-
impossible”, between the “(what cannot happen)” temporality of fantasy fiction and the
“(could happen)” of realistic fiction (To Write Like a Woman 21). But, as Derrida’s “The
Law of Genre” suggests: genre, just like law, needs constant revision. To a certain
extent, we can never define these genres because they will never truly completely
conform to typological or formalist qualities (Luckhurst 6). For the purposes of this
study, however, it might be helpful for readers to think of utopian and science fiction
as:
Anywork of fiction that has a significant impact upon previous philosophical definitions of humanity,
byemployinga “what if?” scenario in order to present an imagined location, which is novel enough in
                                                          
4 For a description of the various definitions of science fiction’s history, see Adam Roberts Science Fiction (2006).
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space and/ or time to engender a social and cognitive comparison with the author’s, narrator’s or
reader’s present.
What it important about this definition is its recognition that knowledge is inevitablya
system of interacting networks, as we see from writers and social scientists such as
Bruno Latour. Therefore this definition is based upon the utopian aims of this
project, to show how utopian and science fiction’s most valuable quality is its ability
to engage with the familiar. In this sense, my definition above draws upon Suvin’s use
of the relationship between the novum and the familiarity of the author’s real world
but relinquishes the need for to emphasise the textual “estrangement” process which
underpins the formalist literary theory that the novum was born from. Nevertheless, I
would define the presence of something new similarly to Suvin, that: its presence
must create a distinct set of philosophical implications for human society in general,
from either the point of view of the author/reader and/or from within the “story-
world” itself. Be this a new idea, invention, object or life-form, it must always form
the motivational factor of the story-plot. Hence a fictional tale in which a newspecies of
plant is discovered might not have a direct impact upon how we conceptualise the
world, but the discovery of a new species which throws into disarray philosophical
beliefs about the status of human life would be.
In its emphasis on being applied to feminist studies of literary history, my
definition above also echoes Adam Roberts’ definition of science fiction (and I would
argue that this applies to utopian fiction also) as literature that: by focussing its
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representationsof the world not through the reproduction of that world but instead by
figuratively symbolising it, it is able to foreground precisely the ideological
constructions of otherness – “Reason’s mirror” (19). Roberts goes on to say that the
“taxonomies” dominating utopian and science fiction studies are, however,
counterproductive. After all, when a fiction so dedicated to social critique and the
exploration of otherness prescribes a way of defining science fiction and utopia
“proper”, it recapitulates eugenics discourses and the imperative to define a “pure
breed” (21). My open definition here is an attempt to overcome this limited critical
position; following de Pizan, I define utopia as a reflection in Reason’s mirror – a
vision based upon what is known (legal, education, religious structures, and so on) in
order to catalyse social critique of the status quo. Engaging with the present does not
mean that utopian fiction can never truly bring out a futuristic and “totalising” utopia,
nor does it mean that it is not inherently dynamic, for it is the actual details of what is
extrapolated (and how) that makes utopian science fiction an important signifier of
cultural history.
Utopian and science fiction is, perhaps, more accurately thought of not as the
visualising of alternative worlds, but as the revision of current society. Produced in
specific historical times, the effect they produced in the author’s contemporary
readers was that of a comparison with – and therefore a “perceived sense” of the
author’s engagement with – the zeitgeist. What is of interest to this project in particular
are the ways in which utopian and science fictions are counter-narratives – literary
affirmations of the fact that women have endeavoured to suggest possibilities for
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cultural changes. This is not an attempt to map a feminist scientific history but to
open up, for further exploration, how empirical thought has been utilised and
problematised by women’s responses to emerging discourses, such as Christine’s
criticism of the misogyny of ecclesiastical history and myth or Cavendish’s scepticism
of the cruelty and irrationality of seventeenth-century “New Science.” Utopian and
science fiction is the focus of this project, rather than another genre form, precisely
because these genres address cultural issues in ways which can be seen as ambiguous,
controversial and imaginative, and they therefore provide valuable explorations for
historians, literaryscholars and sociologists alike. When theyare at their most textually
dynamic, they take aspects of social change (or indeed the fact that there may be a
significant lack of social reform) and cognitivelyproject them to create a newvision of
social conditions. In doing so they create new ways of interpreting what I refer to as
the “real-life present”, which I would define here as our perceptions of the author’s or
narrator’s cultural environment. Much like the measure, the mortar and the mirror, for
Christine’s City, these fictions have therefore provided a powerful tool for early
women writers, who were able to make social critiques through the protected veil of a
somewhat estranged social backdrop.
Feminists  Fictions 
Utopian and science fiction is inextricable from the history of women’s experiences
and articulations, particularly in relation to dominant models of discourse. Yet besides
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the totem contribution of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), women’s writing is
largely excluded from the most influential books on utopian and science fiction.
Clearly feminist influences in science fiction have remained something of an
afterthought to the comparatively richer genealogy of utopian and science fiction
“proper.” Texts such as Frederic Jameson’s Archaeologies of the Future: the Desire Called
Utopia and Other Science Fictions (2005) and Suvin’s The Metamorphoses of Science Fiction
illustrate this neglect of women’s writing. Both studies exclude pre-twentieth century
feminist utopian fictions from their literature reviews, and Suvin even argues that
Frankenstein is not science fiction (see Chapter Four). In Archaeologies, Jameson charts
six approximately chronological stages of utopian and science fiction evolution:
“Adventure” (or “space opera”); “Science”; “Sociology”; “Subjectivity, or in the
1960s”; “Aesthetics or, ‘speculative fiction’” and “Cyberpunk.” Feminist science
fiction texts are the onlytexts which are not actuallylisted. He merelyadds these as an
afterthought which follows this main list, and even then the history of feminist
utopian and science fiction is reduced further, as having occurred onlyafter the 1960s,
in response to the second wave of the feminist movement.
This unacknowledged history – even after the rise of the late twentieth-century
feminist influences within both culture and the academy – has long been the tradition
within utopian scholarship. Manuel and Manuel summed up this critical impetus fairly
accurately by decreeing that the study of women in utopia, women reading utopia and
women writing utopia “are not a major concern of serious utopian thought” (7). They
have even described Margaret Cavendish’s amusing and astutely feminist critiques of
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newscience in the mid-seventeenth century as a vision which is “so private that [it]
border[s] on schizophrenia” (7). Moreover, those accounts which look at pre-
twentieth century feminist utopian and science fiction tend to create genealogies in
which there were no feminist texts prior to Mary Shelley’s science fiction, Frankenstein
(1818), such as Carol Farley Kessler’s “Bibliography of Utopian Fiction by United
States Women” and L. Timmel Duchamp’s “Science Fiction and Utopias by Women,
1818-1949: A Chronology”.5 Although Lucy Sargisson has discussed the political
nature of the feminist utopian consciousness in fiction and Nicole Pohl has drawn
parallels between feminism and space making in literature prior to Frankenstein, there
is a current neglect of the fact that there have been some significant feminist voices in
the history of this genre. If utopian and science fiction can be considered as being a
literature that proffers social change, social comment and social dreaming, omitting
women’s contributions to this genre is tantamount to an omission of women’s visions
for imaging social change, as well as women’s voices. After all, utopian and science
fiction is largely a play between subjectivity and the estrangement from one’s sense of
subjectivity. If we define subjectivity and the construction of “the subject” as integral
to these genres, to neglect women’s contribution is to impair howthey can be seen as
contributing to the understanding, development and exploration of, human subjectivity
throughout history.
                                                          
5 See Duchamp “Science Fiction and Utopias byWomen, 1818-1949: A Chronology”
<http://ltimmel.home.mindspring.com/chronology.html>
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Inaddition to encompassing the work of women throughout history, the title’s
term of “feminist utopian and science fiction” is also based upon a utopian desire to
recognise the overlaying history between utopian texts and science fiction, as well as
those described as both simultaneously. My definition draws upon the work of those
utopian scholars who have been interested in addressing the link between utopian
paradigms and science fiction literature, such as Tom Moylan, Darko Suvin, Jane
Donawerth and Nicole Pohl. I attempt to “edify” the work of these scholars in order
to create a more trans-historical overview of British literary production. My title of
“utopian and science fiction” was inspired by that of Jane L. Donawerth’s and Carol
A. Kolmerton’s edited collection of Utopian and Science Fiction by Women (1994), the
only trans-historical collections of these genres. This term is important because it also
reflect hows the operation of linguistic terms can create conceptual “spaces” through
the politics of inclusion, as well as the fact that science fiction and utopia are hybrids
of other literary forms, as well as their fairly complex history. For example, modern
“science fiction” (from the nineteenth century onwards) can be seen as having
evolved from utopian fiction. “Utopian science fiction” also reflects the phenomenal
rise of the feminist depictions of utopias and dystopias in the science fiction of the
late 1960s and onwards, when women’s writing turned back to the form of the
traditional utopia in order to imagine alternative worlds within which to explore the
politics of equalitybetween men and women.
Unfortunately, the rise and continued influence of the “women’s writing”
debate in the academia from the 1970s and 1980s onwards also appears to have
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createdits own somewhat ambiguously utopian paradigm – the late twentieth-century
rise of “feminist science fiction” criticism.6 De Pizan’s “City of Ladies” is just one
example of a utopia which has been excluded from this feminist literary history, for
despite the fact that de Pizan is described as “striving to write a universal history of
women in The Book of the City of Ladies” (Richards xxvii), neither of the historical
surveys of women’s writing in Ellen Moers’ Literary Women (1977) or Elaine
Showalter’s A Literature of Their Own (1978) mention de Pizan. Another drawback to
the 1970s-1980s feminist impetus in the academy was how it reclaimed women’s
writing; it tended to posit women as marginalised and seemingly pathological figures.
The most influential example of this feminist approach is Sandra M. Gilbert and
Susan Gubar’s The Madwoman in the Attic (1977), which argued that the female writing
consciousness was a split self. More specifically, they suggested that Shelley’s
Frankenstein and his monster were, in fact, two monstrous “Eves”, an idea which
critics have drawn upon in order to identify women writers as Frankensteinian
monsters, as “alien” to society (Daughters of Frankenstein xviii). Contrary to this
definition of woman as irrational and monstrous “other”, this project is interested in
what ways women’s writing can be seen as the product of reason. Just as de Pizan is
inspired by the muse Reason, this project charts how women have explored the
“cognitive” logic of novas and utopian schemas to engage with discourses which have
been historically defined as the domain of male rational/empirical thought, such as
                                                          
6 This was catalysed by Marleen Barr’s Future Females (1981), as well as Joanna Russ’s numerous articles on the nature of
science fiction and feminism.
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science, technology and architecture. After all, within utopian and science fiction’s
male protagonist “explorers” themselves are also alien – a fact which has often been
occluded from feminist criticism. Ironically, as the following chapters hope to reveal,
the hegemonic subjectivities of “woman” have been, for centuries now, effectively
challenged by women employing the logic of objectivity. Thinking along these lines, I
would argue that “woman” is not necessarily “alien” simply because the notion of a
coherent and unchallenged subjectivityis not always possible.
Another key example of how reactionary feminist criticism has impaired
considerations of women’s utopian reason is the feminist interpretation of historically
male-dominated discourses, especially science, technology and architecture, as
anathema to feminist rationalism. In contrast, this thesis does not aim to read utopian
and science fiction in order to produce a “feminist” history of science as always
counteracting a “masculine” history of science. Ultimately, both men’s and women’s
dialogues with rational discourses are part of the same wider cultural history. In fact,
given the centrality of Frankenstein to the post-1960s feminist considerations of
science fiction, it is worth noting that one of the most influential rational feminists in
Western historyis MaryShelley’s mother, MaryWollstonecraft. Ironically, the feminist
interpretation of Frankenstein is therefore one which has been influenced by what
followed Wollstonecraft’s Vindication on the Rights of Women (1792) – the Romantic
revolution’s rejection of Enlightenment ideals such as equality, moral rationality and
the common good. Yet contemporary models of utopian and science fiction can and
indeed must be challenged by the fact that women throughout history have engaged
Feminist Foundations: an Introduction to Utopian and Science Fiction Page 25 
with,and challenged, epistemological discourses. Feminist thought is not merely the
reserve of post-Wollstonecraftian generations of women but it is ultimately the
Wollstonecraftian rational subject and its pursuit of the moral good in order to render
the world utopian that this thesis is implicitly concerned with, as opposed to the post-
1970s interpretation of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein as a figure of irrational feminist
rage. This is especiallyimportant when we consider the fact that writing is said to have
become “more urgent, angry and unpredictable” in the wake of the second wave of
the feminist movement (Showalter 304).
This thesis therefore explores how women writers have followed
Wollstonecraft’s idea that “when Reason offers her sober light, if they [women] be
really rational creatures, let them not be treated like slaves” for, as she goes on to say,
“[t]hese may be termed Utopian dreams” (41). Identifying howwomen’s explorations
of “masculine”-identified narratives have also been excluded by feminist critics, of
both the history of science and the history of utopian science fiction, is therefore
integral to this project. I seek to challenge the value of defining science fiction as
beginning only in 1818, especially by those scholars who negate the cultural influence
of scientific discourses upon science fiction and utopian fiction by positing science
fiction as merely the “offspring” of gothic fiction, such as in Brian Aldiss’s Billion Year
Spree (1973) and Trillon Year Spree (1986). As we have seen, science fiction did not
spontaneously “begin” in 1818 in response to how the nineteenth-century wave of
“new science” became professionalised, institutionalized and categorised (Willis
Monsters¸ Mesmerists and Machines 9).
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Inorder to begin to redress the lack of scholarly engagement between science
fiction criticism and the historical conceptualisation of scientific discourses prior to
the nineteenth century, my approach to the critical appreciation of utopian and
science fiction texts is also grounded in the work of those theorists whose main
concerns lie outside the field of utopian and science fiction studies. As stated earlier,
this study is influenced by Bruno Latour’s theory of social networks of scientific
dialogue in Science in Action (1986), as well as the idea of cultural history advocated by
works such as Catherine Belsey’s “Reading Cultural History” and Mark Poster’s
acknowledgement of the challenges to cultural hegemony that marginalised writers
have presented throughout history in Cultural History and Postmodernity (1997). These
include the literary voices of women, the colonised, the poor and “anonymous”
writers. As a pan-historical revision of the storyof women writing utopian and science
fiction in order to engage with, and comment upon, “masculine” discourses, it is
categorically not an attempt to prescribe an infallible chronology. The influence of
such flexible and revisionist discourses as cultural materialism and Latour’s network
theory should help us to keep in mind throughout that to replace the patriarchal
silencing of women’s voices with a totalising and definitive sense of a feminist history
is equallycontraryto the praxis of this work.
This is the story of women, science and technology as explored within
women’s utopian and science fiction writing. Just like de Pizan’s reclamation of
mythical as well as historically “real” women, all of the theorists who have influenced
the approach of this study have worked to reveal and maintain the idea that neither
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fiction,nor literatures of models of knowledge, are merely the material products and
textual (im)prints of a “true” version of history as it really was (wis es). In using these
references, my methodology is similar to Roger Luckhurst’s Science Fiction (2006)
(although he does not discuss the idea of science fiction as existing prior to
Frankenstein). This sense of reconstruction is perhaps due to the recognition that
history and accounts of human experiences are inevitably constructed in part from
literary products. In other words, because history itself is subject to revision (whether
this is through texts or other means) so too are these “historical” texts subject to
reconsideration. As Latour suggests, knowledge is ultimately only ever definable, at
best, as a social interaction of vast networks.
We also know that these networks are not built with
homogeneous material but, on the contrary, necessitate the
weaving together of a multitude of different elements which
renders the question of whether they are “scientific” or
“technical” or “economic” or “political” or managerial
meaningless. (232)
Latour’s description of heterogeneity here provides a useful contribution to the
methodology of this study. More importantly, it is also a means of defining the texts as
spatio-temporal locations, points which address scientific, economic, political and
technical concepts in their presence as part of a given culturally discernible (and
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negotiable)moment within literaryhistory. Drawing upon this, this thesis will examine
the ways in which women have used the vision of a utopian worlds or newinventions
as metaphorical “social laboratories”. Although the social laboratory is a term which
has been used by Geof Kozeny to refer to the real-life work of intentional
communities, I define the social laboratory here more as an imagined site of
experimentation. In order to reflect how the genre of utopian and science fictions
facilitates more dynamic extrapolations of the present, my definition echoes Matthew
Beaumont’s idea of how fin-de-siècle women’s fiction defined the present as a
“heated laboratory” of social change (217, see Chapter Four).7
This study therefore aims to avoid those cumulative points which remain at the
heart of scholarly debate by, for example, examining texts from very diverse time
periods in the historyof modern literary society. This is not to create a sense of a new
“canon” but to begin opening up the very idea of canonicity as a revisionist process
within the fields of utopian and science fiction studies. After all, before the
eighteenth-century saw purity and sentiment from Adam Smith and Jacques
Rousseau, and the rational feminism of Wollstonecraft, writers such as de Pizan and
Margaret Cavendish had also voiced concerns about women’s unequal roles in society
at large. That purity and sentiment were as much an inherent subtext in
Enlightenment sentimental thought as its gothic backlash was the harbinger of abject
bodily disgust is, however, an idea which all too often neglected. Inevitably, the
                                                          
7 See Geof KozenyVisions of Utopia: Experiments in Sustainable Culture, a video documentaryat “CommunityCatalyst
Project” http://fic.ic.org/video/geoph@ ic.org.
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“monstrous-feminine” has become anathema to rational discourses.8 This aesthetic
eclipses the important fact that women writers have sought for centuries to pave a
path towards a utopia called Equality, and that they have done so not merely for
themselves but for the deformed or otherwise marginalised subjects within British
history. It is therefore no coincidence that we can align our list of marginalised
peoples in those texts studied as being also representative of those rendered as “non-
subjects” under the momentum of British imperialism, such as: colonial slaves (and
later subjects), the poor (those disabled or otherwise unable to work and those
oppressed within work spaces, such as the Luddites), the deformed, the orphaned (of
any social status), and, above all, those struggling to articulate a voice within these
verymachinations.
This thesis does not aim to be conclusive, however, but exemplary, to begin the
thought-processes of conceptualising and situating how dialogues draw upon one
another within various spheres of cultural influence. Furthermore, this should be a
practice that is subject to continual re-examination, for just as cultural history can be
seen to bring together the disciplines of empirical historical analysis and the more
subjective and pluralist approaches of critical theory, science fiction signifies as the
amalgamation of positivist science and the imaginative visualizations of the utopia.9
Ultimately, of course, the feminist foundations of this exploration of the history of
women writing utopia and science fiction have been inspired by Christine de Pizan’s
                                                          
8 See Barbara Creed’s The monstrous-feminine: film, feminism, psychoanalysis (1993).
9 For more details of how science fiction can be seen as the “fiction” of science, see Roger Luckhurst’s Introduction to
Science Fiction (2005) and Martin Willis Monsters, Mesmerists and Machines (2006).
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astutesense of edification as technical process of social engineering, which involves
the latent technological forms of Reason and her companion muses. By corollary, I
suggest that utopia and science fiction are highly materialist and correlative forms of
literary edification, and ones which have, for many different reasons, been particularly
suited to presenting feminist critiques of society. As we shall see, this has formed a
rich genealogy, and one which dates back to at least as far as the fifteenth centurywith
de Pizan, continuing throughout modern literary history until today’s twenty-first
centurycyberpunk and ecotopias.
It would therefore be more appropriate in considering the historical
engagements between women writers and these key areas of concern if we were to
take a more trans-historical view of women’s writing, as the simultaneous
construction and revision of the feminist canon of women’s writing. It is also
important to examine science fiction texts which did, in fact, exist before Frankenstein
(1818) and that, far from being “ur-texts” as Brian Aldiss suggests (Billion Year 9),
early dialogues between women and science, such as those by Margaret Cavendish,
provide a means with which to challenge many of the assumptions of both feminist
and non-feminist critics. Chapter One reveals that whilst the “hermaphrodite”
discourses of Margaret Cavendish have been critiqued for their apparent irrationality,
upon closer examination, they emerge as highly functional feminist critiques and
explorations of scientific praxis at a time in historywhen women were not accepted as
the equals of men. Chapter Two explores whether Sarah Scott’s Millenium Hall (1762)
and its depiction of a female utopia, which includes social misfits such as the disabled
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and circus freaks, is as conservative and “partial” as critics have suggested. Since
Frankenstein has been very much as the heart of a feminist conceptualisation of genre
writing, I re-read exactly howFrankenstein can be seen as positing the idea of “woman
as alien” by looking at the discourses surrounding its emergence and popularity.
Furthermore, I examine how Jane C. Loudon’s The Mummy! (1827) can ultimately
prove as useful for discovering a historyof feminist critiques of science as Frankenstein
has been.
In Chapter Four I read L.T. Meade’s fin-de-siècle serials and novels alongside
Suvin’s idea of the novum, demonstrating how these texts constitute a utopian and
science fictional body of work which engages with the idea of women as scientists.
Finally, in Chapter Five I explore the use value of rejecting contemporary feminist
critiques of scientific narratives by demonstrating how integral popular scientific
discourses are to texts such as Joanna Russ’s The Female Man (1975) and Pat Cadigan’s
cyberpunk novel Synners (1991). Within this chapter I also ask how women’s writing
by the late twentieth century can be seen as directly engaging with the ways in which
popular and controversial scientific narratives attempt to construe the world and the
bodyas a material entity.
The other model of thought that is considered throughout this study is how
women writers engaged with those ideas that are usually associated with Frankenstein,
both before and after its publication in 1818. Aptly, Shelley had herself suggested in a
a letter to John Murray in 1830 that she should write about “the Lives of Celebrated
Women – or a historyof Woman – her position in societyand her influence upon it –
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historicallyconsidered” (Behrendt 137). Shelley was never able to demonstrate such a
history of woman, but she has, nevertheless, become a key part in how that history
has been conceived of by others. Rather than seeing fiction produced before
Frankensteinwithin a retrograde feminist projection that began with a 1960s concept of
“feminist science fiction”, (and with Marleen Barr et al), its influence is seen as a
crucial addition to these already existing debates. For example, Chapter Two reveals
how Sarah Scott’s Millenium Hall (1762) had already depicted the roles of monstrous-
looking humans at least half a centurybefore Frankenstein. To a lesser extent, the same
can be said of Margaret Cavendish’s animal/human hybrid scientists. Of course, one
way in which the monstrous humans depicted in Scott’s Millenium Hall and
Cavendish’s Blazing World differ from the depiction of the monster in Frankenstein is
through the latter’s singularity as a symbol of futurity and production/reproduction.
The monsters in Scott and Cavendish are not created by a scientist as Shelley’s
creature is (in the Blazing World they are in fact the scientists themselves), they are
“organic” or “naturally produced” beings. That the monster’s apparently singular
artifice, which pre-empts the narratives of cyborgian feminist consciousness from
writers such as C. L. Moore and Joanna Russ onwards, is exactly what Shelley adds to
the feminist dialogues of experimental bodies cannot be denied. That said, the most
important difference here is that, unlike Victor Frankenstein, the women in The
Blazing World and Millenium Hall are depicted as seeking a rational dialogue with these
“others.”
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The purpose of this project is to demonstrate that research into the body of
texts which comes to signify a utopian and science fiction “canon” by women should
never be foreclosed and untouchable but always in the process of opening up, which
is perhaps best described using the somewhat untranslatable German phrase of
entwerfen. Entwerfen means to create a project – but specifically one in which ideas or
schemas of thought are opened-up. The idea of a genealogy here is not to suggest, for
example, that Shelley was necessarily aware of Cavendish’s work, merely that all these
writers are both deploying utopian and science fiction as a critical tool for engaging
with wider questions surrounding gender, materialism and subjectivity in their
contemporary societies. This project also aims to examine those texts which have
been canonised in particular ways for particular critical agendas. Perhaps more
importantly, it aims to pave the way for the kind of research in which texts that had
made useful cultural links between various scientific and technological discourses, but
are still to be discovered in the archives, finally emerge from their obscurity.
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 In her Eyes, new Worlds, you there might see : 
Margaret Cavendish s voyage towards a World of 
[her] own.  
 
By this Poetical Description, you may perceive, that my ambition is not onely to be
Emperess, but Authoress of a whole World; and that the Worlds I have made, both
the Blazing- and the other Philosophical World, mentioned in the latter part of this
Description, are framed and composed of the most pure, that is, the rational parts of
Matter
(Observations UponExperimental Philosophy, “Epilogue to the Reader”)
 
by Rational I mean Regular, according to the vulgar way of expression, by which a
Rational Opinion is call’d, That which is grounded upon regular sense and reason;
and thus Rational is opposed to Irregular: Nevertheless, Irregular Fancies and
Opinions are made bythe rational parts of matter, as well as those that are regular
(Observations UponExperimental Philosophy, “To the Reader”)
To begin to understand and examine feminist Reason through the history of English
utopian and science fiction literature, we must consider the political climate of
seventeenth-century English print culture. After all, this was an age in which the
Rationalist aspect of utopian thought and its descendant, science fictional critique,
emerged triumphant. The rise of civil humanism and Puritan thought that unfolded in
the events of seventeenth-century English rule created a new state of rationalism:
society itself looked towards Reason for meaning, as well as the Christian myth of
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monarchical lineage.1 This era of political dissent did not reach its climax in the events
surrounding the English Civil War (1641-1651) and the overthrowing of monarchical
rule in the Interregnum (1649-1660), however, for the Restoration was to soon follow
in 1660. In this backdrop of immense social change and upheaval, the millenarian
impulse of the seventeenth century paved the way for the resurgence of philosophical
debate and the dawn of the “NewScience.” The “NewScience” was characterised by
the a posteriori experimental method of laboratory research exemplified by Francis
Bacon’s “Soloman’s House” in The New Atlantis (1627), and later became reality as
that touchstone of all scientists, The Royal Society. These millennial, Puritan and
scientific trajectories (or rather, their post factum historical canonisation) could be
defined as the cultural products of their time – the rise of secularism and the
momentum of political dissent. Aptly, it is here that we see the printing of the first
explicitly feminist science fiction text within Anglo-European literary culture:
Margaret Cavendish’s The Blazing World (1666), which was first published as
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, to which is added The Description of a NewBlazing
World (1666).2 This chapter considers the utopian visions of science and subjectivity
forged byCavendish, impoverished exiled aristocrat and Duchess of Newcastle (1626-
1673), and whether they can be seen as extricable from the dialectical models of the
                                                          
1 For details of the impact of civil humanism on emerging seventeenth-century female writers, see Catherine Gallagher’s
Nobody’s Story(1994).
2 Unless stated, references to The Blazing World are taken from its original publication Observations Upon Experimental
Philosophy, to which is added The Description of a NewBlazingWorld (1666).
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inward-looking roi absolu or monarchical self that had come to permeate seventeenth-
centurypolitical thought.
Born Margaret Lucas into a royalist family, Cavendish, like many female
aristocrats, left home to attend Queen Henrietta Maria’s court. However, she was
exiled to the court of King Louis XIV at the beginning of the civil war with Henrietta
Maria, whereupon she became privy to some of the most heated debates of natural
philosophy, that of the Parisian salonists.3 Literary evidence suggests that she was
actually the first woman to write deliberately and solely for the publication and
distribution of her writing (Pohl “Of Mixt Natures” 51), and whereas scholars are still
uncertain as to whether Christine de Pizan had editorial input into the material
production of her texts, Cavendish commissioned the printing, and explicitly
proclaimed to be authoress, of some fourteen book editions, with no other patronage
than that of her exiled loyalist husband William Cavendish (Blaydes 52). Cavendish
published consistently between 1653 and 1673, including 24 separate editions between
1653 and 1668, yet Aphra Behn is often mistakenly thought to be the first
professional writer, despite the fact that the majority of Behn’s work was published
later on, and included translations. Cavendish’s corpus of utopian and science fiction
addressed “To Natural Philosophers” therefore marks the first significant feminist
challenge to scientific practices and narratives, a debate which is still very much alive
                                                          
3 See Stephen Clucas’ Introduction to A PrincelyBrave Woman (2003).
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even today (Poems and Fancies, “To Natural Philosophers”).4 Moreover, as I shall go on
to discuss later in this chapter, she encouraged other women to do the same.
As one of a fewseventeenth-centuryfeminist writers who were struggling to be
heard in the masculinist heteroglossia of Early Modern English print culture (Bakhtin
263), Cavendish’s conjectures upon Natural Philosophy demonstrate her role as one
of “Reason’s Disciples.”5 In fact, Cavendish was determined to create fame for herself
as a logical thinker and dilettante by forging dialogues with other philosophical writers.
She not only addressed her books: “To Natural Philosophers” and hoped that her
theories of “Atomes [would] to the Learned go” (Poems and Fancies, “To Natural
Philosophers”), her writing referred to theorists such as Robert Hookes, Cyrano de
Bergerac, René Descartes and Henry More by name.6 She attempted to disseminate
her work by sending her books to universities and libraries, addressing her work in
print “To all the Universities in Europe” (Grounds of Natural Philosophy, for example).
As Cavendish wrote in the 1666 edition of Observations Upon Philosophy, she was:
“resolved to argue with none but those which have the renown of being famous and
subtil Philosophers” (“The Preface” Observations) and she was indeed given a highly-
publicised tour of the Royal Society. However, she was prohibited from becoming a
member (in fact it is not until 1945 that we see any female members) and the
                                                          
4 For example, see Susan G. Harding Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (1991) and Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on
Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Philosophyof Science (2003) and Carolyn Merchant’s The Death of Nature (1980).
5 For a description of seventeenth-century women as rational thinkers, see Hilda L. Smith’s Reason’s Disciples: Seventeenth-
CenturyEnglish Feminists (1982).
6 This is especially the case with Descartes’ theories. See Sophie B. Blaydes “Nature Is a Woman” in Man, God and
Enlightenment (1988).
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“Learned” that her theories were inevitably sent to did not, as Henry More states in a
letter to his tutee Lady Anne Conway, return the favour by giving her “the trouble of
a reply” (Rogers 190). Whilst Lady Anne Conway was fortunate enough to be a
disciple and tutee of More, Cavendish struggled to break into this masculinist milieu.
Therefore, although the New Science had meant that the newly “disciplinary” nature
of “Natural Philosophy” was, potentially speaking, more open to women than other
areas of study, in reality the assistance of a male tutor remained essential to avoid
societal scorn (Hutton 231).7
In contrast to previous ideals or models of feminist subjectivity, Cavendish
grounded her sense of identity in an engagement with discourses of Reason, rather
than the traditional tropes of femininity and the female material body which had thus
far dominated Anglo-European literary culture through the archetypes of “Virgin
Queen”, Wife, Anchoress, Mother and, in women’s writing about the domestic
sciences, the role of the Midwife. Her radical description of her writing as “the child
of my Brain” (Grounds of Natural Philosophy, “To All the Universities in Europe”) and
her earlier works as premature and under-developed because she had “forced them
forth as soon as conceived, and this made the publishing of them so full of
Imperfections” challenged the idea that only so-called “virtuous” women could have
                                                          
7 See Linda Schreibinger The Mind Has No Sex? (1989) and John Rogers The Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry, and Politics in
the Age of Milton (1996) for more details of the gendering of the scientific milieu.
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legitimate voices (Philosophical Letters 232).8 She instead sought to create a radical public
persona in which she donned a mixture of both women’s and men’s fashionable attire,
claiming that her writing was as “Hermaphroditical” as her public image (Observations
Upon Experimental Philosophy “To the Reader”, emphasis in original).9 Despite this
infamous persona as the first publicly-recognised female writer in Britain, scholarly
appreciation of her work remains nevertheless equivocal and her critics can be found
throughout history, from Samuel Pepys to Virginia Woolf; Woolf even described her
intellect rather unkindly as that of a “giant cucumber [which] had spread itself over all
the roses [...] and choked them to death” (A Room of One’s Own 80).10
For contemporary feminists, Cavendish’s privileged status and imaginative style
of writing render her a “troublesome ancestress” (Gallagher “Embracing the
Absolute” 26). Cavendish’s loyalist status in Paris with Queen Henrietta Maria in Paris
was followed by her return to England after the Restoration as first Marchioness, and
then, Duchess, of Newcastle, following her marriage to William Cavendish. Although
they had experienced relative disenfranchisement during the Interregnum, they must
have had enough funds for printing and distributing Margaret’s writing.11 Catherine
Gallagher explains that the conservative tendencies of this lifestyle permeate
                                                          
8 For details of the trope of the Virgin Queen, see Robin Headlam Wells Spenser’s Faerie Queen and the Cults of Elizabeth I
(1983). For a discussion of Cavendish writing as her “child”, see Lisa T. Sarasohn The Natural Philosophy of Margaret
Cavendish: Reasonand FancyDuringthe ScientificRevolution (2010).  
9 Chapter Five and the Conclusion explore how the image of the transgendered figure is a key motif in utopian science
fiction.
10 In contrast, Stephen Clucas interprets Woolf’s comments as admiration for Cavendish. See A Princely Brave Woman
(2003).
11 For more details of the Parisian exile of the Cavendish circle, see Sophia B. Blaydes.
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Cavendish’s texts, and that by attempting to create a female writing self through both
the roi absolute and the moi absolute, Cavendish upholds an imperial individualism that is
anathema to a nascent feminist sense of female equality, a mise en abyme which,
ultimately, results in a vacuous writing self (Gallagher Nobody’s Story 51). The
deployment of the only rhetorical address in which women were permitted to have
any form of relative autonomy – that of the female monarch, can therefore be seen as
rendering The Blazing World (1666) an “imperial fantasy” and “empire of the mind”,
which marginalises woman from society and places them within the topos of female
desire, the limina of rationality.12 Feminist scholars have therefore reduced
Cavendish’s radical voice to that of the inward-looking subjectivity of the moi absolute
(27).
I will endeavour to be, Margaret the First: and, though I have
neither Power, Time, nor Occasion, to be a great Conqueror,
like Alexander, or Cesar; yet, rather than not be Mistress of a
World, since Fortune and the Fates would give me none, I
have made One of my own. (The Description of a New World,
called the BlazingWorld, “Epilogue to the Reader”, (1668))
                                                          
12 This imperialistic role was influenced by the popular cults of Elizabeth I. See Headlam. As Marina Leslie notes, Frank
and Fritzie Manuel’s Utopian Thought in the Western World (1979) reads The Blazing World as revealing the same
“schizophreni[c]” visions that are “conjured up everyday, in and out of hospitals” (7).
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Whilst Cavendish’s attempt to lay claim to a literary space resonates with imperialism,
it must be remembered that she clarifies for the reader that her “ambition is not onely
to be Emperess, but Authoress of a whole World” (“Epilogue to the Reader”, emphasis
added). The key word here is “Authoress:” although Cavendish’s corpus does indeed
appear to make claims which evoke an imperial selfhood, this is motivated by the
desire to write a particular ideology into the very fabric of the as-yet-unchartered
world of “women’s writing.” In other words, as I shall go on to argue later in this
chapter, Cavendish is motivated not by singularity but by an attempt to imbue every
woman with authority.
To define Cavendish’s attempt to claim a female voice as that which can only
be conflated with the role of an inward-turningmonarchical self is also problematic. In
fact, readers of the first edition of The Blazing World would not have been privy to
these claims, since her desire to be “Margaret the First” only appears in its later 1668
edition. The original 1666 edition posits a far more egalitarian praxis of imaginary
space, one which instead emphases everyindividual’s right to one’s own utopian world:
[Y]et rather then not to be Mistress of one, since Fortune
and the Fates would give me none, I have made a World of
my own: for which no body, I hope, will blame me, since it
In her Eyes, New Worlds, you there might see : Margaret Cavendish s voyage toward a World of [her] own   
Page 42 
is in every ones power to do the like. (“To the Reader”
Observations, emphasis added)
Her main concern is not to forge imperial singularitybut, rather, its antithesis: she had
no dialogic recognition as an autonomous critical voice within the debates of natural
philosophy. Indeed, in 1653 she had written in her address “To all Noble and Worthy
Ladies” that: “I wish my Book may set a worke every Tongue. But I imagine I shall be
censur’d by my owne Sex; and Men will cast a smile of scorne upon my Book” (Poems and
Fancies). Cavendish’s writing is, from the offset, always the means for engaging with a
scientific milieu by presenting a feminist self that is instead “grounded upon regular
sense and reason” (Observations UponExperimental Philosophy“To the Reader”).  
The Rational Eye/ I  
The complexityof Cavendish’s rationalityas a writing “I” and scientific thinking “eye”
can be gleaned in the publication of The Blazing World as part of a twin-edition,
entitled: Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, to which is added The Description of a
NewBlazingWorld. Reflecting this idea of the eye/“I”, they were published under the
remit that in describing “two worlds” whose function was to explore the nature of
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science and subjecthood, they formed two inextricable facets of the same
philosophical debates.13
[T]his is the reason, why I added this Piece of Fancy to my
Philosophical Observations, and joined them as two
Worlds at the ends of their Poles;[…]. But lest my Fancy
should stray too much, I chose such a Fiction as would be
agreeable to the subject I treated of in the former parts; it is
a Description of a NewWorld. (“To the Reader”)
We can see here that whilst Observations Upon Natural Philosophy presents science as
“factual” according to Cavendish’s understanding of the cognitive laws of natural
philosophy, The Blazing World proffers a fictional exploration the scientific debates in
Observations, the edition’s “former parts”, byportraying an imaginary world. Moreover,
by publishing a twin edition of “Philosophical Observations” and “Fiction”,
Cavendish is emphasising how natural philosophy (through “Observations”) and
imaginative fiction (“Fancy”) function interdependently.
                                                          
13 This two-book formation reflects how More’s Utopia (1516) can be seen as two mirrored images of the same topos
when Book I is compared with Book II, as well as Francis Bacon’s twin publication of NewAtlantis with Sylva Sylvarium.
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Indeed, The BlazingWorld presents a paradoxical world in which scientific ideas
are both supported and subverted – the epitome of what she describes elsewhere as
an “Irregular world” (Grounds of Natural Philosophy 254). The Blazing World follows the
exploits of a woman after she is shipwrecked on the borders of a strange new world,
of which she is then made Empress, and which is populated with half-animal and
half-man beings who walk “in an upright shape” and are willing to listen to the
philosophical opinions of their newfemale ruler (6). Critics have neglected to account
for the political feminism underpinning the Empress’s rule, however. Amongst other
acts, she lifts the prohibition of women and children from entering churches and state
buildings, unites her people in protecting their country from invasion (recalling the
cult of Elizabeth I), interrogates the usefulness of epistemological approaches to
scientific research and, almost metatextually, employs a female scribe to write a
philosophical treatise of her life as Empress at a time in history when the idea of a
“female writer” was still a paradoxical concept. Rather than the pursuit of the largess
of splendid isolation, then, Cavendish’s corpus can be characterised by its attempt to
create an authorial persona in order to engage female readers and male writers alike.
The utopian isle does not escape the imperial delusion of grandeur however,
for the Emperor’s palace at its centre is so ornately decorated that many critics have
defined her utopia as the manifestation of Cavendish’s greed for the jewels and
property that were confiscated from her husband during her exile in the Interregnum.
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However, it is also possible to compare its crystal stables to the gold chamber pots in
More’s Utopia.
[T]he main Building was of Gold, lined with several sorts of
precious Materials; the roof was Arched with Agats, the sides of the
Walls were lined with Cornelian, the Floor was paved with Amber,
the Mangers were Mother of Pearl, the Pillars, as also the middle
Isle or Walk of the Stables, were of Crystal; the Front and Gate was
of Turquois, most neatlycut and carved. (27-8)
Although such imperial images may at first appear to be problematic in the age of the
East India Company’s trading of gold and silver bullion, the vivid colours here also
reflect the brightness of the multicultural skins of the humans who live alongside the
hybrid animal-men scientists, whose ethnicities range from “Azure” to “Scarlet”
(14).14 Yet such shiny trappings are not the main focal point of the text at all: it is her
examination of the animal-men scientists known as “the societies of her Vertuosos”
(19). This is because her presentation of rational arguments through the fictional
backdrop of the terra incognita or strange “world of [her] own” that she creates
(because “Fortune and the Fates would give [her] none”) can be seen as a more
                                                          
14 For details of the importance of gold and silver in the extension of English eastern imperialism, see Paul Kléber
Monod Imperial Island: a historyof Britainand its empire: 1660-1837 (2009).
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critically useful vision for its readers than scholars have previously argued (Observations
“To the Reader”).
Cavendish’s concern with philosophically“useful” text is made clear byWilliam
Cavendish’s “Dedication” to his wife, in which he distinguishes her “Blazing World”
from both the real-life exploits of Christopher Columbus’ “New World”, as well as
“the French man’s World in the Moon” (“To the Reader”). William’s reference to de
Bergerac’s Histoire comique conterant les etats et empires de la lune (1657) here not only
reveals the text’s critical engagement with contemporary paradigms of utopian
voyages, it demonstrates the demarcation of a particular type of utopian journey as
ineffective. Also referring to de Bergerac’s moon world, Cavendish herself goes on to
argue that the so-called New Science, along with the more traditional philosophies,
such as alchemy, is yet another form of fancyin which men “conjecture.”
[A] Man may suppose or imagine what the innate nature of
such a Vegetable, or Mineral, or Element is; and may
imagine or suppose the Moon to be another World, and that
all the fixed Starrs are Sunns; which Suppositions, man
names Conjectures. (Grounds 24, emphasis in original)
She therefore aligns fiction and science quite clearly, arguing that scientific
“Conjectures” on the basis of organic life can be as fanciful as deliberately fictive
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descriptions of lunar voyages. For Cavendish, the journeyto the “World in the moon”
simply cannot provide the nuanced philosophical critique that the journey to the
imaginary “Blazing World” is able to, and by corollary, Cavendish is making an
important argument for the nuances of the as yet nascent form of the science fiction
text.
Cavendish’s distinction between useful fiction and scientific projection in
contrast to the lunar voyage is also crucial for understanding why The BlazingWorld is
an historical important feminist text. It helps us to understand that just as all
discourses of Conjectures are based upon Fancy, so too do discourses of Fancy, such
as The Blazing World, form a lens through which rational conjectures and arguments
can be presented. This is ultimately because she believes that scientific thought
(including her own) must never be imbued with an unquestionable authority because it
too is a discourse composed of a mixture of supposition and “Fancy.” This is
recapitulated by the Empress’s own rational and enlightened perspective: she clarifies
the premise that all scientific discourses are based upon these “Conjectures” bystating
that some conjectures are more rational than others. What distinguishes these
conjectures from being as fantastical as more deliberately “fictive” forms of writing,
however, is the gravitation towards a sense of logic. For example, the Empress’s
prohibition of the magpie-, parrot- and jackdaw-men’s syllogistic contests (they are
geometricians and logicians). She argues that syllogisms are that “art of logic, which
consists only in contradicting each other, in making sophisms and obscuring truths,
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instead of clearing it” (59) and “disorders men’s understandings more than it rectifies
them.” (161) To base scientific reason on how eloquently scientific arguments can be
articulated is therefore not the same as demonstrating use or substance, as Cavendish
herself explains: “Words are but Shadowes, [they] have no Substance” (“Assaulted and
Pursued Chastity” 125). If science is fancy, then Cavendish is arguing that we must be
careful that it is not also comprised of art or fancy alone and that it has some basis in
Reason, so although The Blazing World is a fantastical world in which semi-precious
jewels are used as flooring tiles, it is nevertheless one that clearly demarcates rational,
from irrational, forms of reasoning.
If the reader was in any doubt as to whether Cavendish’s own rhetorical
address is an attempt to write plausible opinions in a plain style, the idea that she “writ
sense and reason” is clearly emphasised when the Empress is advised against asking
“Galileo, Gassendus, Descartes, Helmont, Hobbes and H[enry]. More, etc” to act as
scribes for the story of the Blazing World on the grounds that they are “self-
conceited” (89). Metatextually, a guide advises her that “Margaret Cavendish” should
instead become the Empress’s scribe because “although she is not one of the most
learned, eloquent, witty and ingenious, yet she is a plain and rational writer, for the
principle of her writings, is sense and reason (89). Yet the reader’s recognition of the
fact that the Empress’s pursuit of sense and reason is not merely for the sake of
rational argument in and of itself is crucial to understanding The Blazing World. For
example, when the Empress prohibits the ape-men’s “fruitless attempts”, at
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experimentations with light, it is on the grounds that they should instead “be wiser
hereafter, and busy [them]selves with such experiments as may be beneficial to the
public” (48, emphasis added). It is perhaps no coincidence that the Emperess’s
critique of the ape-men for conducting “fruitless” experiments on sunlight itself recalls
the premise which lies at the very heart of the utopian science of Bacon’s Soloman’s
House, that of: “Experimenta Fructifera, and Experimenta Lucifera: Experiments of Vse, and
Experiments of Light” (“To the Reader”, The New Atlantis). In contrast to the
experimental method, Cavendish is defining use value as the accumulation and
dissemination of knowledge that is motivated by the desire to enhance human and
animal life. For example, the Empress suggests that we need to understand
phenomena such as how the flea works so that we can discover why beggars are
plagued by flea bites (Observations 11). In doing so, Cavendish debunks the utopian
viewpoint that all scientific work can be seen as either fruitful (Fructifera) and/or
illuminating (Lucifera) by adding the caveat that even experiments with light itself can
simplybe fruitless as well as fruitful.
Cavendish’s vision of utopian science instead considers the ethical issues
involved in experimental research practices. For example, the fish-men and worm-
men scientists attempt to utterly refute the “vitalist” model of natural philosophy by
claiming that blood cannot be the essence of living creatures (the central component of
most vitalist arguments), since some creatures have no blood. The “vertuoses” assert
that their use of “optick instrument[s]” proves that blood is not, therefore, the “seat”
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of animal essences or souls (35). However, it quicklyemerges that theycannot actually
convincingly argue that this is the case because “as soon as they had dissected an
animal creature to find out the truth thereof, the interior corporeal motions proper to
that particular creature were altered” (35). In other words, when they dissected an
animal and examined it under an optical instrument, the “circulation of blood in their
veins and arteries” would stop (the creature having died). The ludicrous nature of
such animal experimentation can also be associated with the popularity of Robert
Hooke’s Micrographia (1665), published a year before The Blazing World. Cavendish’s
critique of micrographia (drawings of magnified living matter), along with any other
form of “fruitless” experimentation, was that dissecting live animals in order to draw
them caused unnecessaryharm.
[T]hey trouble themselves with poring and peeping through
Telescopes, Microscopes, and the like Toyish Arts, which
nether get Profit, nor improve their Understanding: for, all
such Arts prove rather ignorant Follies, than wise
considerations; [this] Art being so weak and defective, that it
cannot so much assist, as it doth hinder Nature. (Grounds of
Philosophical and Physical Observations 294, emphasis added)
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As a wave of gentlemen began collecting optical apparatus for both leisure and study
purposes (including Cavendish’s own husband, William), the popularity of Hooke’s
Micrographia and its objectification of natural phenomena and Baconian experimental
method became culturally inextricable. Bycorollary, so did the “hindr[ance] of nature”
in the name of science.
Cavendish’s critique of experimental science’s disregard for “Nature” here also
pre-empts Romantic critiques of the mistreatment of animals and slaves by centuries,
so although feminist science fiction is often described as a legacy inherited from Mary
Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) (see Introduction), Cavendish can be seen as interrogating
the hubris-fuelled nature of experimental science long before the dissent from the
Enlightenment’s pursuit of Reason. Cavendish instead deploys the rationalism of her
Parisian contemporary Descartes, in which: “it is better to make use only of those
observation which present themselves of their own accord to our senses [...] rather
than to search for unusual and contrived experiments” (Cress Discourse on the Method
36). This forms the basis of Cavendish’s hypotheses, such as her idea that we can
reject the vitalist argument that blood is the “seat” of living creatures because it can be
casually observed that maggots – which are bloodless – can be seen to naturally
“animate” from cheese (Observations 37-8). She therefore demarcates herself from
those scientists who “wast[e] their Time and Estates, with Fire and Furnace, cruelly
torturingthe Productions of Nature, to make their Experiments” (Grounds of Philosophical and
Physical Observations 294). In contrast, Cavendish’s more utopian science upholds the
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ancient a priori method of charting effects through causes by the process of casual
observation. Cavendish even extends this critique of scientific methodology by
contemplating the moral difficulties of imitating Nature through science some 150
years before the “reanimation” of living beings became the central theme of Shelley’s
Frankenstein.
Whether it might not probably be, that the Bones or Carcase of a
Human Creature, were the Root of Human Life?and if so, then if all
the Parts were dissolved, and none were left undissolved, but the bare
Carcase; they might be restored to life. [Yet] it was impossible
they could be restored, by reason the Roots of Human Life,
were those we name the Vital Parts; and those being divided
from the Carcase, and dispersed, and united unto other
Societies,15 could not meet and joyn into the former state of
Life, or Society, so as to be the same Man. (299)
Pre-empting the failure of Shelley’s Victor Frankenstein, Cavendish predicts that
scientists would be unable to successfully “return” matter into its proper form “so as
to be the same Man” (229), since the matter would be changed bythe systems it came
into contact with, such as earth and air (“other Societies”). After all, in both
                                                          
15 “Societies” here means microsystems, such as the atoms of a leaf or the workings of the human body.
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Frankenstein and Grounds of Philosophical and Physical Observations, when the cadaver is
reanimated, it does not knowwho – or what – it is.
Indeed, this question of matter and ethics is an issue which Cavendish reflects
in the actual story of The Blazing World itself, since the debate surrounding the
dissection of animals and the use of dioptical lens also serves to drawattention to the
fact that the scientists are part animal themselves, which raises the question of the ethics
of experimental observation through dissection, which is, in turn, also performed
upon live animals. Cavendish is therefore drawing a parallel between humans and the
live animals theyare so keen to perform experiments on bydepicting a world in which
men are half-animal and half-scientist. Indeed, this is part of the larger critique of
man’s hubris; Cavendish’s half-fish, half-bird and half-worm “natural philosophers”
signify the fact that she believes human reason and intellect are not, in fact, superior to
all natural creatures: fish “know” more about water, birds “know” more about flight
and worms “know” more about what lies beneath the earth than the scientist can ever
make claims to knowing (James 239). In the societies of the vertuoses we see that the
figure of the scientist and the non-human creature share the same visual perspective;
the power relation between the scientist and the object of study are collapsed because
theyare, after all, one and the same, both animal and scientist. More importantly, they
are willing to listen to the rational conjectures of a female scientist. The hybrid animal
scientists are thereby portrayed as far less monstrous than “human” scientists: unlike
Baconian experimentalists, and Shelley’s Victor Frankenstein, they are willing to listen
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to reason concerning useless experiments, irrational arguments and the cruel torture
of nature.
In addition to pre-empting the ethical concerns of Romanticism, Cavendish’s
critique of experimental science also pre-empts the work of contemporary feminist
critics of scientific discourses, such as Sandra Harding, Carolyn Merchant and Evelyn
Fox Keller. Todaythe “experimental” method is often referred to as modern science’s
antecedent: it is in Cavendish that we see the first signs of science fiction’s
simultaneous critique and negotiation of scientific models. Although Carolyn
Merchant’s The Death of Nature (1980) has addressed Cavendish’s role to a certain
extent, I have argued that there is a more integral link between science and fiction at
play in Cavendish’s corpus of “Fancy” and “Philosophy.” However, perhaps unlike
Merchant and Harding, Cavendish’s main aim is not to critique science but to
highlight the strengths and uses of these discourses. In contrast, Cavendish’s corpus
clearly demonstrates how women writers can utilize utopian and science fiction as a
space for interrogating and exploring scientific discourses and social hegemonies. In
The Blazing World, utopian topos and scientific debate together form a “plain[ly] writ”
critical dynamic – one which stands in marked contrast to the somewhat ideologically-
closed epistemologies of The NewAtlantis’ utopian science. Cavendish’s is therefore an
important case study for examining women’s writing: it is both an astute precursor to
MaryShelley’s Frankenstein (1818) and an integral part of the historical trajectoryof the
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feminist appraisal of science: Cavendish is perhaps less of a “troublesome ancestress”
than feminist historians and earlymodern utopian scholars would suggest.
Cavendish’s heterogeneous approach to natural phenomena was, however, not
a viewthat was upheld by the newlyfounded Royal Society (1660), England’s ultimate
authority within the sciences. This is not surprising when we consider the fact that
historians have described the Royal Society as a real-life manifestation of “Soloman’s
House”, and that Soloman’s House itself formed a “lens” for perceiving the world in
the most literal sense of the word: “the Societie of Soloman’s House [...] is the verie eye of this
kingdom” (9). From the French mechanist’s definition of the text as a humanist-based
treatise advocating epistemological classification, to its numerous sequels, Soloman’s
House was upheld as the “Prophetik Scheam of the ROYAL SOCIETY.”16 Here the
definition and segregation of the sciences was, therefore, primarily based upon the
concern with “what” scientists observed; it was an object-orientated practice in which
the subjectivity of the experimenter or observer is given precedent over the object.
How practices which are based upon the Platonic split between “the body’s eye and
the mind’s eye” created the “knowability and the objectablity of nature” remains a
familiar feminist debate even today (Keller and Grontkowski, “The Mind’s Eye” 209).
Cavendish, however, resists the institutionalised objects-related definition of the eye’s
“objectability” by firmly rooting it within a subjective, individual sense of seeing. She
argues that we only ever see individually because each person’s eye is imprinted with
                                                          
16 See Bronwen Price’s Introduction to Francis Bacon’s NewAtlantis (2002).
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the image of what they see in that moment, as “little figures in the sensitive organ, the
Eye” (Philosophical Letters 170). Moreover, this definition of the eye could even be
extended in order to consider howthe concepts of vision and movement reflect some
of the concerns within the fantastical voyage, the terra incognita and the idea of looking
and journeying more generally. 
It is apt, therefore, that Cavendish’s journey towards a “World of [her] own”
begins with an address “To the Reader” in which the first word is “I” and the
remainder of the text serves to call into account the “eye” of the scientist observer
and the colonial utopian explorer, as well as the “I” of the authority of the scientist.
Indeed, the letter “I” is not printed in ordinary type, but appears instead as a large “I”
enclosed within the sail of a ship at sea, its journeyalreadyunderway(see Appendix I).
This may even have been a response to Francis Bacon’s Instauratio Magna (1620),
which had also depicted a single ship at sea. Cavendish’s image of an “I” not only
depicts the sea voyage which takes the protagonist to the Blazing World, it depicts the
allegorical journey towards a more subjective, accessible, reflexive and, therefore,
textually dynamic “I”/eye than other seventeenth-century writers had tended to
proffer. Moreover, seventeenth-century culture also defined the look “inwards” as the
rational use of the brain as autonomous, as part of Cartesian cogito, which also
happened to be one of the prevailing arguments in France during Cavendish’s exile
with Henrietta Maria. Indeed, even Cavendish’s theory that self-moving matter is
responsible for the formation of images within the eye links the concept of travel
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(movement) to that of vision (the eye). It is after looking inward and studying natural
philosophy that Margaret Cavendish’s “I”, allegorically speaking, travels: she looks and
speaks outward, rather than inward.”According to Cartesian cogito, “Reason” must be
either deciphered or “seen” by the observer, the self being preserved as “present”
through this idea of “Reason” alone. Cavendish’s desire to transport her readers on a
metaphorical utopian voyage, in which one can see for oneself the landscape, not only
reflects the idea that self-moving matter constitutes what we see (since Descartes
argues that reason must be “seen”), it means the “I”/eye takes on an almost
metatextual presence in The Blazing World: it becomes the “I” that journeys. More
importantly, its ultimate aim is to become an “I”/eye which transports others to an
alternative, more feminist world of rational thought.
 
New Worlds 
As a woman writing about science and society, Cavendish therefore presents the
readers of Observations Upon Philosophy/ The Blazing World with a new “I” or eyes with
which to see. Even the role of the “author” in The BlazingWorld – the “I”, as it were,
is informed by the both an anonymous narrator/scribe of the story, the character of
the Empress and the “cameo” appearance of Margaret Cavendish as the Empress’s
scribe who is to tell the “story” of the “Blazing World.” Yet although Cavendish
describes her own writing as being “framed and composed of the most pure, that is,
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the rational parts of Matter” (Observations “Epilogue”), critics have argued that the split
sense of female subjectivity it presents posits Cavendish as a discombobulated
“presence” in the text, the manifestations of a mad mind as it descends into hysteria,
insanityand jouissance (Lilleyxxii, Leslie 8). As I have so far demonstrated, Cavendish’s
writing is not a process in which the self is alienated from others and becomes mad; it
is the explicit attempt to build a sense of feminist concern by including the voices of
other scientists, other “I”/eyes to join this nascent dialogue. Howthis dialogue makes
connections with women readers is even more important, and this begins with the
fact that, meta-textually speaking, The Blazing World is the product of a feminist
collaboration between the Empress and her scribe, Margaret Cavendish. The “mixt”
praxis of Cavendish’s oeuvre therefore makes a more solid foundation for the history
of women’s utopian and science fiction writing as the notion of building. This is
referred to literally in The BlazingWorld when the scribe “Margaret Cavendish” begins
to imagine how the Blazing World would be constructed according to the discourses
of other philosophers, ranging from Plato to Descartes. Ultimately, those worlds
prove to be too homogeneous and problematic for the scribe, and so: “when the
Duchess saw that no patterns would do any good in the framing of her world; she
resolved to make a world of her own invention” (101). As we can see, Cavendish’s
writing “I” is certainly one which she truly wished would be “understood by all,
learned as well as unlearned” (Observations “To the Reader”).
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Cavendish’s deployment of the rhetoric of monism is perhaps not as
problematic, therefore, as it may at first appear. In fact, upon closer examination, we
can see that she actually uses monism to describe how it is writing which is powerful,
rather than the self. Writing “hath an absolute power over the Passions; for Poetry is
like a powerful Monarch, can raise, rally, and imbattel them at his command” (Natures
Pictures 629). It is not Cavendish who is posited as the fictional and metaphoric
monarch here, then: it is the “I” in which the emotionally rallying nature of poetic
writing comes to signify itself. As the character Travellia is described in Cavendish’s
1668 stage play, “Assaulted and Pursued Chastity:” it is “[i]n her Eyes, new Worlds,
you there might see” (Lilley 116). This is howTravellia’s retinue describe her after she
commanded them in battle disguised as a man, yet it could quite aptly be used to
describe the real life Cavendish too, and certainly the Empress of the Blazing World.
It is, after all, “through [Cavendish’s] eyes” that we have indeed become privy to a
critical voice that is both feminist and heterogeneous. It is therefore the operation of
“Fancy” as an eye/“I” that is the keymotif in Cavendish’s corpus:
Fancyis the Eye, gives Life to all;
Words, the Complexion, as a whited Wall.
Fancyis the Form, Flesh, Blood, Bone, Skin;
Words are but Shadowes, have no Substance in.
(“Assaulted and Pursued Chastity” 125)
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Through Travaillia, Cavendish draws upon what she knows of female solidarity as
opposed to monarchical singularity, both of which she was privy to in exile with
Henrietta Maria. Putting this together with Cavendish’s address to “All Noble, and
Worthy Ladies”, we can see that exile is not so much a concern with the lack of
material wealth but the metaphorical estrangement from abstract knowledge women
experience – the exile from knowledge and learning.
Long before Mary Shelley considered writing a “history of Woman” (Behrendt
137), Cavendish had tried to raise readers’ awareness of a genealogy of “Writing
Ladies” and how her female readers and contemporaries should aim to emulate the
“many Heroick Women in some Ages” (qtd. in Chalmers 332). The address to “All
Noble, and Worthy Ladies” in Poems and Fancies extends this even further by directly
asking women readers to study and write of their own volition. In what I contend is
an unequivocally feminist agenda, Cavendish addresses the censure of ladies learning
as part of a “Battell.” Directly appealing to women for their support, strength and
respect in the wake of patriarchal society, she urges them to let:
[w] it be quick, and your Speech ready, and your Arguments so
strong, as to beat them [men] out of the Feild of Dispute. So
shall I get Honour, and Reputationbyyour Favours; otherwise
I maychance to be cast into the Fire. But if I burn, I desire
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to die your Martyr; if I live, to be Your humble Servant,
M.N.
It is worth noting the claim to martyrdom and humility here, which lie in direct
contrast to her more public persona of a brazen, hermaphroditical and singular
writing figure. When this is considered in light of the attempt to call women to a
metaphorical feminist battle, the notion of monarchy as singular is entirely unravelled,
for in making claims to a shared female experience, she is suggesting that women
should not only look [in]to themselves alone in searching for a utopian space, they
should unite in the general pursuit of their rights to learn, speak and write. Indeed, this
is given further emphasis in Poems and Fancies (1653), where the entire anthology
culminates in rhyming couplets which state: “Thus I, that have no Garden of mine
owne/ There gather Flowers that are newly blowne” (214). This evokes the idea that women
have been marginalised from philosophical and literary spaces, wherein the flowers
blowing in the Garden amalgamates the image of the utopian space that was
paradise/Eden with the conflation of the gendered nature of knowledge and original
sin. If flowers represent the elusive nature of knowledge discourses for women, the
image of a woman gathering discarded flowers in paradise therefore represents how
women must seek to “gather” knowledge for themselves.
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Conclusion 
Cavendish was a truly radical being, for such a creature as the autonomous and
publically-known “female writer” and critic simply did not exist before her lifetime.
Even in the age of explicit secularism and the mechanism of the soul, we see that
Utopia is a double-bind for women: it is to pursue autonomy when women’s
knowledge itself is subject to both the patronage of men and the accessibility of print
technology. Like science fiction itself, Cavendish was a figure who is neither entirely
possible nor entirely impossible. Yet whilst feminist critics of science have been keen
to demarcate the split between the “I” self and the sensorial “eye” in Cartesian
dualism, Cavendish’s giant “I” on the sail reveals how we cannot trust the authorial
“I” if we cannot also trust the scientist’s methods for seeing, their scientific “outer
eye” (Keller “The Mind’s Eye” 217). The “I” of the first person authoress addresses
the audience as those who will (metaphorically speaking) “sail” with her from one
“pole” to another; to journey from the scientific theories of real life in Observation
Upon Philosophy, into the scientific theories of the alternative world, that of utopian life
in The BlazingWorld. The allegoryhere is as clear as the picture itself: with the dawn of
Cartesian dualism, it is the “I” alone who sails the ship.
This is an important theme within the history of science and utopian fiction,
wherein the “I” of the narrator has been traditionally a male voice, and usually a
scientific explorer/discoverer of utopian worlds (and later, in Victorian fiction, it is to
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become – much like the Empress in The Blazing World – the pedagogical classifier of
strange species and their landscapes). The inner “I” of reason and self-presence is
clearly looking outward here, and just as the textual differences between the twin
books of Observation Upon Experimental Philosophyand The BlazingWorld appear to blur,
so too does the distinction between exactly which eye/I is the outer lens and which
one is the inner. Cavendish’s distinctive authorial persona and the numerous voices of
female characters in her scientific utopia reveal that the “I” can be thematically
conflated with the scientific “eye” of the philosophical observer, for it too is the “eye”
of Reason and the soul. Margaret Cavendish’s voyage is not the manifestation of the
desire to alienate herself from the society that marginalised her writings, The Blazing
World instead provides a new perspective for its readers (especially female readers).
Ultimately, it urges its readers to turn their looks away from hegemonic society, to set
sail and do “Battel” by acquiring knowledge of rational discourse, or by creating
dialogues of Reason with those negligible or “hybrid” figures who society would also
seek to marginalise.
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- 2 - 
My way of thinking : Sarah Scott s Social Engineers 
and the Utopian Architecture of the Body 
I let him into mywayof thinking before he left this place, telling him that if a
Brother behaved to me like a stranger, I shou’d never see him in any other
light than that of a Stranger. I have not that regard to blood some good
people have, [...] therefore I feel little from Relationship, my affection is
proportioned to the merits & behaviour of mykindred.
(Sarah Scott, Letter to LadyElizabeth Montagu, WomenUtopias of the Eighteenth
Century94)
The eighteenth-century was the point in the history of utopian and science fiction
that the myriad forms of the utopian imagination truly emerged in popular culture;
from the Robinsonade and Guilliverian literary satires to the humanist principles of
philanthropy, equality and sentiment that characterised philosophical thought, this
was, indeed, the era of Utopia. Moreover, it was the idea of what is utopian that
brought about those concepts most closely associated with eighteenth-century
Enlightenment thinking (Gender and Utopia 5). In the previous chapter we saw how
scientific endeavour had become expressed as the progress towards a utopian epoch
in knowledge and discovery. In contrast, it is the emergence and proliferation of the
utopian novel itself that characterises the utopian feeling of this century. It is worth
noting, then, that although the emergence of the utopian novel is often associated
with the concept of satirical utopias authored by men, such as Daniel Defoe’s
Robinson Crusoe (1719) and Jonathon Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726), this stage in
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history also played a significant role in the “rise of the women novelist.”1 Yet it has
often been reduced to the rise of the domestic utopia, one which has been labelled
as less politically astute than the Gulliverian or Robinsade utopia. This chapter
interrogates the contemporary feminist argument that the eighteenth-century
domestic utopia was a conservative project. By examining the interwoven dialogues
of architectural space, women’s writing and societal structure, I demonstrate how
Sarah Scott’s (1723-1795) Millenium Hall (1762) can be seen as upholding a more
revolutionaryutopian paradigm than scholars have previouslysuggested.
Sarah Robinson Scott is a particularly interesting case in the history of
women’s explorations of alternative spaces and times as “social laboratories”, since
she is one of the fewutopian writers in history who has actually been committed to
founding and supporting real life alternative community projects. This is also ironic,
given that her sister was the infamous Bluestocking leader, Elizabeth Montagu.
Indeed, critics often label Scott as having been part of the Bluestockings, but this is
simply not true of the reclusive writer, whose life was a far cry from the gambling
habits of this somewhat bawdy fashionable group (Dunne 54).2 She had, unusually,
been granted separation from her husband due to his immense cruelty and she
maintained a relative amount of financial independence due to the popularity of her
writing, living as a spinster with her companion Barbara “Babs” Montagu (no
                                                          
1 See Jane Spencer: The Rise of the WomanNovelist (1993).
2 Scott’s sister Elizabeth Montagu was a leading Bluestocking; for an interpretation of Millenium Hall as a “manifesto”
of conservative Bluestocking feminism, see Gary Kelly’s “Women’s Provi(d)ence.” Nicole Pohl similarly argues that it
is a conservative project in Women, Space and Utopia (2006).
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relation) (Raftery 106).3 MilleniumHall (1762) was one of a number of popular works
she produced, and it was also quite unusual for its time. Not only did it go against
the grain of most women writers in its depiction of a male narrator, it was also one
of the first texts to amalgamate the realist novel and the socio-political thematic
concerns of the literary utopia. Of course, the community it portrays also very much
reflects Scott’s own attempts to form utopian communities.4 To date, scholars have
never noted the fact that its publication was also likely to have been influenced by
the failure surrounding the patrilineal and ultralineal inheritance of country houses
(and hence parliamentary seats), which Lawrence Stone and Jeanne C. Fawtier Stone
refer to as “the demographic crisis” in inheritance (100).5 This is because it is the
description of howa group of wealthy women have pooled their resources together
in order to provide for the disadvantaged in society by developing a utopian micro-
economy. More importantly, they achieve this by re-structuring the architectural
spaces of the country house – a space of marked significance because it was
“commonly taken as a metaphor for the state at large” (Kelly “Women’s
Provi(de)nce” 175). From the well-educated (yet impoverished) orphan daughters of
middle class gentleman and impoverished elderly, to the exploited dwarves and
giants of eighteenth-century circus freak shows, all are included in a microcosm of
what the anonymous narrator refers to as a “familyso extraordinary” (12).
                                                          
3 Also see Jane Spencer’s Introduction to MilleniumHall (1986)
4 Again, see Spencer MilleniumHall.
5 MilleniumHall was re-printed in 1764, 1767 and 1778.
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It is this extraordinary family model which reveals that reading the domestic
female utopia as “partial” or “limited” neglects to account for the wider discourses it
seeks to engage with, namely: medicine, architecture and a contemporary crisis in
state-sanctified primogeniture. Furthermore, this anti-genealogical reading of the text
presents a challenge to feminist readings of Millenium Hall as a gothic text. These
gothic interpretations argue that by adopting giants, dwarves and other deformed
people, the founding women (Miss Mancel, Mrs Morgan, Lady Mary Jones, Mrs
Selvyn and Mrs Trentham) are figured as monstrous mothers who, following
Foucault’s model of the performative and visual treatment of madness in the
Enlightenment, lock themselves away from society’s gaze because they are unable to
be adequate wives and mothers. In doing so, scholars have failed to acknowledge
how Millenium Hall presents a clear challenge to the societal dominance of
inheritance, family and blood-ties through its presentation of alternative and
“extraordinary” familystructures.
As we have seen in the Introduction, the relationship between feminism and
architecture is an extremely important one: from Christine de Pizan’s allegorical Citie
des Dames, women writing utopian and science fiction can be allegorised as the
process of building a feminist space for women (in terms of both a literary history
and in real life society) – a process of architecture, edification or, more precisely, of
engineering in the fiction space of the “social laboratory”. Revising literary
interpretations of this period is particularly important because the wives of wealthy
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landowners had begun to have more authority in the structural development of the
country house by managing the architects.6 At the same time, literary publications
such as Millenium Hall paradoxically depicted fictive country house utopias which
were not possible under this system of patrilinear inheritance. Indeed, one caveat to
add to this increasingly autonomous role (for the more privileged women in society
at least), was that it was inextricably bound within emerging models of women as
domestic “managers.” The anxiety regarding women’s new domestic role was also
very much part of the landed classes’ anxiety regarding patrilinear inheritance. In
other words, managing the domestic space was synonymous with overseeing the
prevention of infant mortality and an investment in the importance of the survival
of male heirs to inherit these same countryhouses, rather than a reflection of a more
feminist autonomy for women.7 In the backdrop of a renewed interest in
Enlightenment social critique and architectural discourses, the allegory of “building”
as the process of implementing social change had been given new weight. This
becomes particularly significant when considered in viewof the changes in women’s
roles in the upkeep and design of the eighteenth-century domestic spaces. After all,
the country house is a signifier of the system which saw men inherit the very same
houses which represented parliamentary seats from their male relatives, along with
the wealth, prestige, autonomy and industrial opportunity accompanying it. By re-
                                                          
6 See Nicole Pohl and Brenda TooleyGender and Utopia in the Eighteenth Century(2007).
7 The newfemale role as the manager of an increasingly nuclear family meant that women’s actions were more closely
scrutinised, for more details see Nancy Armstrong How Novels Think: the Limits of British Individualism from 1719-1900
(2006).
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structuring the architecture of the traditional country house and its surrounding
milieu, the women of Millenium Hall present a political statement about the power
underpinning familial structures.
It must also be remembered that the beginning of the eighteenth century had
also seen the birth of architecture as a cultural discourse. Indeed, as Nicole Pohl has
pointed out, the frontispiece to the first edition foregrounds the neo-Palladian
design of Millenium Hall, a style which had its roots in the città felice (utopian “happy
city”) of renaissance Europe (see Appendix II).8 The “constructed” nature of utopia
is revealed when the anonymous male narrator names the main house and its
surrounding utopian community “Millennium Hall” declaring: “so I shall call the
noble mansion of which I am speaking, as to an assured asylum against evil” (7); like
most utopian enclaves, its real name is unknown. But the fact that the estate has no
real name also highlights the difference between Millenium Hall and the usual
country estate’s role as the signifier of a family name. In short, Millenium Hall is a
model of economic and social sanctuary for the “afflicted” at a time when the
landed estate takes on a renewed social importance. Millenium Hall can therefore be
seen as the literal construction of Christine’s allegorical vision for a utopian polis,
which houses virtuous women so that they may live freely, thereby presenting a
                                                          
8 See Pohl’s “Sweet Place” and Women, Space and Utopia for more details on the significance of architecture and the
utopian city. See Sally Jeffrey “Architecture” and Arthur Humphreys “The Arts in Eighteenth-Century Britain” in
Eighteenth-CenturyBritain: The Cambridge Cultural History(1991).
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radical yet realistic response to what Lawrence Stone and Jeanne C. Fawtier Stone
have coined the “great demographic crisis” in seat inheritance.
Stone and Stone’s “great demographic crisis” refers to the fact that the direct
transfer of inheritance to close blood relatives, male or female, had been decreasing
since the turn of the century to reach an all time low between 1740 and 1780. This
had then resulted in the marked effort to improve property inheritance through
tactics such as ultralinear inheritance (inheritance through women to a younger –
and often distant – male relative), as well as a sense of generalised anxiety
surrounding the distribution of power structures.9 Even the popularity of Millenium
Hall can be seen as reflecting this particular generation’s genealogical concerns: it
was published four times between 1762 and 1778 (Alliker Rabb 11, Spencer viii) –
the exact decade in which inheritance was allegedly at its most critical, but it was
subsequently not re-printed again until the 1980s. Likewise, the origin story of
Millenium Hall reflects the problems of primogeniture: Mrs Morgan inherits the
estate from her husband because it “fell to him” (138), and the story of the
community’s expansion is that they have since gone on to rescue the “melancholy
remains” of a house left to ruin by a younger male relative (221). In fact, because
couples who inherited more than one estate would attempt to preserve the more
powerful family name by inhabiting only one property, the deliberate neglect of the
couple’s lesser estates’ properties sawacres of “melancholy remains.” This was often
                                                          
9 In fact, the figures only improved to reach just above 65% again by as late as the end of the nineteenth century. See
Stone and Stone’s AnOpenElite?England 1540-1880 (1986).
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to enable a married couple to migrate to the larger of the couples’ combined estates
in order to upkeep the “family name” and coat of arms by associating it with the
more prestigious estate. But as secondary properties were rarely passed on to other
relatives, this was the futile concentration of economic resources in the hands of a
privileged few par excellence. In other words, primogeniture perpetuated everything
that was individualised and ineffective about the flowof wealth and power in the as-
yet embryonic Industrial Revolution.
In contrast, MilleniumHall demonstrates a more productive, philanthropic and
effective function for the real life land that is laid to waste as a result of this system.
Hence since none of the women in Millenium Hall would have been entitled to hold
parliamentary seats (women were not entitled to hold parliamentary seats – nor
wealth – in their own name), Scott makes a silent, yet significant, protest. By
inhabiting houses in which the occupants could not hold parliamentary seat, nor
uphold the inheritance system, Millenium Hall disrupts the foundations of the
nation’s political, social and economic systems. Ultimately, as we shall go on to
discuss, Scott reveals that when women possess the means of social power, they are
indeed capable of acting with informed reason. Rather than seeing Millenium Hall as
a challenge to the country house metonym, however, feminist scholars have posited
the text as ideologically colluding with this system. Therefore, the stance the women
make through the structure of the country house is one which is undermined by the
fact that patriarchal nationalism could be seen to be upheld if the Millenium Hall
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women “send weaker women into marital battles in their places” (Lamb 214). Yet
MilleniumHall’s negotiation with the structures of wider societycould also be seen as
a way of bringing about gradual social change. In other words, it is important to
remember that Scott is not against ideas such as marriage per se but against the
injustices caused by those who are corrupt within it and, since no other adequate
forms of support exist within society, theywere keen to provide their own answers.
As the narrator is describing Millenium Hall after he has been taken on a tour
of its estates, it has also been criticised for reflecting howthe tourist attraction of the
country house “openly ratified and justified the patrilineal power of the landed
classes” (Lamb 204).10 When we dissect the English landscape as cultural and literary
historians of space, we must take into account the difference between physical, as
opposed to discursive, power dynamics (McRae 44). This means that there is a
distinct difference between how Millenium Hall operates as a progressive utopian
community and those mid-eighteenth-century discourses concerning spatial politics,
subjectivity and (re)production that it is attempting to subvert (but, simultaneously,
work within in order to affect social change). Millenium Hall presents possible
alternatives for women and other marginalised peoples in the form of an alternative
family community, rather than subscribing one for them. Its effectiveness may be
precisely this: Millenium Hall does not present a radical and totally segregated (and
also totally unobtainable) Amazonian society because it champions Scott’s
                                                          
10 For details on English countryside tourism, see Donna Landry The Invention of the Countryside: Hunting, Walking and
EcologyinEnglish Literature, 1671-1831 (2001).
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commitment to the notion of gradual and real social change. In doing so, Millenium
Hall also resists falling into the utopian binaries as outlined byBarbara Goodwin and
Keith Taylor in The Politics of Utopia (1981), since the utopian microcosm is neither
socialist nor capitalist, neither a total rejection of marriage and normative family
roles nor in support of them. It can therefore be seen as creating a resistive – rather
than a prescriptive – space.
 
Dystopian Enclosure 
In direct contrast to readings of Millenium Hall as the realisation of a conservative
feminism are those interpretations of the text which argue that it operates as an
asylum: “[t]yranny secretly persists among the confined in this lurid presence of
unreason” (Foucault Madness and Civilisation 225).11 If we consider Foucault’s
description of the ideological function of the asylum/Retreat in Madness and
Civilisation (1967) alongside theories of the ideological function of the countryhouse
as a rural retreat for travellers with poor health, Millenium Hall could be seen as a
dystopian asylum, rather than a utopian retreat from society.12 Critics have even
argued that Millenium Hall pre-empts the aesthetics of the Romantic female gothic
novels of Clara Reeve and Ann Radcliffe, in which the “monsters” or circus freaks
                                                          
11 In contrast, Roy Porter argues that asylums had become more humane. See Roy Porter “Shaping Psychiatric
Knowledge: The Role of the Asylum.”
12 For a comparison between the narratives of the Millenium Hall inhabitants to the prisoners tales in Histories of Some
of the Penitents (1759), see Mary Peace “Epicures in Rural Pleasures: Revolution, Desire and Sentimental Economy in
Sarah Scott’s MilleniumHall.”
 My Way of thinking : Sarah Scott s Social Engineers and the Utopian Architecture of the Body Page 74 
 
that the women adopt (monster being the clinical term for someone with a
deformed body), are “manifestations of a complex mix of social persecution, defiant
identification and self-loathing, lurking within the text” (Dunne 72). Indeed, in re-
appropriating the asylum-like space of the country house, the women could be seen
as upholding the ideology of a culture of normalisation; Millenium Hall appears to
be a space in which non-normative individuals voluntarily confine themselves within a
“Retreat” which functions as “an instrument of segregation” (Madness and Civilisation
243). That is to say, it could be argued that it advocates the internalisation of societal
norms regarding difference. These interpretations have their roots in the critical
considerations of women’s writing such as Gilbert and Gubar’s Madwoman in the Attic
(1979). In particular, Gilbert and Gubar’s paradigm of how the writer’s frustration
with society’s constraint of women’s bodies and voices is manifested in writing as a
monstrous alter ego of rage and madness proffered new and exciting interpretative
tools for analysing women’s writing (see the Introduction and Chapter Three).
Furthermore, since it is the rescued circus freaks or “monsters” who reside at the
spatial centre of the community, they can be seen as representative of the founding
women’s repressed sexuality, and their inability to live as mothers, wives and
daughters in normal society (Dunne 71), a process in which the women have
“exteriorized the womb and its monstrous seed” (Acosta 117). In other words, it
could be argued that rather than being Women of Reason, they are the arbiters of
hysteria and Foucauldian “unreason.”
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What is specific to the gothic, but which is not inherent within the bodies of
the deformed monsters, however, is the idea that that which is hidden cannot be
spoken about, and is therefore taboo. This is simply not the case when considering
the nature of the enclosure in MilleniumHall: surprisingly, life within the enclosure is
described as touching, humorous and utterly devoid of the aesthetics of abjection,
drawing instead upon the cognitive aspects of Adam Smith’s definitions of sympathy
and empathy. As Smith’s oft-quoted Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) suggests: “by
the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring
all the same torments” (2). As the narrator explains, the women felt much empathy
for the monsters.
I learnt that when these people were first rescued out of their
misery, their healths were much impaired, and their tempers
more so; to restore the first, all medicinal care was taken, and
air and exercise assisted greatlyin their recovery; but to cure the
malady of the mind, and conquer that internal source of
unhappiness, was a work of longer time. (27)
In comparison to the confines of their dwellings with the “monster-mongers” they
were rescued from, the enclosure within Millenium Hall that the monsters reside in
is therefore more of a “good womb”, a nurturing and protecting space in which the
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monsters have been psychologically rehabilitated, which also corresponds to new
trends in the management of eighteenth-centuryasylums. 
Whilst Romantic gothic writing was an engagement with ideas such as the
sublime, the beautiful, the abject and the picturesque that we find in works as early
as Edmund Burke’s The Sublime and the Beautiful (1757), when we examine the
practical and political nature of the architecture depicted in MilleniumHall and howit
permeates the lives of the utopians, what is striking is that there is a complete lack of
engagement with gothic motifs. In fact, the notion of the picturesque within
Millenium Hall has an antithetical function to that which we see in the female gothic:
it is classical landscaping that attracts the travellers to Millennium Hall. Therefore its
“remarkable verdure and neatness of the fields”, which created a symmetrical space
typical of early to mid-eighteenth century landscaping and arts in general, is far from
the secrecy and dysfunctionality of the gothic story world (4). Millenium Hall even
emphasises the composed and ordered nature of its architectural motifs by positing
building and landscape as highly-constructed entities; the anonymous narrator’s
companion, Lamont, is even reminded of a famous landscaping artist, who the
narrator alludes to as “the person at present most famous for that sort of
improvement” (19). Whereas Lamont was probably referring to Lancelot
“Capability” Brown or his mentor Horace Walpole (since both would have been
practicing at this time), it is in fact revealed that the ladies themselves had designed
the architecture of the landscape in which the “seats formed with such rustic
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simplicity, as have more real grandeur in them, than can be found in the most
expensive buildings” (20). This picturesque, rustic simplicity was typical of much
earlier renditions of gothic architecture, but the fact that it is thought of so highly by
such a ridiculous and comedic character as Lamont, and the fact that this “rustic
simplicity” is highly artificial, renders this praise humorous and demystified, rather
than a portent of the gothic nature of the text.
The women are not, therefore, depicted as the creators, authors or narrators
of a gothic space – literary or physical – but possessors of practical architectural
skills, as well as the knowledge of contemporary architecture needed in order to
implement them. They are architectural and social “engineers” who “question the
universe” and “go beyond the constraints imposed by a particular state of
civilisation” (Lèvi-Strauss 19). The sense of “self” required in order to design and
build the landscape is not the gothic self of repression and darkness: it is a highly
rational and industrious self. As many readers will be aware, the revival of the
pastoral through the notion of asymmetry and natural beauty did not come into
fashion until the latter half of the eighteenth century, when this “natural” look
became an ironically highly constructed and expensive form of horticultural fashion.
Because of the chronology of the gothic, I would argue that Millenium Hall does not
so much reflect the aesthetics and repression of sexuality associated with the
degeneration of Augustan order that signalled the onset of European revolution, but
speaks instead from more Augustan concerns with order, enlightenment and those
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“Heights of Science and of Virtue […]/ Where all is calm and clear” evoked in
James Thomson’s “Summer” in The Seasons (1726-1730) (qtd. in Humphreys 13).13
Simultaneously, of course, its address of where society is yet to fulfil this vision is
strikinglyapparent.
In order to understand how progressive and utopian Millenium Hall aims to
be, it is important to understand that there are key reasons why Millenium Hall’s
architectural design reflects the shift from the Adam style to the functionalist
concepts of caractere and architecture parlante, in which houses were seen as reflecting
their owners’ bodies. More specifically, Millenium Hall epitomises the more general
rise in the interest of Puritan ideals, and how houses should be functional for their
owners (Pohl Gender and Utopia 85). Although Alexander Pope famously questioned
the practicalityof the Palladian style: “Shall wind thro’ long arcades to roar/Proud to
catch cold at a Venetian door/Conscious they act a true Palladian part/And if they
starve, they starve by rules of art” (qtd. in J. Alfred Gotch 237), of the five
architectural styles to be established by 1750: Palladanism, rococo, Gothic, Chinese
and neo-Classical, it was neo-Palladianism which was built for utilitarianism.14 The
surrounding area of a country house had become that space in which “[t]he gardens
were rearranged; stables were built; long walls of enclosure were raised:” (Gotch
241) as well as being a philanthropic move, the monsters’ quadrangular enclosure,
                                                          
13 These aesthetics were to accumulate in gothic parody, such as Jane Austen’s Northanger Abbey (1818), as well as their
complex utilisation and critique in MaryShelley’s Frankenstein (1818). See Chapter Three.
14 See GeoffreyBeard “The Decorative and Useful Arts.”
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itself divided into four sections, also reflects the utilisation of neo-classical
ergonomics.15 If we judge Scott’s intentions by howthe inhabitants of the enclosure
are treated, her futuristic and humanitarian principles cannot be defined as anything
other than exemplars of how Enlightenment utopian thinking can be socially
effective.
This is particularly true of the women’s use of architectural design and space
in order to care for the so-called “monsters.” For example, the women re-construct
the layout of the church so that those with deformed bodies who cannot fit
comfortablyinto normal-sized pews are instead able to worship in comfort.
It occurred to me that their dislike to being seen by numbers must
prevent their attendance on public worship, but my cousin
informed me that was thus avoided. There was in the church an old
gallery, which from disuse was grown out of repair; this the ladies
caused to be mended, and the front of it so heightened, that these
little folks when in it could not be seen. (29)
Not only does this reveal again the useful reusing of neglected spaces, it reflects
discourses on the changing viewof the landscape in a newly visually-aware England.
                                                          
15 In fact, 3,602 acts of enclosure were passed between 1714 and 1820. See Simon Varey’s Space and the Eighteenth-
Century Novel (1990). Enclosure politics were also part of the 1750-1850 Parliamentary Enclosure Acts. See Donna
Landry.
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For example, the Claude Glass allowed the viewer to perceive a landscape without
its deformities because it miniaturised a panoramic view, also known as the
“Claudean Eye.”16 The church pews therefore offer the monsters the same kind of
protection as that of a Claudean eye. However, contrary to interpreting Sarah Scott’s
creation of a space of utility that is custom-built for the abnormal bodies of the
circus freaks, discourses of spatial limitation have characterised scholars’ definitions
of eighteenth-century cultural practice. Simon Varey encapsulates this view by
claiming that: “anyone who builds divides space. To create a building is to create a
space, or more precisely to limit a space and, by limiting, to define it” (9-13,
emphasis added). Yet if the space surrounding the monsters is a process of
limitation, it must be remembered that their enclosure had been built upon their
request because, when they first came to Millenium Hall, “the horror they had
conceived of being exhibited as public spectacles had fixed in them such a fear of
being seen by any stranger, that the sound of a voice […] would set them all a
running behind the bushes to hide themselves” (28). These walls were not
constructed out of condescending social philanthropy or a conservative desire to
hide the non-normative bodies of the monsters: in direct contrast to Foucault’s
madman who has to confront his own madness by looking in the mirror, the former
circus exhibits request a temporary enclosure in a bid to overcome their own
temptation to perceive themselves as mere bodily spectacles alone. The enclosure
                                                          
16 See LandryThe Inventionof the Countryside (2001).
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therefore ironically acts as a form of undoing – not solidifying – the socialisation of
a wider society, one in which theyhave been treated as sub-human.
What emphasises the idea that the monsters are not defined as spectacles is
how the women take great pains to help the inhabitants feel as if their abnormal
bodies are “normal” by altering the structure of the church pews so that they have a
clear viewof the proceedings. This means that when they sit in church their heights
are counterbalanced so that the dwarves and giants can all see as well as anyone else.
Through the ergonomics of space, the monsters become the spectators rather than the
spectacles, and the narrator is clear to point out that the so-called normalising
function of the monsters’ church pews is the antithesis of the tortuous stretching
rack of the “villain Procrustes” (24). In Greek mythology, Procrustes, Poseidon’s
son, would offer a bed to travellers but he would stretch or shrink them on a torture
rack in order to make their bodies fit the bed’s dimensions. Since Foucault’s
descriptions of how eighteenth-century asylums’ attempts to rehabilitate its
inhabitants are quite similar to Procrustes’ desire for a “normal-sized” guest
(stretched to size on his rack), the architectural framing here resists both a “frame of
monstrosity” and a “frame of normalcy.” Instead, it is the explicit attempt to create a
frame of Reason and individual comfort. Moreover, it is one which is relatively
successful, in which the inhabitants have begun to integrate with not just the
members of the Millenium Hall community outside the enclosure but those
strangers who live in the nearby village as well (from whom the monsters had
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initially hidden). As opposed to upholding normalcy for normalcy’s sake (like
Procrustes, and wider eighteenth-century society), the women criticise those who act
upon this desire, those who “torment by scorn those who fall short, or exceed, the
usual standard” (24) “as if their deficiency in height deprived them of the natural
right to air and sunshine” (25). They therefore highlight the fact that, to a certain
extent: “is not almost every man a Procrustes?” (24). In this sense, Millenium Hall
has clearly been as therapeutic for the so-called “monsters” as it has been for its
other inhabitants and visitors.
The construction of their environment – custom-made for their physical
bodies and based upon their psychological needs – has enabled the monsters to
venture outside the enclosure, rather than remain within its confines; Millenium Hall
cannot be seen as the enclosure of internalisation, for its look is outward. The reasons
informing how space is re-appropriated so as to be of benefit to its inhabitants is
therefore key to understanding Millenium Hall’s rational feminism, and the church
pews and enclosure are not the only form of utopian architecture. Not only is their
enclosure the arcadian centre of the community, “filled with shrubs and flowers,
which were cultivated with great delight by these once unfortunate, but now happy
beings” (26), the women also construct uniform housing for spinsters, which they
then customize and re-structure to meet the spinsters’ needs once they have moved
into them. Crucially, Scott’s construction of supportive housing is in complete
antithesis to howher contemporaries addressed the question of newhousing for the
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poor. Indeed, the “Hundred Houses” or “Houses of Industry” scheme involved the
poor from several parishes being housed in one large mansion to alleviate the
expense of housing them locally in separate labourers’ cottages and poorhouses (a
somewhat Foucauldian move in its containment of deviancy). Scott was far ahead of
her contemporaries for deploying architecture to make the lives of the poor and
afflicted more comfortable: it was not until the late eighteenth-century that
architectures such as John Plaw began to design functional buildings especially for
labourers and the poor. Architects such as John Gwynn were still proposing that
London areas housing the poor be demolished and replaced with housing for the
socially affluent; Gywnn did not suggest where the inhabitants of these slums were
expected to then live.17
Unlike Millenium Hall however, these schemes were specifically aimed at
giving collective housing and employment to the “able”-bodied only; the novel’s
description of the exclusion felt by its partially-disabled spinster women hence draws
attention to the discriminatory conditions of such schemes.18 Their social exclusion
prior to living in Millenium Hall is also poignant in terms of how the community
forms a “family so extraordinary.” This is because the women had previously felt
worthless because of their inability to have children and the social discrimination
they experienced because of their various age-related disabilities (such as lameness,
                                                          
17 See Simon Varey.
18 For a description of the “Hundred Houses”, see Dorothy Marshall’s The English Poor in the Eighteenth Century: A Study
inSocial and Administrative History(1926).
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blindness and deafness). Yet Millenium Hall provides a form of integration for these
women into a wider network of childcare, cloth production and non-familial
community. Indeed, the spinster women become essential to Millenium Hall’s
structure of an “extraordinary” family. In turn, they not only become foster mothers
to every fourth child born to parents who could not afford to support them, they
also undertake part-time work and aid the basic education of the children. This
makes them feel “useful” and like “mothers” again (14), until the children are
provided with schooling at the expense of the community at aged five. The
donations of the founding women from the main house pay for the children’s
schooling and have created a community amongst the spinster women as a social
group, who claim that they used to row with each other when they first arrived at
Millenium Hall. Reflecting Scott’s own ambiguous relationship with her
Bluestocking sister Elizabeth, the spinsters claim that: “We used to quarrel, to be
sure, sometimes when we first came to these houses, but […] now we love one
another like sisters, or indeed better, for I often see sisters quarrel” (15). The women
also describe how the weaver who is sent the foster mothers’ spinning thread was
previously untouched by other businessmen and “who before they came broke for
want of work” (14). Hence the utopian community is built upon a network of aid,
exchange and reciprocation: the poor children are fostered by the spinster foster
mothers who work as part-time spinners and the yarn is sent to a weaver who is
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unable to obtain work from anyone else, all as part of a co-operative that the
spinsters define as the “power of friends” (14).
Indeed, the country house system itself was a spatial dynamic based upon the
relativity of people and places. Where division (and enclosure) can be seen as a pro-
active movement towards custom-building for the individual bodyas part of a larger
community network of re-enfranchised sub-communities, we can no longer say that
the hierarchy of division is that of exclusion. From the varying height divisions of
church pews, the division of the spinsters’ housing into more private apartments, the
enclosure protecting the traumatised circus freaks, to the metaphorical bounds of
the overall space we refer to as the “Millenium Hall” community itself, space is
divided for humane reasons only. Millenium Hall is the product of discourses of
sympathy and neo-Palladian architecture, which emphasised the idea that humans
are relational – and not mere objects – in space, especially to their fellow beings.
Therefore to critique Millenium Hall as a space of social division that manifests
limitation in the very architectural splices and carves it makes into the landscape of a
formerly misused mansion is to negate howthe narrative explicates exactly why these
divisions were created in the first place. One of the key reasons for its alternative
spatial dynamic is, after all, to proffer an alternative to the family kinship web. The
critical confusion surrounding the gothic readings of Sarah Scott’s Millenium Hall is
therefore the question of how sentiments are being manifested. I suggest that Scott’s
emphasis upon architecture and Reason, rather than affect and sublime terror or the
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internalisation of normalcy, is indicative of how it forms an exploration of how
discourses of sympathy can be related to the humanism of William Shaftesbury and
John Locke; Locke had even referred to the body as the “house” of the soul (Locke,
Essay II, xxvii).19 MilleniumHall’s ergonomic re-structuring of the church seating, the
enclosure and the foster-mothers’ housing all evoke the idea that whilst current
trends in architecture caractere had been to see buildings and landscapes as reflective
of the human body and the household itself, it must not be forgotten that
architectural change could have a great impact on how certain bodies are able to
operate in society. Hence, the style of caractere is inversed, and architecture instead
begins to radicallyalter howmarginal bodies could be presented.
The birth of modern visual culture and the politics of “normalcy” were
bound in the mid-eighteenth century as they had never been before. Science and
spectatorship went hand in hand as people went to look at canvases of other people
looking at displays, such as Joseph Wright’s famous A Philosopher GivingA Lecture on
the Orrery (1766) and An Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump (1768).20 If the
“monsters” are indeed to be figured in anywayas monstrous seeds, this need not be
a pejorative idea, for although disease and deformity (which was thought to be the
direct result of the mother “looking” at something) were seen as essential to ideas of
“inheritance”, this also meant that there was a new autonomy for moulding life
                                                          
19 The most famous of these was Tobias Cohn’s illustrations, which depicted the house as a human body. See Roy
Porter Bodies PoliticDisease, Death and Doctors inBritain, 1650-1900 (2001).
20 See Peter de Bolla The Educationof the Eye (2003).
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(Boucé 96). After all, the womb is an archetypal utopian space too. The womb-like
monsters’ enclosure also happens to reflect the contemporary feminist sociological
claim that, rather than forming a dichotomy, the relationship between nature and
nurture is instead more astutelyconsidered as a reciprocal process also known as the
“developmental niche” (362).21 Amid discourses of inheritance anxiety and the
impact of Smithian sympathy upon the development of the foetus, then, Millenium
Hall’s claim to a right to perform the role of social “moulding” by engineering the
environment in order to change the quality of life for its inhabitants means that
even in the face of an emerging medical cartography of the grotesque, the human
body is also the place in which ideas of order, genealogy and moral good are played
out. Moreover, for Scott, this is a moral good which is utterly extricable from the idea
of “nature” or biological “Kindred”, as shall be clarified later on in this chapter. 
The corollary of this revision of architectural space is that the female body in
Millenium Hall becomes not so much a sexualised or de-sexualised product of
domestic space but is re-structured – architecturalised, even – as a heterogeneous
entity. This body of women, along with those who have been socially rejected as
sexually non-reproductive (the spinsters and the monsters), could even be seen as a
new and radical metonym for the country house itself. This is because, considering
the culmination of Enlightenment discourses of sympathy, the moulding of life and
                                                          
21 See Karla Stotz “The Ingredients for a Postgenomic Synthesis of Nature and Nuture.” Indeed, whether a pregnant
woman’s feelings of sympathy or revulsion could result in deformities in the unborn child had been a key eighteenth-
centurydebate. See Paul-Gabriel Boucé’s “Imagination, Pregnant Women and Monsters.” 
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architectural caractere, Millennium Hall becomes the pseudo-uterine space in which
its inhabitants are protected from external forces, and from within which women
nurture. Whether or not the monsters can be figured as the foster children of the
founding women or as the women’s symbolic monstrous offspring – disabled, and
all are beyond childbearing age – the spinster women also reflect the founding
women’s biological deviancy. This is not tantamount to a collapse into late
eighteenth-century medical aesthetics in which the female body was an abject form,
however. Instead, it could be seen as a quite powerful feminist criticism of
patriarchal order. The women of Millenium Hall are re-appropriating power
relations by taking in those who, normatively speaking, would have no power in
society because they do not function to support the grand narrative of linear
inheritance – the main function of the highly metonymical mid-eighteenth-century
country home. Scott’s country house is not so much a Picturesque, Gothic or
Arcadian utopia of affect, but the epitome of neo-Palladian utilitarianism – of arts
segregated yet functioning as a well-ordered whole – the product of female Reason.
What is of significance here, of course, is that the women do not mould the
monsters as such, but the space around them in a process of nurturing and re-shaping
nature (and the discomfort their “natural” biological deformities cause them). In
other words, that utopian form of architecture most commonly associated with the
building of the città felice is utilised to fit around those who are far from having the
freedom of the polis.
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A family so extraordinary  
Although Scott has been criticised for retaining elements of social class exclusion,
the overall positive regard, and subsequent treatment of, all who have been
marginally “failed” bysociety undermines any attempt to define Scott’s philanthropy
as inherently condescending. In fact, she felt the blow of society’s shortcomings
almost as equally as any of the fictional inhabitants of Millenium Hall: she was not
only facially deformed from small pox, she lived as a spinster after being allegedly
poisoned and generally maltreated by her husband.22 She was also treated
ambivalently by her famous sister and brother, and in the same year Millenium Hall
was published, Scott relays to her sister their brother’s lack of respect for her in a
letter:
I let him into my way of thinking before he left this place,
telling him that if a Brother behaved to me like a stranger, I
shou’d never see him in anyother light than that of a Stranger.
I have not that regard to blood some good people have,
therefore I feel little from Relationship, my affection is
                                                          
22 See Jane Spencer’s Introduction to MilleniumHall (1986).
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proportioned to the merits & behaviour of my kindred. (qtd.
in Johns, WomenUtopias 94)
Scott’s distinction between “Kindred” and “blood” relation on the basis of
behaviour alone is highly political; if blood kin who do not behave suitably, they
cannot be deemed to be “Kindred”. Hence the concept of “Kindred” takes on a
non-biological meaning which is similar to Millenium Hall’s ethos of the “power of
friends” and the “family so extraordinary”. Furthermore, this female autonomy in
familial relations, a feminist “way of thinking”, evokes the idea that the anonymous
male narrator learns from his experience at Millenium Hall because, to use Scott’s
phrase (above): the founding women do indeed “let him into [their] way of thinking
before he left this place.”
Although the male first person narrator remains anonymous to the reader of
Millennium Hall, he is soon revealed to be Sir George Ellison in her sequel, The
History of Sir George Ellison (1766). By choosing to describe Millenium Hall through
the eyes of the male narrator/explorer to educate male readers, Scott was in fact
going against the trend in which women writers presented female narrators (Spencer
MilleniumHall xi). Yet MilleniumHall has been criticized for upholding the traditional
utopian role of the anonymous male narrator’s first person narrative authority as
explorer, scientist, factual writer and/or patriarch through the so-called eye/I of
reason. But we must remember that the feminist trope of subverting the role of the
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authoritative male in texts such as Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) and Charlotte
Perkins Gilman’s Herland (1915) would not have been familiar to the mid-
eighteenth-century reader. In contrast to this usual authority, “Sir George”, as he is
later known, came to Millenium Hall after being advised to by his Doctor to rest
because the “twenty years” he had spent overseeing his Jamaican plantation had
affected his health (11). The History of Sir George Ellison even sees him return to
Jamaica to right the wrongs of slave labour and reject the parliamentary elitism of
the seat system by refusing to run for parliament. In much the same way that the
monsters are invited and made welcome into Millenium Hall as “Kindred”, Sir
George subsequently buys freedom for his slaves and provides them with as much
paid employment as he can afford. In MilleniumHall, the bodies of the disfigured are
freed by a group of women who have experienced the physical and moral
vulnerability societycan render, whilst in its sequel, on the other side of the Atlantic,
black slaves are freed by a man who has learnt from these same women after
becoming ill (and having therefore also experienced physical vulnerabilityhimself).
The narrator’s recognition of the true utopian nature of Millenium Hall lies in
the fact that as he explores this alternative countryhouse, pastoral idyll is exposed as
being a false utopia. Sir George Ellison’s initial utopian dream of refuge in Arcadia is
undermined by its social realities when MilleniumHall instead presents “what is to be
accomplished after the demolitions and the removals” of the brickwork of Scott’s
contemporary society(Archaeologies 12). Rather than being mere mirror images of the
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women’s state of abject self-awareness, its marginalised inhabitants are,
paradoxically, at the heart of a social imperative to free imprisoned peoples. The
History serves to demonstrate something of the impact that Millenium Hall could
have had upon the impact of England’s political, economic and social structure.
Crucially, how this economy of positive discrimination, shared wealth, self-
sufficiency, and nascent feminism develops into an expanding community project is
largely based on various incidences in which people learn from one another. The
importance of this learning dynamic means that Millenium Hall cannot be
comfortably aligned with the static hegemony of Puritan philanthropy; similarly, the
text is grounded in reality far more than the hyperbole of the novel of sentiment. In
contrast to the novel of sentiment, Millenium Hall does not struggle to convincingly
portray a neo-classical “man of feeling” or “woman of virtue” against a social
backdrop that emphasises the new nature of non-reproductive production but
encompasses these ideals of sentiment and virtue from within a realistic sense of
economics and society at a time when the idea of production became markedly
distinguishable from the idea of procreation (Johnson 34-48).
In fact, production and creation are intrinsic parts of everyday life at
Millenium Hall: many of its inhabitants are producers but not excessive consumers,
and none of them are procreators. Its alternative nature of production is emphasised
from the moment that they are first introduced to the reader: the founding women
are all engaged in creating different forms of structures; one woman is painting a
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landscape, the other a Madonna, another is carving a picture frame and another is
busy engraving. The fact that the ladies are described first by what they are doing
rather than what they look like and the fact that these pieces can be seen as
representing the women’s individuality rather than their abstraction, problematises
the assumption that they represent the new leisured classes’ “abstraction of
femininity” (Gender and Utopia 2). Miss Mancel, who is described as the most elegant
(“the handsome lady”), was painting the Madonna (107). Miss Trentham, who was
carving, is described as having been scarred by small pox, who – like Scott herself –
has endured the “cruel ravages of that distemper”, carved into her own face (9).
Lady Mary Jones, employed in engraving when we first see her, is described as
someone who has survived “sickness” with less physical scarring than Miss
Trentham, but yet she is not as beautiful as Miss Mancel. The landscape piece – a
work which could be described as depicting the same panoramic vision as the
architectural eye, is revealed as the work of Mrs Morgan, the founder and principle
benefactress of Millenium Hall. Therefore, the founding women are differentiated,
rather than abstracted, by how their various life experiences have become
represented within the very art that they produce, as each piece is symbolic of their
individual contributions to the utopian storybehind Millenium Hall’s social project.
Far from being, as manycritics have argued, typical of the “female Arcadia”, a
landscape of “abundant fertility and female sexuality” (Dunne 57), Millenium Hall
presents an acute awareness of modern construction and artificial production. As
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producers who are aware of howthe roles of “woman” and “human” are themselves
constructions, the women are the antithesis of the Bluestockings. Instead the
women of Millenium Hall reject elaborate dress and frivolous past times and argue
that to indulge them would be to “dress with so much expense that [they] could
scarcely move under our apparel”, a habit which is famously demonstrated by
Alexander Pope’s “Essay on Woman” engraving (203). By emphasising non-creative
and non-reproductive forms of production, they subvert conventional definitions of
who exactly the normative (re)producers are in dominant economic relations and, I
suggest that in doing so Millenium Hall seeks to subvert normative (re)production
itself. The important point to remember about the link between production,
nationhood and family through Millenium Hall’s social network of non-normative
bodies and non-familial relationships, such as “fostering”, is that it presents the idea
that if societal structure is that which is produced, it is hence that which is also
subject to re-structure – to change. The women of Millenium Hall reveal that when
different producers/non-“reproducers” are in charge of material and maternal
production, they are capable of beginning the edification of new social practices.
Millenium Hall completely subverts the eighteenth-century grand narrative of blood
relations and the production of normal bodies: if more communities such as
Millenium Hall existed, more people could elect – in the literal sense – to be part of
an alternative community to one which is dictated by blood ties. Millenium Hall does
this by playing upon the idea of the “sentimental look” whilst asserting that
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sentiment that is indulgent remains mere affect, and is therefore arbitrary unless
Reasoned and then acted upon. Millenium Hall heads a different kind of reproduction
to that of the state-sanctioned primogeniture; it presents the reproduction of ideas.
In this sense, Millenium Hall is built upon variations on the idea of social inclusion,
fostering and kinship circles that exist outside of blood ties as much as it is built
upon the neoclassical and Palladian concepts of order and utility.
After centuries of the eroticism and comedy of the female utopian
community, Millenium Hall is one of the first utopias to depict women-only
communities in a positive sense. The female utopian vision of MillenniumHall is very
much the product of its time – a much-needed space for women who lived in a
Protestant England that did not provide the retreat of the convent (Spencer,
Millennium Hall xiii). This is ironic, given that Scott is writing at a time in which
female utopias (and perhaps attempts at female equality with men) are defined as
failing. Earlier eighteenth-centuryutopias, such as Eliza Haywood’s The British Recluse
(1722) and Delariviere Manley’s The NewAtalantis (1709), had given way to the more
Puritan utopian writing of Scot, Sarah Fielding, and Lady Mary Hamilton (Pohl
Women, Space and Utopia 79). Whilst we can examine the feminist nuances of texts on
a specific level, the fact that utopian writing bywomen depicts the intentional female
community as inevitably failing: from the all-female secret group the NewCabal and
the coup d’etat to overthrow the matriarchs of Utopia in The New Atalantis, to the
failure of the utopia in Sarah Fielding’s David Simple: Volume the Last (1753), female
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utopian spaces were seen as failures. Alessa Johns suggests that the partial vision of
the eighteenth-century women’s utopia was not necessarily the failure of feminist
utopia; these texts can also be defined as a “gradualist” approach to social change, a
form of “utopian colonization” (“Thinking Globally” 169). Considered thus,
MilleniumHall can be seen to “reproduce” only itself in terms of its plantation sequel,
its new houses and its realisation as Scott’s real-life country house community
projects at Batheaston and Hitcham (Cullen Khanna 36). Indeed, many utopian
scholars would argue that to define the literary utopia as a totalizing “blueprint” for
a better society is to oversimplify the complexity of the genre’s socio-political – and
spatial-temporal – dynamics.
Frederic Jameson argued that ineffective utopian visions occur when “the
effort to imagine utopia ends up betraying the impossibility of doing so” (Archaeologies
290, emphasis added). The more “unrealizable” and “unimaginable” the utopian
world appears to be in comparison to the author’s social context, the less of a
plausible catalyst for social change utopia becomes (xv). Utopia – like science fiction
– can therefore be defined as a temporal negotiation between what is possible and
what is not by defining what is possible in terms of time itself: what may not be
possible today, may be possible tomorrow instead. Crucially, what demarcates
Millenium Hall’s gradualist utopian endeavour from other eighteenth-century utopias
is its inclusion of social “others” – from the women villagers surrounding the house,
to the monsters at the community’s centre. That its paradoxical disruption of
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inheritance through the re-appropriation of the family and reproductiojn is not
surprising, given the fact that many critics recognise the family as being the one
system that utopian fiction has always sought to change (Archaeologies 207).
 
Conclusion 
Millenium Hall is clearly rooted in the shifts in both the eighteenth-century
understanding of the material body, and what happens when the social hegemonyof
the universal body – that of the “male body” of “Enlightened” man – comes under
threat in an inheritance crisis. This may be one reason as to why utopian science
fiction in which “monsters” form part of the kinship circle are nearly always
characterised as part of the “post-human” movement in Anglo-American discourses
(Archaeologies 207). Explicitly emerging in theoretical and fictional writing from the
1980s, the posthumanism debate questioned and disrupted the assumption that the
human is a sentient and unique philosopher in the world, known as universal man,
and has therefore contributed significantly to the feminist critique of this figure (see
Chapter Five). Millenium Hall’s inclusion of the “other” foregrounds recent
arguments regarding the exclusivity of the family structure, how it is represented by
the normative, reproducing body and, by corollary, it exposes the fact that the
definition of what it means to be “human” is highlyexclusionary.
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Through its re-alignment of social structures, Millenium Hall can be seen as
freeing women from the domestic role of their material bodies. Paradoxically,
Millenium Hall does not include the usual female figures which would have been
integral to eighteenth-centurynationhood: mother, wife, daughter and so on, and yet
it does house these figures, in two senses. Firstly, the women are wives and mothers
disillusioned by howthe family structure can act as an incubator of tragic events and
immoral deeds and, secondly, the role of “mother”, “daughter” and other familial
roles can be clearly gleaned in the fact that the women act as foster mothers to the
wider Millenium Hall community. This is also extended by the spinster women’s
fostering of the unwanted children of large, poor families. Scott therefore frees the
domesticated female body from the chains of bourgeois notions of nationhood but
not the notion of the familial itself. However, I would like to suggest a more radical
reading of Scott’s “family so extraordinary” (Millenium Hall 12): Scott’s negation of
resolving these states of female, as well as other, marginal subjectivities is akin to
how contemporary queer theory has sought to sever the futurism of genealogical
processes (Edelman 23). This must not be mistaken for an imperative to oppose all
social phenomena which claims an identity for itself as a radical and political
counterforce in the pursuit of achieving the “suturing” of identity however. Rather,
as Lee Edelman suggests: “undo[ing] the identities through which we experience
ourselves as subjects [...] undoes the paternal metaphor of the name” (24-5, emphasis
added). This is exactlywhat we see in MilleniumHall: the metonym of societyat large
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is rendered socially formless in terms of patriarchy: no parliamentary seat, no
inheriting family name, no core reproductive identities – no sense of a genealogical
familyfuture at all.
More important is for whom this metonym is seized: it is the much-maligned
deformed, those beyond child-bearing age, those widowed young, those never
married, those separated from their children and/or mothers, those scarred by
illness, those, in fact, who, despite their apparent lack of social power, happen to
constitute precise and direct threats to normative reproduction. The inhabitants are
those in whom the nation as it was known could be seen as not having a future at all,
and in doing so they simultaneously figure as the creation of a new legacy and
genealogy of power relations. There may be “no future” for the inhabitants in a
sense of patrilinear reproduction, but this is where we can see exactly how the
overlap between queer and feminist praxes can be effective. Through the notion of a
“family so extraordinary”, Scott presents a truly heterogeneous and nascent queer
vision. It is one in which we can begin to glean how feminist utopian and science
fiction operates as a legacy that stands, paradoxically, to challenge the concept of
howgenealogy always serves to uphold the status quo. For this reason, the “family so
extraordinary” cannot be conflated with the “normal and natural” pseudo-familial
institutional milieu of Foucault’s asylum (Madness and Civilisation 252). They present a
truly different future, one in which non-reproductive production is the main
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function: they craft an extraordinary family of utopian endeavour, one which is
upheld bythe “power of friends” (MilleniumHall 17).
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- 3 - 
Monstrous (Re)production: Women Writing 
Imperialist Technology 
I have thought also of the Lives of Celebrated Women – or a history of Woman –
her position in societyand her influence upon it – historicallyconsidered.
(MaryShelley, Letter to JohnMurrayIII, 1830)
The future is composed merely of images of the past, connected in new
arrangements by analogy, and modified by the circumstances and feelings of the moment; our
hopes are founded upon our experience; and in reasoning concerning what may be
accomplished, we ought not only to consider the immense field of research yet
unexplored, but likewise to examine the latest operations of the human mind.
(Sir Humphry Davy, A Discourse, Introductoryto a Course of Lectures on Chemistry, delivered
inthe Theatre Royal Institution, onthe 21st January1802, emphasis added)
The first few decades of the nineteenth century represent a period in British literary
history which has been defined as “transitional.” This is because literary canons often
suggest that the popular novel had no dominant formduring the onset of the Industrial
Revolution. Neither that of Romanticism’s gothic, nor the Victorian bildungsroman,
literature produced in the period 1810-1830 is defined as either post-Romantic or pre-
Victorian, and rarely“Regency” (1811-1820). However, the earlynineteenth-centuryis
also an age which is entirely singular in terms of its scientific and technological
advancements, when the technological and ideological drive of industry took a firm
hold of both Britain and the popular imagination. As much as literary studies has
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defined this period as an intangible one, it is this very sense of sociopolitical flux
which is integral to an understanding of the genealogy of women writing utopian and
science fiction.1 It was, paradoxically, this literarily ambivalent era that utopian and
science fiction scholars have earmarked as that which is able to boast an important
canonical accolade, for Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) is seen by many as the birth
of a ground-breaking genre form, which was later coined “science fiction.”2
Given the rise of industrial technology of this era and the publication of
Frankenstein during the early nineteenth century, this period should surely be of
particular interest for utopian and science fiction scholars; in reality this is not the
case. Few scholars, for example, have considered the work of a similarly-themed and
equally popular British text: Jane C. Loudon’s The Mummy! (1827).3 This chapter
attempts to redress this by charting the ways in which Frankenstein and The Mummy!
explore science and technology, production and reproduction. Rather than being
liminal within literary studies, this chapter demonstrates how, in terms of dialogic
engagements, the period 1800-1832 is canonically central. Since Ellen Moers’ Literary
Women (1977), Elaine Showalter’s A Literature of Their Own (1978) and Gilbert and
Gubar’s The Madwoman in the Attic (1979), numerous women’s writing scholars have
focused their attention on Frankenstein as the work of the daughter of controversial
early feminist writer Mary Wollstonecraft and radical philosopher William Godwin,
                                                          
1 This sociopolitical unrest was partly due to the Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815), the War of Independence (1775-82) and
numerous British workers’ revolts (1811-1817).
2 See Anne Mellor MaryShelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters (1989).
3 See Alan Rauch Useful Knowledge: the Victorians, Moralityand the March of Intellect (2001).
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andwife of the Romantic poet Percy Bysshe Shelley. It has therefore been read as a
Miltonic “birth myth” which explores the tragedies of Mary Shelley’s life experiences
within the backdrop of medicine’s depiction of the material body – especially the
female body – as abject. For example, not only did her own mother die shortly after
giving birth to her, three of Mary’s own children died in infancy. More recently, critics
argue that Frankenstein has inspired a generation of science fiction by women, as well
as critical feminist writing produced by women working within scientific fields.
Playing upon the concept of monstrous progeny, this bodyof writing is often referred
to bycritics as the feminist “legacy” of Frankenstein.4
Loudon’s The Mummy! is also part of this legacy, since it was a direct response
to the themes within Frankenstein. Following this, The Mummy! should perhaps be seen
as having initiated Shelley’s feminist legacy as Frankenstein’s first metaphorical “heir.”
Not only is the plot closely related to that of Frankenstein, like Mary Shelley and Sarah
Scott (see Chapter Two), Loudon’s familial circumstances meant that she was forced
to financially support herself. Born Jane C. Webb (1807-1858), she moved to London
following her father’s death when she was just seventeen. She would also have been
privy to controversial fictions such as Frankenstein because she lived under the care of
John Martin, a Romantic painter who entertained the likes of William Godwin.
Whereas Shelley went on to write the apocalyptic fiction The Last Man (1826), after
publishing The Mummy!, Loudon instead met future husband, the well-known
                                                          
4 For example, see Debra Benita Shaw Women, Science and Fiction: The Frankenstein Inheritance (2000) and Jane Donawerth
Daughters of Frankenstein (1996).
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horticulturalistJohn Loudon and together they became the leading horticulturalists of
their time, a turn of events which scholars have been extremely dismissive of.5
Despite The Mummy!’s depiction of a futuristic Europe founded on steam technology,
few critics have considered it to be anything other than a conservative novel of
utopian science.6 There has been no constructive recognition of the fact that the
emergence of this new“science fiction” form of the novel is epitomised bythe critical
dialogue between Frankenstein and The Mummy! following the British excavations of
the Pyramids and the discoveryof electricity.
Loudon’s relative neglect as a science fiction writer also raises a more general
point regarding the nature of women’s writing, since reading texts such as The Mummy!
as too conservative to be included in a feminist literary canon ultimately means that
their literary and cultural engagements remain unrecognised. Yet from the
Frontispiece onwards, The Mummy! posits itself as an engagement with the 1818
edition of Frankenstein. Just as the title page of Frankenstein presents a quotation from
“Paradise Lost” in which Adam questions being created, The Mummy! proffers a
biblical source of this same question of creation, wherein the phrase: “bring me up”
explicitlycorrelates with the word “promote”:
                                                          
5 See Lisa Hopkins “Jane C. Loudon's The Mummy!: Mary Shelley Meets George Orwell, and They Go in a Balloon to
Egypt”. For a critique of Loudon’s career as a botanical writer, see Useful Knowledge (2001) and Paul Alkon The Origins of
FuturisticFiction (1987).
6 Only Silke Strickrodt’s “On Mummies, Balloons and Moving Houses” approaches the text in anything resembling a
positive light, compared to Lisa Hopkin’s “Jane C. Loudon's The Mummy!: Mary Shelley Meets George Orwell, and They
Go in a Balloon to Egypt” at http://www.cf.ac.uk/encap/romtext/articles/ cc10_n01.html and Alan Rauch Useful
Knowledge (2001).
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DidI request thee, Maker, from myclay
To mould me man? Did I solicit thee
From darkness to promote me?
John Milton Paradise Lost (X.743–5) (Frankenstein 1818,
Frontispiece)
Whyhast thou disquieted me, to bring me up?
(I Samuel 28. 15) (The Mummy! 1827 I, Frontispiece)
The former quotation reflects Frankenstein’s story of how a late eighteenth-century
Genevan scientist amalgamates and re-animates parts of several human corpses,
whereas The Mummy! explores this theme bydepicting a future world of 2126 in which
a scientist re-animates the mummified corpse of the ancient Egyptian conquer
Cheops. As many readers will be aware, Frankenstein is the tale of how the scientist
Victor Frankenstein becomes drawn towards applying his knowledge and passion for
the “modern” newscience in order to cure the sick and bring back the dead, in order
to rid “disease from the human frame, and render man invulnerable to any but a
violent death” (23). This in turn leads to the desire to bring about the “creation of a
new species [which] would bless [him] as its creator and source” (36). The utopian
image we are presented with is that of Frankenstein’s view of the future of earth
populated by a physically superior species – the reality, however, is somewhat
different (Sternenberg 149).
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Frankenstein’s utopian dream becomes a dystopian endeavour as he isolates
himself in a workshop and constructs an artificial man out of the corpses of the poor
and the criminal, which he animates by some undisclosed means of scientific
apparatus. Horrified that the realisation of his “utopian” man is an ugly, fleshy and
monstrous being, Frankenstein flees his workshop. After being deserted by
Frankenstein, the resulting monster’s attempts to assimilate into the world are all
thwarted by his gigantic and sutured form as his interactions with society are met only
with horror. Upon discovering Frankenstein’s notebooks describing “the whole detail
of [...] the minutest description of [his] odious and loathsome” origins (as the product
of numerous corpses), in despair and vengeance he murders several of Frankenstein’s
family and friends (105). His voice is therefore the one which most explicitly reflects
Miltonian Adam’s lament (see above). Frankenstein’s efforts to destroy his monstrous
creation lead to his own death from exertion, whereupon the monster claims that now
Frankenstein is dead, he too will kill himself.
As many scholars have noted, Frankenstein itself is the inspiration behind
Loudon’s The Mummy!, which charts the impact of the reanimation of an Egyptian
mummy after Frankenstein himself had observed of his own reanimated, monstrous
invention: “A mummy again endued with animation could not be so hideous as that wretch”
(40). The Mummy! both explores and ultimately supports his claim, for the reanimated
mummy Pallic king Cheops is indeed not as monstrous as Frankenstein’s creation
Monstrous (Re)production: Women Writing as Imperial Subjects Page 107 
 
becausehis Shakespearian dissembling is eventuallyrevealed as being motivated byhis
desire to put right his own imperialist history as the conquer of lands. But the
popularity of both Frankenstein and The Mummy!, and their novas of science,
technology and the possible future “evolution” of the human form, come as no
surprise when we consider that the first few decades of the nineteenth century pay
witness to a flurry of industrial, scientific and technological innovations. This is
especially true for The Mummy!, whose depictions of futuristic engineering and steam
power can be seen as having been influenced by the introduction of the first steam
locomotive engines after George Robert Stephenson’s “Blucher” (1814), the first
“towing” steam boat (1802), the first railway at Stockton and Darlington (1825), the
development of the new “macadamized” road system, the innovation that was
Thomas Telford’s Menair Suspension Bridge (1826) and the dissemination of
industrial inventions such as the “steam loom” (Rauch 81-2). The developments in
electrophysiology directly referred to in both Frankenstein and The Mummy! were based
on a series of Luigi Galvani lectures when, following Alessandro Volta’s voltic pile,
the first electric battery (1800) and the subsequent use of galvanism in science,
Humphry Davy had discovered that electrolysis caused electricity, and Michael
Faraday had developed the “Electric Machine” (1821). Finally, much to the dismay of
those advocating anti-Jacobin paradigms of religion and stability, Erasmus Darwin’s
Zoonamia, or the Laws of Organic Life (1794-6) had controversially cast doubt on the
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existenceof the human soul, suggesting that humans were evolved from lower, rather
than higher, forms of life.
Knowledge of these technological and scientific advancements were also all
fairly available due to the rise of print culture due to the fact that printing techniques
were dramatically aided by technological advancement (Tropp 25), catalysing that
surge in textual production and reading cultures that Rauch has dubbed the
“knowledge industry” (1). Scientific developments became disseminated widely in
Davy’s extremely popular literary works and lectures from 1802 onwards. We come
full circle when we consider that this then facilitated the dissemination and
redistribution of texts such as Frankenstein and The Mummy! in subsequent reprints and
revised editions, which means that the “textual bodies” of these novels were very
much those of popular material cultures.7 Many critics have noted how the theme of
material cultural in Frankenstein is played out by demonstrating a blurring of the
cultural boundaries between rich and poor, male and female, man and monster,
master and slave and more importantly, Same and Other (Lee 171). The monster’s
abhorrent fleshy and material nature no doubt demarcates him as evil, reminding us
that our own biological bodies are also monstrous.8 I suggest that a further, more
crucial, dialectic is at play within Frankenstein: the monster, even as sentient and
                                                          
7 See Alan Rauch for a reading of Frankenstein as a direct comment upon the epistemologies of early nineteenth-century
knowledge: the body of the monster is an allegory of the actuality of an (otherwise merely metaphorical) discursive
“body” of monstrous knowledge.
8 See Colin McGinn Evil, Ethics and Fiction (1997).
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abhorrentlyfleshy as he is, blurs the boundary between production and reproduction,
specifically in the blurring of the idea of man and machine.
One way in which Frankenstein achieves this is by blurring the boundaries
between procreation/reproduction on the one hand and scientific/technological
production on the other. By manufacturing a being which is in the image of man,
Frankenstein usurps the role of Nature in bestowing biological life and the role of the
female body as the vessel in which this human life is created. As discussed in Chapter
One, the Newtonian/Baconian language describing the scientific pursuit of Nature
has been critiqued by feminist writers from Margaret Cavendish onwards. Rauch even
goes as far as to align Frankenstein’s endeavours with Francis Bacon’s seventeenth-
century ideal of utopian NewScience, whilst simultaneously classifying The Mummy! as
a nineteenth-century version of Bacon’s The New Atlantis (1627) (81). Indeed,
Frankenstein has been one of the key focal points of this trajectory of feminist critique,
for Frankenstein’s actions have often been interpreted as constituting – both
metaphoricallyand literallyspeaking: “a rape of nature” (Mellor 124).9 Whereas Rauch
argues that Frankenstein’s “approach to knowledge, inclusive and revisionary, anticipates,
as we will see, feminist critiques of science” (98, emphasis added), it must be
remembered that, as demonstrated in Chapter One, feminist critiques of science
actually existed prior to Frankenstein. It is therefore more accurate to describe
                                                          
9 Mellor’s MaryShelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters is the exception to this trend.
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Frankensteinas having become a “touchstone” for feminist critiques of science: as a
manifestation of irresponsible approaches to scientific praxis, the monster has come
to be seen as symbolising the feminist revolt against Newtonian/Baconian discourse.
To read Frankenstein as merely a critique of seventeenth-century science is to
oversimplify its inherently intertextual form, however. A more enriching approach is
to consider the scientific milieu surrounding Mary Shelley informing the relationship
between science and Frankenstein. For example, Shelleyhad been reading Davy’s work,
whose lectures were printed due to their popularity (Mellor 93-5).10 Davy’s premise
that “science has for its objects all the substances found upon our globe” is key to a
more nuanced understanding of Shelley’s text as an exploration of the structures of
imperialism and industry (A Discourse 1). This is because Frankenstein’s monster can be
seen as playing out the concept of man as industrial machine in several ways: the idea
of the automaton, the revival of neo-Cartesian philosophy in response to the work of
John Locke, such as Julien Offray de la Mettrie’s Man A Machine (1748), and the
socio-political status of working men and women in Britain. It is Davy’s A Discourse
that links the ideas of “monster”, “machine” and the moulding of the industrial
landscape, providing useful insights into how the automaton may have been seen in
the earlynineteenth century:
                                                          
10 Whereas Rauch puts forward Humphry Davy as the philanthropic antithesis of Victor Frankenstein in his desire to
disseminate knowledge and relinquish its economic profit for the common good, Mellor instead examines A Discourse
(1802) in order to demonstrate that Davy’s work was instead the plausible inspiration for Shelley’s portrayal of
Frankenstein’s ambitious ego.
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The working of metal is a branch of technical chemistry;
and it would be a sublime though a difficult task to
ascertain the effects of this art upon the progress of the
human mind. [...] it has enabled him to cultivate the
ground, to build houses, cities, and ships, and to model
much of the surface of the earth in his own imaginations of
beauty [...] it has enabled him to oppress and destroy, to
conquer and protect. (316, emphasis added)
What is of particular interest here is the idea that metal working and building have all
been conducted in order to realise men’s “own imaginations of beauty”, just as the
monster is Frankenstein’s “utopian” man and the automaton is the image of man
“work[ed]” in metal. It is precisely this imperialist industrial view of the globe as a
wholly material entity that Shelley engages with, and ultimately critiques, in
Frankenstein.
Davy’s references to the structures of capital imply that the working man is a
machine employed to build the houses that the “thinking” man has designed, and as
such is subject to the manipulation of science in the imperial praxes upheld within
the oxymoron of: “oppress and destroy, to conquer and protect” (A Discourse 316).
Davy’s application of scientific knowledge to industrial contexts may have been life-
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savingbut his ethical views of the working man are that he should be placed firmly in
subjugation to the thinking man, whose work produced scientific theory and
phenomena; ultimately it was scientific knowledge which separated the “uncultivated
savage from the being of science and civilisation” (318). Describing Frankenstein as a
text which blurs the distinction between machine and man may seem to be
anachronistic: the idea of man as an “automaton” in science fiction studies is not
generally recognised as appearing in literature until the 1920s play “R.U.R” by Karel
Capel (Small 300).11 It must not be forgotten, however, that the “automaton” had
become a key figure in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, within both
technology and literature.12 Perhaps more significantly, philosophers such as La
Mettrie had suggested that “Man is fram’d of materials” (41) and that because “[t]he
human body is a machine that winds up its own springs; it is a living image of the
perpetual motion” (11). La Mettrie’s idea here is important because Frankenstein’s
monster is in many senses not a “creation” but an industrial product, reflecting the
scientific interest in automata.
By reviving the Cartesian image of the human frame, Mettrie’s automaton
human reified the realisation that the Enlightenment myth of liberal humanism (that
through the future progress of knowledge and feeling, the human will eventuallyreach
a utopian state of being) has failed (Montag 303). In other words, if man’s existence is
                                                          
11 Small also notes that the Czech word for servitude is robota.
12 Whereas Baron Wolfgang Kempelini’s chess-playing robot from c.1769 had been added to by Pierre and Henri
Jacquet-Droz’s, the automaton emerged in literature slightly later, with E.T.A. Hoffman’s “Automatons” (1812) and
“The Sandman” (1814) (53-4). See Martin Tropp MaryShelley’s Monster: The Storyof Frankenstein (1976).
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tofunction onlyas a machine (biologicallyspeaking, but also in terms of the Industrial
Revolution’s ability to increasingly define the human as an unskilled labourer), then
the human body becomes, like the automaton: “dead matter; in a way in which a
natural object, organic or inorganic, is not” (Small 310). It is this concept of man as
machine which is represented in totality in Frankenstein: the monster is stitched
together from an amalgamation of material bodies and these are also the bodies of the
very same group who were at the heart of industrial and political unrest: the poor.
Hence the monster does not function merely as a metaphor for the “plight” of the
marginalised poor in Britain, he is a literal representation of the sutured bodies of the
dead and dying who have been marginalised by the gathering forces of industry and
technology.
Technology and Imperialism 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak argues that nineteenth-century British fiction must be
understood in the context of imperialism (243). Technology too must be understood
within the context of imperialism simply because technology is inextricable from the
economics of the globalisation of capital which – when considered in the context of
the nascent (pre-Victorian) Empire we are examining here – must inevitably go hand
in hand with imperialism. The impact of imperialism on Frankenstein’s production is
inescapable: Shelley even began writing in 1816 – the exact year that anti-slavery
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debates re-emerged in Britain. Although human trafficking had allegedly been
abolished in the Slave Trade Act of 1807, plantation slavery had continued. In 1816
this debate took a more directly colonial turn as Britain began to consider the moral
question of the economic gain made by the continuation of plantation slavery (Lee
171). Co-incidentally for our consideration of production and reproduction here, 1816
was also the year of the height of the Luddite revolts. The “Luddites” consisted of
various mill worker groups in the Midlands and the North of England, whose working
conditions were threatened by the invention and/or attempted introduction of
technology in the workshop, as well as the move to more centralised “factory-style”
premises. Although there are many regional variations and the use of the word
“Luddite” was not often accurate, 1812-1816 could be somewhat crudely described as
the period in which men sought to smash the machines that had replaced them.13
Targeting the gig-mill, the shearing frame and the new steam loom, insurrectionists
revolted against being cast as a machine which could be replaced when technology
became more advanced (50-3). Furthermore, because protestors were shot dead
during these uprisings, their status as a surplus economic resource became all the
more explicit.14
When Mary and Percy Shelley had returned to England to work on the final
manuscript of Frankenstein, the effects of social revolt was all too evident: the last of
the scores of Luddites were being publicly hanged and their close companion Byron
                                                          
13 See Malcolm I. Thomis The Luddites: Machine BreakinginRegencyEngland (1970).
14 See also Paul O’Flinn “Production and Reproduction: The Case of Frankenstein.”
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had even spoken out against Luddite mistreatment in parliament (O’Flinn 196).
Indeed, this maltreatment is implicitly revealed in Davy’s suggestion that the textile
industry labourer “who merely labours with his hands” should be “obliged” to, and
thankful for, the “means of human inventions” (A Discourse 316-7). These events
meant that men could be segregated into two distinct groups: the “uncultivated”
beings and “beings of scientific knowledge”, a gap which was further exacerbated by
rebellions of plantation slaves in Barbados. Just as textile technology in the Midlands
and the North of England had been ravaged by the Luddite revolts, some 70 West
Indian plantations became the targets of revolution. Slaves revolted on Easter Sunday
in Barbados and marched to nearby towns in the same way that Luddites had
marched to Nottingham (although the Barbados uprising was much bloodier).15 It
might be too obvious to emphasize the parallels between these two movements, that:
pro-slavery factions tended to viewslaves as literal machines, morally suitable onlyfor
production, in whom “reproduction” was only sanctified in order to expand
workforce numbers. Indeed, even Frankenstein notes that his scientific progress was
not so much that of “an artist occupied byhis favourite employment” (as Davy thinks
a textile worker might be) but, in reality, feels akin to those who are “doomed by
slaveryto toil in the mines, or anyother unwholesome trade” (38).
This clash between personal freedom and industrial production was, of course,
not a newdebate but a residual one. The Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815) and the failure
                                                          
15 See Michael Craton Testingthe Chains: Resistance to Slaveryinthe British West Indies (1992).
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of Republicanism may have been apparent since 1815, but the radical liberal (and
hence Wollstonecraftian) doctrine of “liberty, fraternity and equality” was a premise
which was still very much upheld in the light of how abolition debates and Luddite
revolts provoked questions about the nature of the human body. Mary Shelley was
acutely aware of the enormous amount of media interest in these events; she even
supported abolition by boycotting sugar (Lee 173). Indeed, the year of the 1823
Demerara sugar uprising was also the same year that a unified abolitionist agenda was
established under the newaegis of: “The Anti-Slavery Society” and its publication the
Anti-Slavery Reporter (Lee 173). Meanwhile in London and Paris, the Richard Brinsley
Peake stage adaptation of Frankenstein’s sell-out success could perhaps be attributed to
the fact that people were keen to watch the depiction of man’s “weird and villainous”
unfree “Other” in the figure of the unnamed creature, since it had often double-billed
with plays such as The West Indian (31-3). Such was the success of Peake’s portrayal of
the creature that the second edition of Shelley’s Frankenstein was released in the same
year.
In fact, if there was any doubt as to whether or not the dialectic surrounding
Frankenstein was inextricably bound within the cultural politics of plantation slavery
and the figure of the poor, uneducated British worker, it is worth noting the
numerous popular references to the text in the decades to come. Politician and editor
of the Anti-Jacobean and Foreign Secretary George Canning even based his 1824
House of Commons speech opposing the motion to free the children of West Indian
Monstrous (Re)production: Women Writing as Imperial Subjects Page 117 
 
slaves when they reached adulthood on the plot of Frankenstein. More precisely, his
speech was based upon his own interpretation of it, in which he conjectured that
Frankenstein and the monster were analogous to the social juxtaposition of white men
and “negroes” (Malchow 33). He argued that because “negroes” have “all the
corporeal capabilities of a man” but with “a more than mortal power for doing
mischief”, setting young slaves free would be comparable to how Frankenstein frees
his – subsequently murderous – creature. Like Victor Frankenstein, Canning urged
England to also “recoil from the monster which he has made” by not freeing the
monstrous children of West Indian slaves in fear of a future world dominated by
freed slaves (Canning qtd. in Lee 174).
I do not wish to dwell here on the moral questions informing abolition and
trade unionism during the dawn of the Western British Empire; the main point to
note from Canning’s speech is howreadilypoliticians would drawupon Frankensteinas
a well-known point of reference in 1824 or, more precisely, how easily the monster
was conflated with real-life “others” within society, and in a way which negated the
explicit empathy for the creature that Shelley’s narrative unequivocally evokes. For
those intolerant to the intrinsic rights of men to own their own bodies, the nature of
the “other” was inherently disposed to “mischief” and must therefore be protected
from their selves by the wielding of social power. For nearlya century after, the figure
of the monster (often mistakenly referred to as Frankenstein) remained in the cultural
imagination as a figure of racial and ethnic discrepancy. Punch’s depiction of an “Irish
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Frankenstein” in 1843 is just one example of the continuity of the monster’s ethnic
otherness.16 We come full circle again when we consider howElizabeth Gaskell’s Mary
Barton (1848) plays out the correlation between Frankenstein and the monster as a
conflation of the role of master and slave in her description of the complex power
relation between the educated classes and the working classes in Britain.
The actions of the uneducated seem to me typified in
those of Frankenstein, that monster of many human
qualities, ungifted with a soul, a knowledge of the
difference between good and evil.
The people rise up to life; theyirritate us, theyterrifyus,
and we become their enemies. Then, in the sorrowful
moment of our triumphant power, their eyes gaze on us
with mute reproach. Why have we made them what
they are; a powerful monster, yet without the inner
means for peace and happiness? (qtd. in Mellor Mary
Shelley112)
It is worth noting here how Gaskell describes the working classes as “made” by the
educated and as metaphorically inanimate until those in power notice their deviances.
                                                          
16 See Deborah Lee’s Slavery and the Romantic Imagination (2002) for a full list of political “racial Frankensteins” in the
nineteenth-centuryBritish press.
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In fact, the link between the monster and real-life rebellion was made in western
cultures even up to the mid-to late twentieth century in apartheid South Africa: from
1955 onwards, anyone possessing a Frankenstein book in South Africa could be fined
£1000 or sentenced to five years imprisonment (Vaspolos 133). The many figures of
“Frankenstein the monster” reveal that the monster has not been merely historically
comparable to the colonial slave, the British rebels rallying against the dawn of
machine production/introduction or the artificial figure of the automaton, the
monster is a cultural signifier for material otherness in a more generalised sense.
It is worth noting that another debate which corresponds to those ideas is how
Frankenstein could also be seen as recapitulating the early nineteenth-century British
desire to consume – everything from knowledge to food. Deborah Lee suggests that
the new British desire to consume is reflected by the cultural obsession with travel
narratives by writers such as Joseph Banks and Mungo Parks, in which cannibals were
the most prevalent subject of anthropological enquiry (176-90). Aided by the rise of
print culture, the exploits of writers/explorers such as Banks and Parks became public
knowledge (Tropp 25). Such anthropological travel narratives also represented the
imperial desire to journey to the terra incognita or strange land of an “uncivilised” lost
world of alien primitive beings, whilst remaining somehow civil and superior to the
“other.” Here the aesthetics of the more traditional fiction of the seventeenth-century
utopian voyage become more specific in nineteenth-century narratives: the focus
becomes exclusively that of civilising the cannibal figure. In other words, the concept
Monstrous (Re)production: Women Writing as Imperial Subjects Page 120 
 
of consumption in a newly-improved industrial politic was reflected by the popular
interest in the figure of the “cannibal” – that most abhorrent and excessive of consumers.
Moreover, both Victor Frankenstein and the monster reflect the cannibal. Just as
Frankenstein’s desire to consume knowledge takes him to the charnel houses in order
to cannibalize the bodies of the dead, the monster claims that he will “glut the mawof
death” with the blood of Frankenstein’s friends and family. However, here
“cannibalize” does not mean to consume but to disassemble and reassemble parts of
flesh (aptly, the term was later applied to machinery). In its collapse of the distinction
between master and slave, then, Frankenstein aligns the anthropological with the figure
of the cannibal through the desire to pursue and consume knowledge – or flesh –
respectively(Lee 189-90).
In the wake of the politics of otherness and production, the fact that
Frankenstein and the monster use similar terminology in order to refer to their selves
takes on new significance. Claiming in one moment to be the other one’s slave and
the next to be his master interchangeably, they blur the boundaries between man and
monster, self and other through both their actions and their speech. Just as
Frankenstein claimed that he did not want to toil in the mines, the monster also
asserts that: “[his] shall not be the submission of abject slavery” (119). As the popular
references to Frankenstein by Elizabeth Gaskell and George Canning reveal when they
attempt to separate the monster from his creator, Frankenstein’s popularitywas perhaps
motivated by the fear of, and resistance to, the possibility that the “other” will speak
Monstrous (Re)production: Women Writing as Imperial Subjects Page 121 
 
back.But this is not really a fear of insurrection; it is the fear that in the moment in
which a dialogue is created between the “self” and its “other”, they would,
paradoxically, become confused and conflated with one another. But whereas the
“female gothic” has been seen as an Enlightenment backlash to the master/slave
dialectic, which highlighted the ironic juxtaposition between philosophical ideals and
the social realities of Europe’s ecclesiastical and political corruption through the
concept of Otherness,17 the social realism and nascent modernist solipsism of the
“Victorian” individual in the bildungsroman has been read as the subsequent moral
journey of the nineteenth-century “Self” back from this corruption. This raises the
question, then, of how we are to define texts between these periods which do not
adhere so explicitly to either of those models of selfhood and society? This question is
perhaps best answered by beginning to think about the ideas which are at play when
we conceptualise these literatures, more or less, as the gothic concern with the
“Other” and the bildungsromanconcern with the “Self.”
 
Otherness as Terra/Terror Incognita 
The cultural anxiety evoked within discourses such as abolitionist narratives and
controversial texts such as Frankenstein can be traced back to the simultaneous
conflation and resistance of the binaries which operate within more general,
                                                          
17 See TerryCastle The Female Thermometer: Eighteenth-centuryCulture and the Inventionof the Uncanny(1995).
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anthropologicaldialectics. In fact, the similarities between each socially “powerless”
party within these dialectics become more explicit. In other words, concepts such as
“monstrous”, “poor”, female, “slave” and “other” can be seen as converging as the
social power inherent within concepts such as “rich”, “male”, “master” and “self” are
called into question. In being materially-created against its own will and excluded from
the rights of men for only resembling man in part, the monster represents several
figures: the nineteenth-century female (who is without equal rights); a disenfranchised
plantation slave within Frankenstein’s purpose-built “workshop” of production (for
plantations are also sites of production) and finally, a marginalised textile worker
(since the monster is stitched together from the bodies of the poor). Having
previously outlined the correlation between the figure of the monster, the automaton,
the plantation slave and the British textile worker, I shall now account for how the
monster demarcates women’s complex position within this economic and imperialist
dynamic. The conflation between woman and the monster would perhaps account for
the critical propensity to interpret the (predominantly nineteenth-century) female
writing subject as “monstrous” – yet powerless – in their frustrations against
patriarchy and their resistance to becoming the “Other” of hegemonic male culture.
This paradigm was most famously outlined in Gilbert and Gubar’s Madwoman in the
Attic’s reading of Jane Eyre (1847) as the textual conflation of Bertha/Jane/Brönte, as
well as the inextricable nature of the identities of the monster/Frankenstein/Maryand
PercyShelley/Eve/Adam which permeate Frankenstein.
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Incontrast, Spivak’s focus upon British Imperialism in the nineteenth-century
text leads her to assert that, whereas Jane Eyre “does not deploy the axiomatic of
imperialism” (254), Frankenstein functions as a deconstructive counter-narrative to the
(white) female protagonist of the bildungsroman, of which Jane Eyre is one of the
paragons. The protagonist’s struggle for subjectivity in novels such as Jane Eyre have
come to define the “high” feminist norm, an integral moment in the history of
Western feminism. The struggle that typifies the journey of subjectivity and
independence of the female bildungsroman (and, I would add, serves as a metaphor for
the feminist struggle or “journey” throughout modern Western history) is destabilized
through the even more “marginal” experiences of the women in Frankenstein,
especially Safie and the monster (244).18 In fact, the social marginalization of the
monster and Safie serves to critique this exact Anglo-American/European sense of the
high feminist norm. The “nascent feminism” Spivak gleans in Frankenstein is therefore
not synonymous with, but tangential to, the beginning of what Gubar and Gilbert have
defined as the dual emerging consciousness of the writer through their female
protagonist (or in the case of Frankenstein, the monster). Safie and the monster come
to represent Ariel and Caliban respectively through both their access to (and
alienation from) the Western education model of the “self” and their role as
marginalized “Others” within British Imperialism (257).
                                                          
18 See Johanna M. Smith ““Cooped Up”: Feminine Domesticity in Frankenstein” and Anne K. Mellor’s Mary Shelley: Her
Life, Her Monsters on the domestic role of women in Frankenstein.
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Itis with Spivak’s prerequisite inclusion of British imperialism that I would like
to summarise my cultural materialist reading of Frankenstein. Since the monster has no
name, his subordination and lack of identity is always evident: he is a being who is as
dehumanised as the slaves in British plantations were, whose names were taken from
them (Malchow 29). If the slave trade had provided the capital for Britain that was
necessary for its industrial expansion and revolution, the bodies of plantation workers
– even after the abolition of the infamous slave trade passage – are rendered the same
as the experimental metal automatons which were being produced in Europe, as well
as the machines which were being produced to replace working men and women in
Britain. Whilst this reveals Frankenstein to be an astute social critique, the problem is
that its plot is actually situated far away from any reference to technological material
reality in Britain or Europe. Its depictions of technology are only ever implied, such as
the methods that produced the monster, or are merely metaphorical, such as the figure
of the monster itself. The reason is metatextual: Victor Frankenstein/Mary Shelley
does not want to inform Walton/the reader of these galvanic discoveries, lest
someone were to repeat the process. The technological extrapolation which is, in
essence, the pivotal feature of the novel, is therefore referred to merely as involving
“instruments of life” (38), and the threads of imperialist technological (re)production I
have read as informing Frankensteinare ultimatelyonlyinferred.
In contrast, Loudon’s The Mummy! explicitly depicts the technology involved in
reanimation for the reader, describing the use of galvanism in some detail and,
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furthermore, this is by no means the only way in which The Mummy! extends the
debates put forward in the 1818 and 1823 editions of Frankenstein. The Mummy! begins
with Loudon’s somewhat metatextual first person account to the reader of how she
came to write her “Tale of the Twenty-second Century” and her desire to “give you [the
reader] a hero totally different from any hero that ever appeared before” (vi). When
we compare this perspective of voice to the first-person narration of Jane Eyre and
other female bildungsroman texts, The Mummy! can be read as a type of counter-narrative
to the high feminist norm of the developing white female “voice” of the nineteenth
century, as well as the submissive females populating the gothic novel.19 In The
Mummy! women are monarchs, wear “loose trousers” for practicality and comfort and
work alongside men as their equals in order to overcome social unrest (I, 258).
Moreover, this feminist agency is set within a backdrop of weird and wonderful
inventions, giving the impression that the overall technological interest of Loudon’s
The Mummy! is far more explicit than that of Shelley’s more metaphorical explorations.
The Mummy!’s numerous technological speculations of future technology
include: the use of “stage–balloons” as opposed to travel by horse and stage coach (I,
117);20 the use of “asbestos paper” instead of “rag paper” (117); steel rendered
“perfectly flexible”, for moulding whenever needed (272); “moving houses”, which
allowtheir owners to holidaybecause theycan “fit on the iron railways and as theyare
                                                          
19 According to Alkon, The Mummy! may have been drawing upon the beginning of John Banim’s Revelations of the Dead-
Alive (1824).
20 The record for balloon travel in 1804 was Briot and Gey-Lussac’s height of 7,000 metres. See Silke Strickrodt.
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propelledby steam, slide on without much trouble” (141), the use of “apparatus for
making and collecting inflammable air” and for “making and concentrating quicksilver
vapour […] in the place of steam” in order to power high-speed air balloons (177).
Moreover, there is further speculation regarding possible future advancements in
technology, such as the idea that “the whole materia medica might be carried in a ring,
and that all the instruments of surgery might be compressed into a walking stick”
(176), “aerial bridges to convey heavy weights”, “a machine for stamping shoes and
boots at one blow”, “a steam engine for milking cows” and “an elastic summer house
that might be folded up so as to be put into a man’s pocket” (III, 51).21 The most
important description of technology in comparison to Frankenstein, however, is its
detailed description of the animation of an Egyptian mummy using an “electrical
machine”, which, theoretically speaking, enables the resuscitation of the living and the
reanimation of the dead (201). As the story develops, this key main theme of
technologyand progress is explicitlyconsidered and critiqued.
Another way in which The Mummy! extends the key themes we see in
Frankenstein is geographically, through its treatment of technology in a global – and
hence imperial – content. Loudon’s vision of an age in which steam boats swarm the
Nile was fairly astute, contemporaneously speaking. Not only was steam-power
beginning to emerge in Britain, the image of Egypt was still very much in the public
eye, due to both the Napoleonic campaigns there and because of the popular interest
                                                          
21 It may be worth noting that the name Dr. Entwerfen may be a play on the fact the German “to open up”, hence
reflecting the action of collapsible technology. See the Introduction for howthis thesis is informed byEntwerfen.
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inEgyptian artefacts which had been recently brought to Britain. The poem “Lines
Addressed to a Mummy at Belzoni’s Exhibition” by Horace Smith was part of a
collection published by Henry Colburn in 1825 following the “strongman” Giovanni
Belzoni’s exploits in real-life in Egypt, which were a favourite story for the British
popular press (Rauch 64-5). Furthermore, it was purported that Giovanni himself
discovered that the sarcophagus in the “First Pyramid” – which later became known
as the great pyramid of Cheops – was, in fact, empty (64). The missing referent in
colonial exploitation then, had folded back upon itself: the desired object was missing,
eluding its inevitable possession in imperial hands. Loudon’s narrative therefore
begins where the real-life, much-publicized story of Cheops ends, by providing one
explanation as to what could have happened to the mummy. The word play between
Mother Nature and the missing “Mummy” subsequently emerges as being concerned
with both imperial production and reproduction in the face of Nature. Rather than
being an accomplice to a proto-“Victorian New World Order” as some critics have
suggested, however, Loudon is attempting to complicate Britain’s relationship with
these Egyptian material artefacts.22 Through the presence of the reanimated Cheops,
Loudon allows Egypt to speak back.
Spivak’s term for those aspects of a novel in which an image of the third world
is created during the nineteenth century is its “worlding”, the worlding of Jane Eyre
                                                          
22 See Paul Young Globalization and the Great Exhibition: The Victorian New World Order (2009) for more details of the
relationship between the naturalisation of imperial endeavour and material cultures, including howthe Great Exhibition
can be read as Frankenstein’s monster.
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wouldbe the depiction of Bertha as a foreign, monstrous “other” and the worlding of
Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park (1814) would be the ambiguous hiatus in the text created
by the brief reference to its counterpoint West Indian plantations.23 I would like to
extend Spivak’s very specific meaning here in order to apply the idea of “worlding” to
a more general “global” picture instead, in which worlding refers to any geographical
images which serve a socio-political, comparative function. Loudon’s depiction of the
bumbling scientist, for example, subtly undermines the feminist depiction of the male
patriarchal scientist/explorer of masculinist discourses such as colonial travel – real or
imagined, as well as proffering a potent critique of the Romantic egoism inherent
within the depiction of Victor Frankenstein. It is interesting to note here that
Frankenstein is further emphasised as a text which negates the concrete images of
technology when we extend Spivak’s idea of worlding. In other words, Frankenstein
inherently negates the “worlding” of industrial Britain, since there are no references to
any early signs of either the Industrial or the French Revolution to contrast with the
picturesque images of nature untainted in Europe, or the hereto unexplored icy plains
of Antarctica, which Captain Walton, the epistolary narrator, is poignantly attempting
to explore and chart. As Paul O’Flinn observes, Frankenstein’s negation of both
revolutions is even more peculiar when we consider the fact that Frankenstein travels
through keyindustrial areas, such as Edinburgh, London and Paris (200).
                                                          
23 See Edward Said Orientalism (1978) for an analysis of Mansfield Park’s “sideways” look towards the West Indies.
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TheMummy!, in contrast to Frankenstein, places “worlding” at the forefront of
the narrative by describing in detail the potential future Egyptian colonisation and its
subsequent problems, even highlighting Egypt’s indigenous “Mizraim” race. By
depicting the terra incognita of the “Other” worlds within the novels of her
contemporaries, Loudon depicts the mirror image of the bildungsroman’s high feminist
norm, the attempt to cover strange grounds. The usual path of exploration, perhaps
more helpfully conceived here as the terra cognita or “familiar ground” of nineteenth-
century novels by women, is essentially that of the metaphorical journey – the female
protagonist’s journey towards a fully developed sense of subjecthood. Loudon’s
reference in the Preface to a “newtype of hero” is more usefully considered as the act
of rejecting the figure of the hero and its simultaneous resistance of the usual models
of “selfhood” or “Self-ness.” In fact, nineteenth-century futuristic fiction’s
deliberately meta-fictional style could be seen as being motivated by the desire to
differentiate itself from the more psychological novels of realism (Alkon 193). By
presenting complex and multiple plotlines Loudon’s rejection of the terra cognita (or
the protagonists’ journey towards the “self”) draws the reader’s attention instead to a
different theme, that of the communal responsibility required in order to avoid the
industrial (read: colonial) future of her 2126 world vision.
One of the ways in which Loudon shifts the emphasis from individual
responsibility to that of community is through her depiction of the scientist. Whereas
Shelley recapitulates Margaret Cavendish’s seventeenth-century feminist critique of
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experimentalnew science in order to critique its contemporaries, Loudon depicts the
scientist as a less dominating individual. Blame for the “rack[ing]” of the earth’s
resources is not directed at the “House of Soloman” but rather, society in its entirety.
In place of the Frankensteinian scientist, we are presented with an alternative future in
which there are “numerous” industrialists who, through their “wild schemes and
gigantic speculations”, have scarred the landscape and “racked the globe to its centre”
with their use of advanced technology (2-3). Loudon sees the future as a place in
which monstrous technology has devastated the globe, and, aptly, at the forefront of
this critique is the literal “level[ling]” of the world landscape into a Western model of
agriculture and commerce (2-3). Looking from the vantage point of their high-speed
balloon, Edric and Dr. Entwerfen (and the reader) gain a clear view of the Anglo-
American colonythat of twenty-second centuryEgypt.
[H]ow different from the Egypt of the nineteenth century, was
the fertile country which now lay like a map beneath their feet.
Improvement had turned her gigantic steps towards its once
deserted plains; commerce had waved her magic wand; and
towns and cities, manufactories and canals, spread in all
directions. (188)
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Thismay, at first glance, seem like a positive description of the effects of “civilisation”
and the progress of commerce and industry as beneficial to all, that “gigantic” merely
has a positive meaning. However, the description of modern Egypt continues in a
slightlydifferent tone:
Colonies of English and Americans peopled the country, and
produced a population that swarmed like bees over the land,
and surpassed in numbers even the wondrous throngs of the
ancient Mizraim race; whilst industry and science […] had
converted barren plains into fertile kingdoms. (189, emphasis
added)
This additional description of the historical changes that have brought about the
landscape “map” of Egypt in 2126 renders the description of “positivist” progress as
somewhat equivocal – and the “magic wand” of “commerce” becomes a slightlymore
sardonic comment on the march of industrialization, for ultimately in a subtle play on
the nature of creation, its “barren plains” are developed only at the expense of their
“swarm[ing]” overpopulation. In “gigantic steps”, Egypt has been “map[ped]” out by
the installation of Anglo-European agricultural farming systems, and a populace
which has overcome the once natural Egyptian landscape.
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Indeed,when we consider Loudon’s choice of the word “gigantic steps” when
describing the processes of “improvement” here, progress has not merely improved
Egypt but in a sense dominated it in much the same wayas a giant might.
Amidst all these revolutions, however, the Pyramids still
raised their gigantic forms, towering to the sky; unchanged,
unchangeable, grand, simple, and immovable […] seeming to
look down with contempt upon the ephemeral structures
with which they were surrounded […] Indestructible,
however, as they had proved themselves, even their granite
sides had not been able to entirely resist the corroding
influence of the smoke with which they were now
surrounded, and a slight crumbling announced the first
outwards symptoms of decay. (189-190)
Loudon’s description of the Pyramids as “simple” and “immovable” architectural
forms, even in the face of the two hundred years of scientific, technological and social
revolutions, is such that newimprovements seem “ephemeral”, in other words: newer
forms of industrial technology are transient and insubstantial compared to the
imperialism which created the Pyramids. Yet even the Pyramids cannot escape the
effects of these newforms of commercial colonisation: as “indestructible” as they are,
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theyhave nevertheless been “blackened and disfigured” by the steam industry (190).
After all, decay is the antithesis of progression and advancement, when structures not
only remain still but collapse in upon themselves and reflect processes of
degeneration, as opposed to a utopian epoch of progression.24
To emphasise further how steam power has been integral to global migration
and pollution, Edric and Entwerfen escape Egypt on one of the few remaining sail
boats left, with the more usual steam-powered boats over-taking them on all sides.
Travelling from Egypt to Spain, they reverse the path through which Loudon’s Africa
had been allegedly colonised by the character Spanish Don Alfonso (II, 193) in order
to pave the way for the seat of an “Imperial Queen of Africa” (II, 208). If Edric and
Entwerfen’s journey into Africa proffered a cartographic aerial survey of the current
state of its colonised, mapped and agriculturally-dissected landscape, their journey out
of Africa again marks the reversing of this imperial and industrial progress. The use of
steam power here is crucial, given that steam-powered boats were still really
ineffective in the late 1820s: Percy Bysshe Shelley himself had lost money when a
steam-boat development had failed (Bieri 158). Loudon’s depiction of steam power
can therefore be seen as an extrapolation of the nascent developments in steam after
the Stockton and Darlington steam Railway and their possible impacts. As Edric and
Entwerfen sail back to Africa’s seat of imperial power on a sail boat as steam-powered
                                                          
24 Loudon’s idea of degeneration here is not to be confused with later Victorian narratives of degeneration, race and
physiognomy, in which undead Mummies and vampires became signifiers of the ancient global figures of threat to the
modern/imperial self. See David Glover Vampires, Mummies and Liberals: Bram Stoker and the Politics of Popular Fiction
(1996).
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engines surround and overtake them, the image of the sail boat signifies Loudon’s
1820s present, being swiftly overtaken by its blackening and destructive steam-
powered, imperial future. Yet theyalso signifyas a laboratoryof social change, for the
fact that they are sailing in a non-steam-powered boat reveals the imperative to begin
to undo and unlearn such damaging technological developments.
Loudon’s exploration of the effect of colonisation and industrial development
on the landscape of non-Western civilisations is further emphasised when Loudon
tells the reader that the Pyramids were constructed as symbols of Nature itself, since
“under all the variant forms in which she presents herself […] it was Nature that was
typified in the Pyramids” (192). Byportraying the Pyramids as the ultimate symbols of
Nature for the past civilisations of Egypt, Loudon’s critique here is an explicit
juxtaposition of Nature on the one hand and the pollution caused by steam-powered
industrial progress on the other. This is a more explicit trajectory of Frankenstein’s
critique of Newtonian science, for it is one which also looks forward to the possible
future in order to pre-empt the very realistic possibilities of colonial industrial
technology and its effects upon precious natural resources. Indeed, The Mummy!’s
depictions of the somewhat anthropomorphic “gigantic steps” of Anglo-American
“improvement” as that which has, in effect, trampled over the landscape, history and
peoples of indigenous Egypt can be read as an early feminist ecological critique of the
machinations of both colonisation and industrialisation. However, rather than seeing
Loudon as raising important questions regarding the effects of technology upon
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ecology,critics such as Alan Rauch have argued that Loudon’s subsequent interest in
botanywas merelydue to “an accident of marriage”, her husband being the renowned
botanist John Loudon (62).25 Yet to read Loudon’s work in this way would be to
forget just how important ecology and botany were within early nineteenth-century
scientific discourses.
It must not to forgotten that the discussion surrounding Charles Darwin’s The
Origin of the Species (1859) can be traced back to Erasmus Darwin’s evolutionary and
genetic interests, which have their roots, so to speak, in his Botanic Garden (1789,
1791), as well as the later influence of the discovery of Gregor Mendel’s genetic
experiments with bean plants. Though the term “ecology” was not coined until several
decades after The Mummy! in 1869, ecological issues were very much at the forefront
of scientific progress. What is significant for a more thorough understanding of
critical utopian visions of the future, such as we see in The Mummy!, is the fact that
ecology’s etymological roots are inextricable from utopia-related concepts of
edification and space. The word ecology has, in fact, been historically linked more to
the concept of civilisation and structure than to the abstract concept of Nature,
deriving as it does from the Greek word for “home”: oikos, which became the English
word for housekeeping, “oeconomy”, by at least 1530.26 Loudon’s shift from writing
an ecological critical utopia such as The Mummy! to writing about the science of
                                                          
25 See also Alkon.
26 For more details on the history of ecology and botany, see Derek Wall Green History: a reader in environmental literature,
historyand politics (1994).
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flower-growingis not as farcical a career move as contemporary critics have assumed:
as a subject in which many scientific principles must be taken into account, botany
was not the stereotype of “ladies growing flowers” that some scholars have assumed it
to be.
If there were any doubt as to The Mummy!’s presentation of the march of
progress and imperial economic domination in the future as potentially dystopian,
Loudon clearly asserts that the devastation that this would cause to the ecological
balance of the earth would be significant even if it meant that wealth were to be
distributed evenly.
Thus it was with the people of England. Not satisfied with
being rich and prosperous, they longed for something more.
Abundance of wealth caused wild schemes and gigantic
speculations […] New countries were discovered and civilized;
the whole earth was brought to the highest pitch of civilization;
every corner of it was explored; mountains were leveled [sic.],
mines were excavated, and the globe racked to its centre. Nay, the air
and sea did not escape, and all of nature was compelled to
submit to the supremacyof Man. (2-3, emphasis added)
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The combination of the technological means to create an economically productive
planet by levelling its structural anomalies, such as mountains, and the globally
widespread wealth to do so, means that the earth becomes overrun – every square
mile is subject to the machinations of colonisation. That this colonization is
inextricable from the concepts of nineteenth-century infrastructural improvement is
made explicit by the fact that “macadamized, turnpike roads” replace the desert (188):
the path of progress is one of tarmac. Loudon’s critique of imperialism and
“civilization” (emphasised in the quotation above bythe repeated use of this word), as
that which inevitably “racks” earth’s resources, is inescapably explicit here. It is
therefore apt that the novel ends in Egypt again when Edric returns there once again
to clarify exactly how the mummy Cheops was reanimated, as well as to contemplate
the moral use of science in general.
As Edric enters into dialogue with the reanimated mummy and is reminded of
what he has learnt (that the monster is not, after all, evil, nor inhumane), there is a
sense in which The Mummy! resolves the dialogue which started by Frankenstein and
his monster in the village of Chamounix – this time one in which the scientist learns
from his hubris and takes full responsibility for the monster’s misdeeds. This is
because Loudon’s protagonist is more self-reflective of his actions, asking himself:
What right have I to renewthe struggles, the pains, the cares, and
the anxieties of mortal life? Howcan I tell the fearful effects that
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maybe produced bythe gratification of myunearthly longing? (I,
202-3)
Narratively speaking, The Mummy! offers a more complete resolution of the trajectory
begun by the science fictional novum of reanimation in Frankenstein, which was
rendered “incomplete” through both his lack of understanding for the monster’s
murderous actions and his inability to learn from his hubris by hoping that “yet
another maysucceed” (Suvin 136, see also Chapter Four).
What can be gleaned also when we compare The Mummy! with Frankenstein is
the historical shift in which the exploitation of the body of the (formerly African)
slave instead becomes the exploitation of the landscape body of Africa itself. Loudon’s
futuristic concern with the globalisation of technologyand the economy become even
more astute when we consider the fact that The Mummy! depicts a scenario which is
not altogether different from Britain’s actual historical future following the book’s
publication in 1827. After all, Victorian Imperialism gathers momentum only decades
after The Mummy! is published, in which the economic interest in the slavery of the
colonial plantations only truly ended when the explorations of Africa itself began.
This is not to suggest, however, that the terminology used in The Mummy! is pre-
emptive of the types of misogynistic descriptions we find in later works such as H.
Rider Haggard’s She (1886) and King Soloman’s Mines (1885). Crucially, Loudon’s
descriptions of nature and knowledge never portray exploitative applications of
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scienceand technologyas an essentially“masculine” domain. Indeed, both Nature and
“progress” are described with feminine pronouns, for The Mummy! is neither a
realisation, nor a critique, of the patriarchal endeavour to create a “scientific utopia”
that we see in Bacon’s Soloman’s House (see Chapter One). Indeed, this is where the
strength of her feminist criticism ultimately lies: The Mummy! depicts the misuse of
technology and the colonial imperative as an issue for which everyone should take
responsibility for. Furthermore, this reflects that most useful campaign idiom in the
abolition of plantation slavery: we are all responsible because when we consume the
exports of the plantations, we are all metaphorically “cannibalising” the bodies of the
West Indian slaves. What Loudon adds to this is the sense in which we should not
also seek to “colonise” the indigenous lands of the West Indian slaves: Africa, which
is why Loudon chooses to reanimate that not so “hideous” mummy, the conqueror
Cheops (Frankenstein40).
The Missing Mummy  
Historically noted as a great conquer of lands, Cheops was upheld by the Romantics
as a symbol of the inherent folly that was imperial/colonial endeavour. Perhaps due to
the intense media interest which surrounded the British exploration of the pyramids,
both Byron and Shelley engaged with the symbol of the mummy as a figure of
fallibility, and the mortal folly of warfare. Byron’s Don Juan (1819) cites Cheops’
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disappearance as the subject of a whole stanza and Percy Bysse Shelley’s
“Ozymandias” (1817) cites Cheop’s disappearance as an act of justice for his
tyrannical deeds (Rauch 67). Shelley’s reference to Frankenstein’s monster as more
hideous-looking than an Egyptian mummy at the same time as the real-life missing
mummy Cheops features heavily in both the British press and her closest
companions, Byron and Percy Shelley, published poetry about Cheops, suggests that
her own monster is also based upon the figure of Cheops. After all, the monster goes
missing from Frankenstein’s workshop after being reanimated in the same way that
Cheops is missing from his sarcophagus (both in real life and after his reanimation in
The Mummy!). Man’s confrontation (or displaced confrontation) with the monster and
the mummy therefore signifies as the place at which coloniser and colonial subject
meet, in which master and slave, and good and evil, become equivocal constructs. It is
in this paradoxically liminal era in literature that we see such useful explorations of
how technology can be defined as no more than the projections of our sense of self
merging with our self-image (Tropp 55).
As stated previously in the chapter, the way in which The Mummy! portrays
technology as “self-image” is slightly different to the definition of Frankenstein’s
monster as a gothic doppelganger. Rather than uncanny doubling, this is the idea that
technology is a trajectory of the human image because technology is ultimately the
extrapolation of human experience. This is explicitly emphasized by the scientific
interest in creating human-like automatons, but, paradoxically, the subjective
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definition of the machine has never been signified more aptly than through
Frankenstein’s production of the fleshy figure of the monster (Tropp 65). Similarly,
the productive fertilityof the newlyagricultural Egypt in The Mummy! is comparable to
those real life colonies: the fertile lands of the West Indian plantations. Just as the
Egyptian agriculture of the future is overshadowed by the blackened Pyramids – the
Blakeian “dark satanic mills” (to use an anachronism), so too are the plantations of
Loudon’s present threatened bythe darkness of inhumanity, in which black bodies are
consumed within the paths of global industry. Yet The Mummy! is slightlymore explicit
in making the connections between the figure of the monster and the fact that
technology itself is often our monstrous projections of ourselves. Here we see that,
like the monster, the British Industrial Revolution has inescapablygrotesque origins; it
too is the product of numerous corpses, of both the corpses of African plantation
slaves and the later deaths of more British workers. Ultimately, these bodies become
the monster that “revolts” in both senses of the word: abhorrent in form because they
are feared by those in power, the dispossessed rise up and rebel year upon year in
spite of their numerous deaths.
Together then, Frankenstein and The Mummy! can be seen as having formed a
dynamic critical dialogue for reading audiences in Regency and early-Victorian Britain.
In fact, The Mummy! is one of the only books which has ever attempted to make any
sense of the political unrest that was the transition from Regency turmoil to Victorian
Imperialism in England (Rauch 62), yet critics have often overlooked the cynical
Monstrous (Re)production: Women Writing as Imperial Subjects Page 142 
 
politicalimpetus informing this literaryzeitgeist of the gothic parody. 1818 was the year
that the gothic text became the subject of satire in Jane Austen’s Northanger Abbeyand
Thomas Love Peacock’s Nightmare Abbey; Frankenstein’s rejection of the usual plot
formulations of the gothic also marked its demise. Loudon’s The Mummy! even
explicitly parodies the genius of the Romantic ego (and in one sense, the figure of
Victor Frankenstein himself) through the figure of the bumbling, ineffectual and self-
pitying scientist Dr. Entwerfen, who comes “rushing down-stairs to meet them, his
sleeves tucked up, and his wig thrown back, in a very experimental-philosophic
manner” (I, 299).
The Mummy! adds to this satire of the Romantic ego by making a comical figure
out of the formerly uncanny automaton that we see in E.T.A. Hoffman’s The Sandman
(1816), and by depicting the “automaton judges” that preside over Edric and
Entwerfen’s indictment in Republican Spain as malfunctioning, the ineffective and
unjust nature of the British judiciary in handling the social unrest of the workers
revolts (1811-17) are simultaneously parodied. Reflecting judicial corruption, the
automaton judges are pre-programmed with the verdict before the trial commences,
and one of the robot judges even begins the trial in French and has to be re-set again
(II, 338 qtd. in Alkon). Again, whereas Frankenstein keeps these dialogues at a
metaphorical level, Loudon’s setting of the future allows her to manifest these
concepts and engage with them more explicitly. The Mummy!’s automaton judges
clearly demonstrate the idea that “[w]hether conceived as a mechanical imitation of
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man or as an actual man reduced to pure mechanism, [the robot] is wholly under
domination” (Small 310). Pre-programmed with knowledge of the judicial, the
automata form just one example of Loudon’s commentary upon the real use value of
education as a means for liberating society. This is seen most strikingly by the
ridiculously verbose development of language when education renders everyone
highly articulate – but without practical knowledge. In depicting how automata could
replace even highly educated judges (however ineffectively), Loudon reveals that men
and machines are reciprocal processes of one another.
Just as the automaton is inextricable from the human, science fiction has often
been defined as literature that explores social and philosophical problems by
juxtaposing and/or drawing similarities between an alternative world and the material
conditions of the reader’s or writer’s contemporary ones. In this last section, I would
like to return again to the main argument of the thesis, that of the centrality of
Frankenstein in science fiction studies, particularly within feminist criticism. After all,
Frankenstein’s iconographical impact in creating the figures of both “Frankenstein” and
“the monster” are inextricable from feminist definitions of the science fictional. As
discussed previously, the monster has, historically speaking, represented ethnicity,
class and political values, but since the 1980s, the monster has somewhat “evolved” to
also figure as cyborg, transsexual and the idea that women in general are marginalised
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figures within scientific discourses and practices (Clayton 84-5).27 However, this
twentieth-century focus upon gender and science has been more within the late
eighteenth-century Romantic gothic tradition than that of its successor, that time of
imperial hegemony, political turmoil and industrial change within which Frankenstein
was actually written and re-written. Frankenstein can indeed be seen as fulfilling many
functions within women’s literature, but it must be acknowledged that whilst it is
useful to deploy the monster as a symbol for many feminist concerns, from trans-
feminism and cyborg studies to the figure of the “alien” in science fiction in general
(Donawerth, Daughters of Frankensteinxviii), there are also other ways in which Shelley’s
writing can be canonised as a legacyfor “feminist” science fiction.
In fact, the depiction of the monster as a feminine figure of the “other” or the
hybrid is not the only way in which writers have referred to Frankenstein as a template
text for exploring feminism and science, and neither is it the most politically astute in
light of the socio-politics of the period. Although science fiction can be quite usefully
considered as the “hideous progeny” of Frankenstein, the product of cannibalized
(disassembled) texts, it must be remembered that the term “hideous progeny” did not
even appear until the 1831 “Author’s Introduction” to Frankenstein (ix), and it was not
until Mary Poovey’s essay on its motifs of reproduction: “My Hideous Progeny”
(1980), that it became a term for science fiction. Those critics who conceptualise
science fiction as Frankenstein’s “hideous progeny” do indeed go some way towards
                                                          
27 See Laura Kranzler “Frankenstein and the Technological Future” on the transgendered body and the body of the
monster.
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highlighting the genre’s intrinsically hybrid nature; just as the monster is made of
many bodies, science fiction’s hybridity relies upon the intertextual nature of key
motifs, of which “Frankenstein the monster” is one of the most prominent (sic.).
Nevertheless the fact remains that it is nothing short of utterly implausible to describe
Frankenstein as the first science fiction text. Science fiction’s roots, imbedded within
many genres – most notably, that of the utopia and the fantastic voyage – stretch
much further back than the year 1818. The amalgamation of genres into that which
we call “science fiction” span literature from at least as far back in history as Margaret
Cavendish’s The BlazingWorld (1666), if not earlier (see Introduction).
The motif of reproduction could be extended even more at this stage, for it
could be argued that if Frankenstein is a “hideous progeny” it cannot simultaneouslybe
a child that is, to use Mellor’s term, also wholly “legitimate.” It must be remembered
that the Preface to The Mummy! describes Loudon’s search for a “new type of hero”,
whereas the presentation of Frankenstein is not that of a self-consciously new form of
genre. In fact, by the revised 1831 edition, Shelley’s new “Author’s Introduction”
reinstalls the text within a gothic aesthetic – that of ghost stories and nightmarish
visions of reviving baby corpses in the European landscapes of the Romantic gothic.
It is important to remember that many critics have argued that the 1818 edition of
Frankenstein is nearer to the aesthetics of science fiction than its much-revised yet oft-
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quoted1831 version.28 Given this, The Mummy! can be seen as responding to the more
“science fictional” editions of Frankenstein. After all, it was in the final 1831 edition
that Mary Shelley famously contextualized Frankenstein as the result of a ghost-story
competition, the content of which was inspired by a dream she had, which placed
Frankenstein finally within the landscape of the Romantic gothic text. To complicate
this debate, Brian Aldiss’ defines science fiction as the descendant of the gothic novel
alone: “[w]e look at the dream world of the Gothic novel, from which science fiction
springs; we identify the author whose work marks her [Shelley] out as the first science
fiction writer” (Billion Year Spree 8). Aldiss’ definition is odd, given that 1818 was also
the year of gothic parody. By focusing on the debates within Frankenstein which
demarcate the text as humanist rather than merely feminist, such as the rejection of all
scientific practices as masculinist, this chapter runs slightly against the grain of many
feminist science fiction treatises regarding the “legacy” of Frankenstein. By corollary,
re-reading Frankenstein in terms of its implicit contemporary technological concerns,
such as the Luddite revolts and the abolition debate, serves to emphasise how the
ideas crystallised within this text were also the concerns of previous feminist/proto-
feminist writers examined within this thesis.
                                                          
28 See Jay Clayton “Frankenstein’s Futurity” and David Ketterer’s “Frankenstein’s “Conversion” from Natural Magic to
Modern Science—and a Shifted (and Converted) Last Draft Insert.”
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Conclusion 
Inthis chapter I have explored the idea that Frankenstein is more culturally entrenched
in the imperial and industrial politics of the other and the revolutionary imperative
than feminist science fiction scholars have been willing to account for. Moreover, that
these ideas so aptly recapitulate the fact that the era between Romantic and Victorian
literature in Britain can be seen as “liminal” in a political, rather than historical, sense.
In other words, that this era is liminal in a more positive sense of the word; texts such
as Frankenstein and The Mummy! had constituted something of a new horizon in
literature. Challenging the present scholarly neglect of The Mummy!, I have revealed
how Frankenstein and The Mummy! are both philosophically astute in differing ways.
Reading these texts in dialogue with contemporary debates also functions as an
effective means for contextualizing women’s writing and those debates which,
historically speaking, individual women have attempted to engage with. Whilst
feminist utopian and science fiction scholars may not have been keen to place
Frankenstein within a specific trajectory of women engaging with science and
technology prior to the nineteenth century, Shelley herself was nevertheless interested
in the wider acknowledgement of the historical trajectory of women’s achievements. As
stated in the Introduction, she had outlined a desire to produce a book to be
preliminarily entitled “the Lives of Celebrated Women – or a history of Woman – her
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positionin society and her influence upon it – historically considered.”29 In focussing
more explicitly upon how Frankenstein can be seen as directly attempting to articulate
some of the cultural concerns of its time, this chapter takes a step towards seeing the
genealogy of the utopian and science fiction genres as a process which has not only
evolved over time, but whose identity is continually evolving. In other words, if today
we re-read “canonised” texts such as Frankenstein and explore relatively neglected
texts, such as The Mummy!, in order to understand the historical uses of genres, so too
should these interpretations todaybe subject to revision tomorrow.
If science fiction is defined as the extrapolation of, and engagement with, the
author’s contemporary scientific, technological and social phenomena, then in order
to consider how the utopia has been historically conceptualized within the emergent
formula of its descendant – “science fiction” – it is vital that the scientific and
technological history of the early nineteenth century must not be neglected. Both
Loudon and Shelley can be seen as outlining the idea of technology as a powerful
social entity in and of itself, just as G.C. Burrows was to say shortly after the
publication of both Frankenstein and The Mummy!: “Machinery is the hydra of the
present day […] mankind are slaves to things inanimate” (qtd in Wall 144).
Significantly, the context of Burrows speech is the 1832 elections, a year which is
often mistakenly referred to as “Victorian”, despite the fact that Victoria herself was
not on the throne until five years later.
                                                          
29 This was probably in response to the condescending account of women’s achievements in Herman’s Records of Woman
(1828) (137-143). See Stephen Behrendt “MaryShelley, Frankensteinand the Woman Writer’s Fate.”
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What Burrows meant by comparing the nature of technology to the many-
headed monster “hydra” is that technology is self-reproducing: if you cut off one of the
monstrous heads – or paths – of technological progress, another will just as quickly
grow to replace it (as the machine-smashing Luddites were to become painfully
aware). Burrows’ comparison here between the figure of a female monster and
technology is something which science fiction is all too familiar with, as it has
continued to draw upon the mid-nineteenth-century Marxist articulation of the
monstrosity of urban development and the consolidation of capitalism. It is worth
remembering, then, howboth Loudon and Shelley can clearly be read as pre-empting
the cultural anxietysurrounding the metaphor of social machinerythat Karl Marx, and
later, Matthew Arnold, were to render more explicit.30 This chapter has argued that
this is, in fact, not the case. Reading “monsters” as tropes for women and/or
technology alone is inevitably counter-productive to a feminist praxis. Ultimately,
technology can only be developed through humankind’s image of itself, so the
metaphor of the hydra is only useful if we invert it: technology is not self-reproducing,
rather: it is an attempt to reproduce the “Self”, not the “Other.”
                                                          
30 See Marx’s “Fragment on Machines” in Grundrisse (1858) and for Arnold’s definition of self perfection as the desire to
disentangle the self from social “machinery”, see Culture and Anarchy: AnEssayinPolitical and Social Criticism (1869).
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- 4 - 
Where we men of science would have been afraid 
to tread : L.T. Meade s fin-de-siecle Eye/I of 
Reason
She dared to enter where we men of science would have been afraid to tread;
and just because she did venture to lift the curtain behind which we would
not have attempted to penetrate, she had helped forward her husband’s
immature discoveryin a marvellous manner.
(Meade, The Medicine Lady171)
The fin-de-siècle was undoubtedly one of the key turning points in the evolution of
utopian and science fiction writing. By the end of the nineteenth century, science
fiction had emerged as one of the most prominent literary templates for imagining
socio-political change, and proffering socio-political critique. Science fiction was
therefore one of the most dynamic “literaryresponses” to the scientific discourses and
material technologies of the late nineteenth century (Cranny-Francis 39).1
Developments in electromagnetism and optics not only meant that we could nowsee
“through” objects with the Röntgen ray (x-ray), basic scientific and philosophical
models were subverted – including simple chemistry, Newtonian mechanics and
“Descartes’ mechanical god” (Taton 3). For example, the impact of the discovery of
the Röntgen ray (x-ray) meant that we could now see through material, and the
                                                          
1 The others are detective fiction and gothic fiction. See Cranny-Francis Feminist Fiction: Feminist Uses of Generic Fiction
(1990).
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boundaries of what constitutes an “object” were utterly disrupted.2 This meant that
models of Rationality, in which cognitive thought was seen as the corollary of
objective observation, were called into question. In other words, the very nature of
mechanical space itself was challenged, which problematises current feminist
definitions of Western scientific discourses as that which has always sexually
objectified and sought to “unveil” natural phenomenon à la Newton and Bacon.3 This
chapter demonstrates how British fin-de-siècle writer L.T. Meade (Elizabeth
Thomasina Meade Smith, 1854-1915) also challenges current feminist critiques of
science in its portrayal of a model of scientific collaboration and the presentation of an
ethical duty of care between men and women of science despite the fact that she is
writing in an era in which feminism has been historically characterised as engaging
with eugenics and other problematic models of “Reason.” By applying Suvin’s
formula of the “cognitive” novum, I suggest that we can glean how Meade’s science
fiction can be seen as upholding a “scientific” sense of feminist Reason which is more
astute than contemporarycritics have allowed for.
L.T. Meade wrote and co-authored some two hundred works of fiction after
coming from Ireland to London to pursue journalism (Kestner 246). An extremely
successful and popular writer of this period, her oeuvre represents an endeavour to
                                                          
2 See James Mussell Science, Time and Space in the Late-Nineteenth Century Periodical Press (2007) for the counter-argument to
this. 
3 Most notable are the discussions of science explored by Sandra Harding, Carolyn Merchant and Evelyn Fox Keller.
This is a viewpoint perhaps best exemplified by Harding’s claim that: “the best scientific activity and philosophical
thinking about science are to be modelled on men’s misogynistic relationships to women-rape” (112). See The Science
Question inFeminism (1986).
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make key links between science, gender and society.4 Joint editor of popular girls’
journal Atlanta 1887-92, Meade was a prestigious figure in terms of woman’s writing
and she was also an unusual figure, in that she had a lot of support from the popular
press. She was one of the few women writers who were able to vocalise her belief in
women’s right to “equality with men”, without losing the popularity of those
publications which were critical of the “New Woman”, such as Punch (58).5 Such was
her celebrity status as a writer that she continued to publish under her maiden name
even after marrying, and she used this fortunate status to make waves into the public
acceptance of other women writers.6 Sally Mitchell and Mavis Reimer have argued
that Meade’s writing was integral to the creation of a “mainstream Victorian feminism
bydepicting strong female heroines” (311). Yet whilst scholars have recentlybegun to
acknowledge the importance of Meade’s feminist responses to issues such as
consumerism, racism, eugenics, the anti-vivisection debate and the contentious role of
the so-called “New Woman” (Mitchell 9-23), to date there are no considerations of
those texts which reflect Meade’s rich engagement with science and scientific debate
in general.7 In particular, her work addresses two questions that have remained at the
heart of feminist considerations of the historical development of scientific reason:
                                                          
4 This included the development of two key new subgenres: the “medical mystery” and “New Girl” fiction. See Lorena
Laura Stookey, Robin Cook: a critical companion (1996) and Julie Simons “Angela Brazil and the Making of the Girls’ School
Story.”
5 For more details, see Chris Willis, as well as Linda Hughes “A Club of Their Own: the “Literary Ladies”, NewWomen
Writers, and Fin-de-Siècle Authorship” and Elizabeth Miller ““Shrewd Women of Business”: Madame Rachel, Victorian
Consumerism, and L.T. Meade’s The Sorceress of the Strand.”
6 See Chris Willis “Crime, Class and Gender in the 1890s Strand Magazine.”
http://www.chriswillis.freeserve.co.uk/strand.htm.
7 In contrast, some scholars define her feminism as ambivalent, due to her “New Woman” and female criminal
protagonists. See Chris Pittard “Purityand Genre: Late Victorian Detective Fiction.”
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what are women’s relationships with “science” and what are the potential social
impacts of the development of scientific knowledge?8
In order to begin to consider howL.T. Meade’s fiction can be both rational and
dynamic, it is useful to consider Suvin’s seminal argument in The Metamorphosis of
Science Fiction (1979) that Frankenstein should not actually be considered as science
fiction at all because it is a “flawed hybrid” of both this genre and the aesthetics of
Romantic gothic fiction (127). Of course, his rejection of Frankenstein as a non-pure,
“flawed hybrid” initially appears flawed itself when considered in light of the main
theme of Frankenstein: Victor Frankenstein rejects a being or “creature” – created from
a number of different bodies – on the basis that it is does not appear to be “human”
enough, in spite of the monster’s consistent attempts to assert his humanity. If we
compare the initially humane behaviour of the monster to the nature of the
“function” of science fiction, Shelley’s critique of Frankenstein’s hegemonic view of
humanity(that which regards aesthetics as tantamount to an internal Rosseauian virtue)
is reflected in Suvin’s rejection of Frankenstein as a “flawed hybrid.” Upon closer
reading, however, Suvin is not actually presenting the same argument as Frankenstein;
he is, instead, rejecting the premise that the mere appearance of science fiction motifs
are enough to constitute a text as a work of science fiction, which is, in fact, in
antithesis to Frankenstein’s rejection of his monstrous creature due to its inhumane
                                                          
8 Sam Moskowitz briefly referenced her “Where the Air Quivered” (1898) in Science Fiction by Gaslight (1968), as has L.
Timmel Duchamp in “Science Fiction and Utopias by Women, 1818-1949: A Chronology” and Eric Leif Davin in
Partners in Wonder: Womenand the Birth of Science Fiction1926-1965 (2006).
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appearance. Indeed, he clarifies this further by outlining which functions science
fiction texts should fulfil and whyFrankenstein falls short of these.
In the Introduction I briefly described how, according to Suvin, the “novum”
is one of the most important functions of science fiction proper. I would like to
elaborate on the idea of the novum further at this point, in order to demonstrate that
it is perhaps more compatible with the feminist concerns of cultural historicity, and
that it therefore provides a much richer basis for the consideration of women’s
writing, than the feminist model in which the “Frankensteinian scientist” or explorer
is juxtaposed to the “woman as alien.” According to Suvin, the novum is a “totalizing
phenomenon or relationship deviating from the author’s and implied reader’s norm of
reality” (64). The mere appearance of this so-called “novum”, however, is not enough: it
must also fulfil several other functions. In particular, the novum must not be
presented within the text as “the interposition of anti-cognitive laws” (8). In other
words, concepts such as the paranormal or supernatural cannot form the basis of the
novum. Unlike those feminist critics who argue that certain tropes in science fiction,
telekinesis, for example, provide a useful basis for critical scholarship, Suvin argues
that even when the workings of the novum may not be explained as scientific,
technological or – at the very least – “cognitive”, the inherent function of the novum
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must never have recognisable roots in the highly structured and inherently conservative
genres of folk lore or fairytale.9
It is possible to distinguish various dimensions of the novum.
Quantitatively, the postulated innovation can be of quite
different degrees of magnitude, running from the minimum
of one discrete new “invention” (gadget, technique,
phenomenon, relationship) […] to the maximum […] new
and unknown in the author’s environment. (64)
For Suvin, one of the most important aspects of the novum is that it must bring about
a dramatic shift in the thought processes of the protagonist. Therefore, Suvin does
not dismiss Frankenstein’s creature as a novum on the basis that to interpret this figure
as a Miltonic “demon” would be to allude to an anti-cognitive symbol of Christian
mythology, however; it is because Frankenstein himself fails to learn from his mistake.
The novum must also be cognitively “complete” or have brought about a
satisfactory resolution within the text, since the protagonist must have been wholly
changed by its existence, yet Frankenstein’s claim that “yet another may succeed” in
the usurpation of life itself (in making that which is living out of that which is dead)
                                                          
9 For a full description of the formalism of these genres, see Vladmir Propp Morphology of the Folktale (1968). For a
discussion of telekinesis in feminist science fiction, see Jane Donawerth Daughters of Frankenstein.
 Where we men of science would have been afraid to tread : L.T. Meade s fin-de-siecle Eye/I of Reason 
 Page 156 
 
renders him “an improper Prometheus or bearer of the novum” (136). Similarly, false
or incomplete novums amount to mere “scientific vulgarization or even technological
prognostication” and are hence devices that do not function to reflect critically upon
society, nor do they present a change in the narrator’s contemporary reality (9). But
while Verne and Wells were locked in dispute about whether science fiction should
consist of explicative and/or plausible descriptions of science and technology (such as
in Verne’s work) or exist as a basis to enable the exploration of socio-political
ideology in general (as Wells does), Shelley had already cut straight to philosophical
questions about the nature of scientific knowledge, gender and hubris.10 The fiction of
Meade is an interesting case to consider in light of Suvin’s definition of the novum.
Reading Meade alongside Suvin can also be seen as a means with which to challenge
contemporary critical models of what constitutes a “feminist” science fiction. After
all, it must not be forgotten that like those “genre-writers” throughout history who
are familiar to us as the avatars of modern science fiction, such as Mary Shelley, H.G.
Wells and Jules Verne, L.T. Meade was not conscious of such genre models. Although
Suvin and John Sutherland refer to the late nineteenth centuryas “the evolution of SF
from a satirical device to a genre” (Victorian Science Fiction in the UK 123), the generic
topologies which such works are often argued to have “invented” are inevitably only
post factum epistemologies. The formation of genre, of course, is as much the work of
critics and editors as it is the work of authors; as stated in the Introduction, genre
                                                          
10 See Anne Cranny-Francis.
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label of “science fiction” was very much a phenomenon of the 1920s. Moreover, it
was pulp editors’ refusal to publish fiction that did not reflect the Wells and Verne
extracts that they reprinted which truly brought about what feminists have termed the
“traditional” science fiction canon (that which is populated predominantly with the
work of male authors) (Donawerth, Daughters of Frankensteinxviii, see Introduction).
The fact that Meade’s work simply did not feature in this 1920s (re)printing
project does not explain, however, why contemporary feminists have not already
recouped Meade’s utopian science fiction as “feminist” in the same waythat theyhave
acknowledged the likes of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Mary Shelley, Marie Corelli and
Lady Florence Dixie. One reason for this may be because, following the 1980s rise of
feminism in the academy, feminist utopian and science fiction critics had themselves
attempted to formulate a “feminist” version of Hugh Gernsback et al’s traditionally
male-dominated science fiction canon, tracing a history from Mary Shelley onwards.
As discussed previously, this literary model is often seen as synonymous with the
highly limited definition of Frankenstein as the critique of all scientific endeavour on
the grounds that it was the product of misogynistic practices (Clayton, “Frankenstein’s
Futurity” 88). Frankenstein’s feminist “inheritance” is often reduced to the idea that,
as a scientist, Frankenstein epitomises the idea that:
the scientist is male and nature is female; science is the
domination of nature. The domination of nature is erotic: the
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scientist pursues nature, uncovers her and unveils her,
penetrates her, and rejoices in his mastery. (Donawerth xix)
These contemporary feminist debates become extremely important when considering
the era in which Meade is writing. Before the pulps reprinted Wells and Verne, it was
late nineteenth century developments of cheap print culture which had made their
writing accessible in the first place. This was due to both the emergence of cheap
“penny” publications, as well as the marketing success of well-established titles such
as The Strand Magazine, which continuouslypublished Meade’s serial short stories.11
Significantly, this era can also be defined as the historical moment in which
there were marked attempts to consolidate the sciences as disciplines and to define
the modern role of that newly-coined being: the professional “scientist.” It was
around the time that Meade’s writing was at its most popular that the terms “man of
science” and “scientist” were coined; in 1901 Meade even named one of her Strand
science fiction serials “The Adventure of a Man of Science.” These new terms were
part of the British’s government’s move to imbue the sciences with epistemology, as
they became institutionalised and segregated into separate disciplines in a way which
had not been seen since Margaret Cavendish’s contemporaries’ founded the Royal
Society (Willis Monsters, Mesmerists and Machines 210). Significantly, the epistemology of
                                                          
11 Whilst the sheer volume of Wells’ science fiction oeuvre is impressive, I disagree with the critical over-emphasis
Nicholas Ruddick and others have tended to place upon Wells’ role in amalgamating science with utopian projections
and social critique. See Ruddick British Science Fiction (1992) for more details of the so-called “Wellsian synthesis”.
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segregated, disciplinary thinking is a form of rational modelling which feminists have
often defined as anathema to historical definitions of women as a more emotionally-
orientated creature, and which permeate our conceptualisations of literary
movements. For example, the “Female Gothic” is often seen as an inherently
“female” response to the late-eighteenth century failure in realising (“masculine”)
Enlightenment ideals. This antagonism between “masculine” concepts of Rational
thought as opposed to feminine concepts of Romantic-influenced “feeling” become
all too obvious when examining the recent scholarly neglect of fiction such as
Meade’s: the late Romantic elements of Frankenstein are, conceptually speaking, far
more compatible with contemporary feminist models of the critique of scientific
discourses than their fin-de-siècle counterparts. The outcome of this has been a
critical impasse in which feminist models can no longer be informed by scientific
reason.
Far from being merely the domain of decadence and masculinity in crisis,
however, critics such as MatthewBeaumont have already demonstrated howthe fin de
siècle constitutes a particular period in women’s writing that ought to be recognised as
one of excitement in terms of feminism and utopian imaginings. As he observes of
fin-de-siècle utopian fiction, “[i]n the 1880s and 90s, “advanced” middle-class women
perceived the present as a vital site of social experimentation, the heated laboratory of
some more liberated society” (217, emphasis added). Beaumont’s description
highlights precisely how literary criticism has canonised late nineteenth-century
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women’s writing as a comparatively more rational female subjectivity than the
destabilised female agency of its earlier literary counterparts, such as the “Female
gothic” and “novels of manners” that influenced Mary Shelley, for example. As stated
in the Introduction, his metaphor of the “heated laboratory” of society evokes the
idea that utopian and science fiction allows writers to conceive alternative
presents/near futures which are “social experiments” of how problems within the
writer’s contemporary society could be addressed. In other words, that writing is itself
the heated laboratory for creating a more utopian society. Moreover, fictional
depictions of actual heated laboratories such as Meade’s go even further to suggest
that the social laboratory of utopian science fiction can be created in real-life society
after all. This emphasises the concept of woman as a rational, ethical, scientific and
social thinker, as opposed to being the antithesis of Reason. Rather than positing the
site of the laboratory as a space of hubris and contempt for knowledge (one which
excludes women only to produce horrific Frankensteinian births), by the end of the
nineteenth century the laboratory – in fiction at least – can be seen as yielding a more
empowering form of agencyfor women.
Indeed, it is a fact often neglected by scholars (and certainly the editors of the
1920s science fiction pulps) that although Wells has been upheld as the paragon of the
somewhat male-dominated origins of turn of the century science fiction, he was both
adamant about the importance of cognitive fictional writing, such as detective fiction
and science fiction, and keen to support the idea of female scientists, such as we see in 
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Ann Veronica: A Modern Love Story (1909).12 Challenging the neglect of fiction which
does not correspond to the science as “rape” trope allows us to see howwomen have
also depicted themselves as having greater agency within the laboratory; women are
not merely experimented-upon and alienated beings: they are also laboratory
collaborators. Meade’s fiction does indeed address the same questions that Shelley
raised but she is answering them in an entirely different way. That is to say, Meade’s
central focus is defining how women and men collaborated as rational, feeling
humans, rather than perpetuating the model of an allegedly alienated, marginalised
and perhaps even non-human “creature”: the woman writer. Utopian and science
fictions are, after all, best defined as those cultural spaces in which we should be able
to make such socio-historical leaps.
Daring to Tread 
This is not to say that Frankenstein is not integral to this project however: Meade can
be seen as continuing Shelley’s interrogation of scientific responsibility and ethical
practice by updating the icon of the male scientist who chooses to take “life” forces –
such as death and disease – into his own hands. This can be clearlygleaned in Meade’s
various depictions of male and female scientists, who can be seen as being both
ethically responsible and ethically irresponsible. That said, upon first reading her
utopian science fiction does not proffer an altogether explicitly feminist writing in the
                                                          
12 See Mussell for more details of Well’s model of the ideal scientific fiction writer.
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light of contemporary feminist criticism’s definition that masculine scientific
rationality is signified by the authority of the phallic eye/“I” of the male
scientist/narrator. Whilst feminist considerations of the Platonic eye/I are too
numerous to note here,13 I would like to instead present how Meade’s depictions of
men and women “of science” – working both together and in opposition to one
another – posit a clear moral code of cognitive reason and humanity over the hubris
of the “I”. It is worth noting at this point that whilst Shelley was the woman in the
text behind the voice of three male protagonists: Victor Frankenstein, Captain Walton
and the monster (who is purported to be “biologically” male); seventy years later
Meade is able to begin exploring scientific ethics in no less a role than that of The
Medicine Lady(1892).
The Medicine Lady explores women’s role in relation to scientific knowledge,
makeshift laboratory research and the question of responsibility of this knowledge in
terms of society in general. In addition to Shelley’s nascent feminist concerns, Meade’s
The Medicine Ladywas co-written with a male doctor and forms a voice of male/female
equality that is signified by her use of the pronoun “we.” This was initially described
as an anonymous collaboration, but Clifford Halifax M.D. was later named as co-
writer.14 It imagines what might happen if a cure for tuberculosis was developed, one
which resulted in a full recoveryfor some patients, but which made others fatally ill. It
                                                          
13 See Evelyn Fox Keller DiscoveringReality(2003).
14 For more details, see Chris Willis.
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may appear to today’s readers to be more of a “medical drama”, yet the average late
nineteenth-century reader would have viewed this as a tale of the future possibilities
of medicine and their ambiguous results: in short, a science fiction story. The
protagonist, Cecilia Digby, develops her husband’s research after he dies before its
completion. When she then contracts tuberculosis, she continues his work by
injecting herself – becoming her first test subject, and begins to work on the
inoculation compound alone. Administering the cure to the wider community, she
becomes a local hero because she is willing to help those who are impoverished,
unlike “the men of science, who were afraid to help poor, suffering humanity” (253).
Historically-speaking, we knowthat a cure for tuberculosis is a newinnovation
or novum for readers in 1892 because the modern-dayBCG (Bacille Calmette Guérin)
vaccine was not developed until the 1920s. Even if readers did not already know that
Dr. Koch had only just identified the fact that tuberculosis was an organism named
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, his pursuit of a cure is clearly stated in the Preface as the
inspiration behind the story. The ambiguity surrounding Cecilia’s attempt to develop
the cure – against her late husband’s wishes – is clearly demonstrated to the reader by
the public’s reaction to its effects: a mob gathers outside Cecilia’s house, half of
whom are in favour of the cure and demanding more, and half of whom want to stop
her because its use has resulted in several deaths. Shortly after, the reader learns that
her motivations were, however, based upon humanity, not hubris, when she claims
that: “It was wicked of me to use that medicine, but I did not do it with a wicked
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motive. I used the medicine in perfect faith in its power to save you. I believed in it”
(251). Unlike Victor Frankenstein’s inability to “bear” the novum, Cecilia instead
concedes that her attentions were not those of pride but social philanthropy.
Rather than depicting women of science as morally superior to “the men of
science” (253), however, The Medicine Lady emphasises the positive collaboration
between men and women. The second edition of book, published in 1901, included
an epilogue written byanother character, Dr. Dickinson, who claims that Cecilia:
dared to enter where we men of science would have been afraid
to tread; and just because she did venture to lift the curtain
behind which we would not have attempted to penetrate, she
had helped forward her husband’s immature discovery in a
marvellous manner. (171, emphasis added)
It is clear to see howMeade debunks the idea that the Baconian pursuit of science is
a metaphorical act to unveil and “rape” nature; here the gendered associations with
this style of scientific language and its associations with the irresponsibility of “men
of science” are subverted because it is a woman instead who has “dared” to
“penetrate” and “lift the veil” of discovery when male scientists had not dared to.
Crucially, such a daring pursuit of knowledge ultimately has a positive impact upon
the future of society: Cecilia alone is responsible for the fact that a cure for
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tuberculosis lies in the very near future. Meade also acknowledges the collaboration
between her own work and that of a doctor in much the same way as Cecilia
acknowledges her husband’s work. Referring to her co-writer, Dr. Clifford Halifax,
she states in the Preface that: “[o]wing to the severe laws of Medical etiquette I am
obliged to let this story appear before the public without mentioning the name of the
clever Doctor who so largely helped me in this formation.” Meade is therefore
presenting both the positive developments in science and women’s role within it in
order to show that, by the end of the nineteenth century, women writers are instead
able to use science fiction as a more direct means of engaging with important
questions surrounding humanityand contemporaryscience than Shelley.
More importantly, both the Preface and the Epilogue demonstrate that what
can be defined as new (the novum) will always inevitably be a temporal/spatial
projection from an ever-shifting horizon of discourses, that which Mikhail Bakhtin
would have described as the “dialogic.”15 Indeed, the reason underlying this definition
is perhaps more complex, since the historically specific nature of the novum is based
upon whether it can be distinguished as “cognitive” as opposed to “anti-cognitive”
and that this is, in turn, reliant upon an understanding of the evolvingnature of rational
discourses. It is for this reason that Meade’s thematic interest in hypnotism, or
mesmerism, as it was also known, provides an excellent demonstration of the
                                                          
15 Here I refer simply to the “dialogic” as a state of any given contemporary society and culture as defined by its
“knowledge” discourses. For a more precise definition, see Mikhail M. Bakhtin The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays
(1982).
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historical specificity of cognitive rationale; hypnotism may have been seen as an anti-
cognitive discourse by today’s scientists but it was not considered to be anti-cognitive
in 1890s Britain. The last two decades of the nineteenth century have even been
referred to as the “golden age” of the “clinical” practice of hypnotism (Gauld 577-8).
After all, as Carl Freedman has noted, Suvin’s definition of science and utopian fiction
relies upon the idea that it is the playbetween cognitive reasoning and estrangement of
the novum which proffers such an astute engagement with the author’s present (17).
For Meade, hypnotism has a cognitive basis, being “[t]he little understood science of
mesmerism” (“The Panelled Bedroom” 675, emphasis added). The reason whywe can
define hypnotism as a novum, even though it was not a concept which was
“invented” anewfor the purposes of the plot, then, is because its treatment by Meade
is new in “My Hypnotic Patient” (1893) and The Desire of Men: An Impossibility (1899).
Indeed, in “My Hypnotic Patient”, Meade even suggests that because it is a “science
which is yet in its infancy” encompassing “one of the most dangerous productions of
modern times”, that its increased use could cause very serious problems for society at
large (172). Although hypnotism could be thought of as having no science fictional
relevance because it can be defined as neither new(since it was an existing concept in
1890s Britain), nor anti-cognitive, Meade describes it as a cognitive discourse, a
novum through which the rest of the narrative is conceptualised. What I want to
examine in particular here is how Meade depicts hypnotism as a fatal practice for
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society, due to its alleged ability to control the “mind” and mental health, two
obviously“cognitive” concepts.
When the semi-autobiographical character Dr Halifax (after Dr. Clifford
Halifax, the co-author) meets a patient who has been hypnotised into committing
murder on behalf of an alleged “doctor” who claims to be “a hypnotist by
profession”, the patient nearly dies from the resulting mental trauma (“My Hypnotic
Patient” 173). This short story theme is then extended in The Desire of Men, a novel
exploring the possible side-effects of hypnotism when used alongside intra-venous
drugs. What is significant about the combination of intra-venous drug usage and
hypnotism is the interchangeable nature of these practices; theyare part of a process that
is described by the elderly narrator as “a force which I could not in the very least
resist, [...] pushing me the way it wished me to go” (199). The novel predominantly
follows the point of view of Philip Rochester, who is offered youth at the expense,
unbeknown to him, of his own granddaughter’s health by his landlord, Jellyband.
Jellyband is revealed as a scientist who has set-up a boarding house in order to
experiment upon his tenants, indeed “the whole [house] is but an experiment” (79).
Therefore, the “desire of men” of the title is not the desire to be a man of heroism
but that of Victor Frankenstein: the medical and utopian desire to fulfil humankind’s
wish to live longer, free from the diseases of old age. As is the case with the majority
of Meade’s fiction, The Desire of Men is therefore structured in a format which
emphasises the ethics of experimenting on other human beings, and the power
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relations at play between a hypnotist and their subject, reflecting current feminist
concerns with the role of women as the subjects of scientific discourses. It is
important to note, however, that unlike many feminist reactions to the gender-bias
language of science throughout history, Meade is not relegating women to the
position of objectified-victim-of-male-scientist: after all, the experimental subject,
Phillip Rochester, is a man.
The cognitive projection of the theme of hypnotism in The Desire of Men helps
us to understand that we cannot – and must not – conceive of what is anti-cognitive
without considering the historical evolution of logical discourse. The evolution of
scientific rationale can even be defined as post factum interpretations of the cultural
dialogic surrounding historical definitions of the “cognitive”; never is it merely the
reflection of the ahistorical, essential “truth” of the material world. If the novum must
not function as an anti-cognitive phenomenon, then that which is “cognitive” must be
clearly defined. This is a key point in any discussion regarding science fiction, one
which is especially true of pre-twentieth century literature: what is possible – and
therefore, what is impossible – can only be judged in comparison with the scientific and
technological developments that are contemporaneous to its publication/writing. In
other words, in addition to being complete in the sense of a shift in the protagonist’s
mode of thinking, the novum’s cognitive function must be one which is a cognitive
projection of what was contemporaneous to the author’s present.
 Where we men of science would have been afraid to tread : L.T. Meade s fin-de-siecle Eye/I of Reason 
 Page 169 
 
Having considered Suvin’s idea of the historically specific novum, I shall return
again to the feminist science fiction paradigm of “Frankenstein’s inheritance”, in
order to reconsider the extent to which Meade is engaging with the questions that
Frankenstein raised earlier on in the nineteenth century. The allusions to Promethean
overreaching are obvious even given the stories’ titles, for example, how The Desire of
Men and The Medicine Lady evoke a sense of the gendered nature and agency involved
in scientific aspiration. The Desire of Men is reminiscent of the sub-title of Shelley’s
Frankenstein of: “the Modern Prometheus” (Butler, Title page). References to Prometheus
from Greek mythology indicate a thematic concern with desiring the knowledge of
something in order to overreach our roles as humans, the desire to displace the
function of the gods (since Prometheus was the first human to obtain the use of the
gods’ fire). However, the legacy of Frankenstein cannot be simply reduced to the
positing of science as the “other;” this is to merely turn inside out the anti-feminist
idea of nature – and hence woman – as the other, and hence to posit “man” as
“scientist” in a spurious dichotomy in which woman is “not-scientist.” Meade’s short
story entitled “Spangle-Winged” (1901) is the most explicit example of her
engagement with the Frankensteinian theme of the responsibility of the male scientist.
“Spangle-Winged” is Dr Matchen’s first-person apologia in recognition of his hubris,
and as such it closely recalls Victor Frankenstein’s confession to Captain Robert
Walton in his claims that: “I was a scientist of no mean attainments, a medical man
for whom one of the laurel wreaths of the profession may have been a possibility.
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Nevertheless, I fell. I plead no excuse” (“Spangle-Winged” 201, emphasis added). But
whereas Matchen here pleads “no excuse”, the narrative structure of Frankenstein can
be described as Frankenstein’s attempt to present Walton/the reader with numerous
excuses.
Matchen goes on to reveal in his apologia that his experimental research into a
cure for malignant malaria becomes the means by which he and his accomplice
attempt to murder Rachel, a woman he is in love with, and her soon-to-be husband
Captain Channing. Matchen’s liminal position in relation to the couple therefore
makes him comparable with the jealousy, otherness and rage of Frankenstein’s
creature as he observes Victor and his new wife Elizabeth on their wedding night.
This is important, since Matchen’s alienation destabilises the “woman as alien” motif
of feminist science fiction, wherein the alienated being signifies as “woman” by
default.16 However, because the protagonist decides to save their lives with the
antidote that he has been developing, Meade’s concern is more plausiblydefined as an
exploration of the humane way in which we should interact with scientific knowledge.
Matchen’s pursuit of knowledge has been motivated not by the totalizing control of life
and death, as Victor Frankenstein is, but by an altruistic desire to create a cure for a
disease which is the undiscriminating and arbitrarykiller of millions of innocent (often
impoverished) lives. Having infected his two victims through a malignant malaria
                                                          
16 For an account of the inherent masculine identity of the “other” in Victorian scientific narratives and gothic fiction,
see AndrewSmith VictorianDemons: medicine, masculinityand the gothicat the fin-de-siècle (2004).
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sample taken from the namesake “spangle-winged” mosquito of the title, Matchen
attempts to make amends for his malice, by nursing Rachel and Channing back to
health. As a result of this, like Frankenstein’s mother, he too becomes infected –
further subverting the trope of the irresponsible scientist as an inherently masculine-
identified figure, since illness and degeneration are often defined as feminine
attributes. After deliberately infecting them, Matchen decides to not save his own life
by self-administering the antidote drug and so the story ends – quite literally – mid-
sentence because the narrator has allegedlydied whilst attempting to document both his
confession and his scientific findings. To add a sense of the “what if” to his account,
there is an epilogue stating that he was indeed found dead with his pen in his hand
because he was trying to document the details of his discovery. In doing so, the plot
also performs the literary function that Suvin terms the “lost invention” device
(Metamorphoses 72). As clichéd as the lost invention trope may seem, in one sense, it
functions to complete the novum in terms of the concept of the question “what if?”:
instead of becoming the “when” in terms of the microcosm of the story world, it
creates as sense of speculation – “what if he had documented the malaria antidote?”
In contrast to Matchen and his apologia, Meade’s oeuvre also includes two of
the earliest popular fiction examples of professional female criminals, Madame Sara
and her reincarnation as Madame Koluchy in The Stand serials “The Brotherhood of
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the Seven Kings” and “The Sorceress of the Strand.”17 Indeed, although critics have
insisted that the following description is more comparable with that of a witch’s den, I
argue that Meade’s depiction of Madame Sara’s laboratory as a space in which highly-
technological treatments are performed instead recapitulates the conflation of the
gothic and the scientific that scholars often associate with a crisis in masculinity at the
fin de siècle, the so-called “Jekyll and Hyde” paradigm.18 In the following quotation,
Madame Sara plays out the subversion of this motif when a male narrator describes her
laboratory.
Above the chair hung electric lights in powerful reflectors,
and lenses like bull’s-eyes lanterns. [...] There were dry-cell
batteries for the continuous current and conduction coils
for the Faradic currents […] Madame took me from this
room into another, where a still more formidable array of
instruments were to be found. Here were a wooden
operating table and chloroform and ether apparatus.
(“Madame Sara” 392)
It must be stated that Madame Koluchy and Madame Sara do not prove to be
unproblematic feminist figures for readers: their use of scientific knowledge is far
                                                          
17 These were co-written with Dr Eustace Robert Barton, rather than Clifford Halifax. See Chris Willis.
18 See AndrewSmith.
 Where we men of science would have been afraid to tread : L.T. Meade s fin-de-siecle Eye/I of Reason 
 Page 173 
 
from utopian. Paradoxically, it is preciselythis depiction of Madame Sara and Madame
Koluchy as female scientists who misuse scientific discoveries which lies at the heart of
Meade’s feminism. Whilst the crisis in eugenics, xenophobia and femininity that is
arguably played out in the role of the multi-talented surgeon, “beautifier”, scientist,
and dentist: “Madame Sara”, have all been well documented by critics (The Sorceress of
the Strand 166), what I am concerned with here is Meade’s emphasis upon Madame
Sara’s undisputed talent.19
In “Talk of the Town” (1903), Madame Sara even outsmarts Professor Piozzi, a
man who is described as none other than “a phenomenon, a genius, probably the
most brilliant of our time” (68). Piozzi has produced “artificial light”, which would
replace the need for both the electrical light that was still fairlynewin 1903 and its gas
counterpart. Madame Sara also quickly comprehends the potential of both this and
Piozzi’s new synthetic food enzyme, which could rid the world of starvation and
poverty, and attempts to patent the discoveryas her own work for economic gain. She
has therefore been able to interpret Piozzi’s findings in a way in which he has not
been able to, desiring world domination over curing world poverty. Although
Madame Koluchy and Madam Sara have chosen to use their scientific knowledge to
gain economic success, they are nevertheless radical characters because they are
depicted as women who are proficient enough to out-wit other men of great scientific
                                                          
19 See Elizabeth Carolyn Miller “‘Shrewd Women of Business’” for a description of Madame Sara and Madame Koluchy
as a modern appropriation of witch-craft and the racism of eugenics.
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intellect. Yet this is not the main focus of Meade’s feminism; it is in depicting women
as monstrous scientists that Meade’s texts help to subvert definitions of Frankenstein’s
inheritance as that which inextricably bound the male Romantic ego to the more pan-
historical figure of the irresponsible (male) scientist.
The idea of the ethical and gendered nature of scientific knowledge is extended
in Meade’s short story “Twenty Degrees” (1898). It describes how Madame Koluchy
nearly kills a man through the radiation poisoning emitted by an x-ray machine of
fantastical size, built so that its rays would be able to penetrate the wall of the house
next door. Radiation poisoning is a theme that Strand readers would have been
familiar with, since it extended an earlier story about the Röntgen ray in Meade and
Clifford Halifax’s “The Adventures of a Man of Science”, which had run alongside a
Strand Magazine article presenting the x-ray machine, entitled “The NewPhotography”
(1896).20 “The New Photography” depicted x-ray pictures of objects, animals and
people’s limbs and revealed how this so-called “new photography” was an entirely
new way of thinking about the natural world, since rendering the solid merely
“opaque” has deep philosophical resonances. By highlighting the possible dangers of
the newx-ray, “TwentyDegrees” was drawing upon the contemporaryinterest in how
the Röntgen ray functioned as an “eye.” Meade’s extrapolation of the x-ray therefore
explores the idea of seeing and speaking through the “eye” of science and the “I” of
                                                          
20 “The NewPhotography” is a Strand article of note for many Victorian scholars. See Mussell and Pittard.
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the narrator respectively, and hownewand/or possible technologies allowus to “see”
much more than we could before.
By the end of the nineteenth-century, science has therefore transported society
to a place in which its application was not so much a desire to “unveil nature” as
much as it was the idea of being able to see through material matter. This new
transparency must not simply be reduced to a metaphorical “penetration” of nature;
there are more complex issues at play here when we define technology as enabling us
to see matter in – quite literally– an entirely different light. After all, when objects are
translucent, observation and knowledge do not so easily fall into the remit of the
Baconian definition of knowledge (in which truth is tantamount to a divine light or
the process of “enlightenment”).21 Rather, the identity of scientific knowledge as
divine light is problematised by the glow or spark of those electromagnetic currents,
which destablises the boundaries of matter for the viewer. Ultimately this undermines,
rather than supports, the definition of the history of science as a space in which the
Platonic divide between matter and mind is at its most poignant.
If the so-called “new photography” therefore constituted an entirely new way
of thinking about the natural world, it was one which did not as easily support
conceptualising the human through the highly gendered dichotomy of “bodily
woman” and “thinking man.” Meade’s “The Horror of Studley Grange” (1894) plays
                                                          
21 The eye, the sun and the light are all used in Plato to establish intelligibility. See Evelyn Fox Keller and Christine
Grontkowski’s “The Mind’s Eye.”
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out this very idea. The narrator Doctor Halifax tries to discover the circumstances
that have brought about Lord Studley’s “malady of the mind”, a condition which is
causing him so much trauma that it is predicted his physical body will also inevitably
“give wayunder the strain” (4). It is revealed that his mental strain has been caused by
an optical illusion, the non-material nature of which affects both his sense of
temporality and reality, since he cannot cognitively explain what the apparition is (see
Appendix III): “I know by a faint ticking sound in the darkness that the Thing, for I
can clothe it with no name, is about to visit me [...] a preternaturally large eye, which
looks fixedly at me with a diabolical expression” (8, emphasis added). Lord Studley’s
malady can be therefore seen as signifying the philosophical destabilisation of the
observer’s scientific eye. In other words, “the Thing” which eludes definition brings
about his loss of selfhood, and, thereby, the unknown origin of the “Thing” comes to
represent society’s inabilityto understand the world.
The “Thing” is eventually revealed to be yet another example of how women
can be seen as possessing technical prowess; Dr Halifax reveals that the giant eye is
the result of scientific apparatus used by Lady Studley (13). Although “The Horror of
Studley Grange” could not be described as science fiction per se (since the technology
enabling the apparition of a giant eye is revealed to be entirelypossible in the present),
it nevertheless provides an important “lens” through which we can consider Meade’s
other short stories. The fact that the gender of the “eye” which has been scrutinising
Lord Studley and his doctor – the narrator, Dr Halifax – is revealed to be female
 Where we men of science would have been afraid to tread : L.T. Meade s fin-de-siecle Eye/I of Reason 
 Page 177 
 
creates yet another inversion of the gendered roles of irresponsible or morally
“criminal” scientists. The usual narrative “I” of the male scientist/explorer is instead
enacted bya responsible and caring male scientist (Dr. Halifax), the “victim” is a male
in power (Lord Studley) and the scientificallyproficient criminal scrutinising them both
is Lady Studey and her scientifically-enlarged phallic eye. Yet again, this undermines
the feminist stereotype of the male explorer/scientist who, like Victor Frankenstein,
“uncovers” and objectifies nature in order to gain knowledge. Moreover, what is
crucial to a more nuanced understanding of the cultural importance of Meade’s
popular writing is the cognition of the fact that the uncanny and penetrating gaze of
Lady Studley’s projected, enlarged and scientifically-constructed “eye” serves as a
symbol of the collaborative eye/“I” of Meade’s Reason. After all, in scrutinising Dr
Halifax, the giant female “eye” can be seen as scrutinising the political meaning of the
“I” of the first-person narrator. The importance of Lady Studley’s “eye” within
Meade’s thematic concerns is emphasised even further by the fact that it is this image
which forms the Frontispiece to the book collection of Stories fromthe Diaryof a Doctor:
First Series (1894).
Lady Studley’s giant eye is just one of many examples of “eyes” and “I”s that
become integral to Meade’s engagement with the heated laboratories in which woman
can be the bearer of technological knowledge, and, likewise, men can figure as the
exploited subject of a gaze motivated by scientific epistemologies. Lady Studley’s
projected eye, the “Bull’s eye” surgical lights in Madame Sara’s high-tech laboratory
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and the giant, wall-penetrating x-ray eye of Madame Koluchy can all clearly be seen as
proffering a feminist – yet rational – disruption of the gender stereotypes which are
often at play in scientific discourses and spaces. Meade does not simply present
societal inversions of empowered women scientists at the expense of the “man of
science”, however, in addition to these more problematic feminist figures, she extends
this premise of the feminist subversion of the “I”/eye even further in her anthology
Silenced (1904); here she explores the roles of female agencythrough the power of voice.
 
Scientific Sanctuary 
Contrary to the recent lack of engagement with her work, Meade’s Strand serials were
so successful that theywere reprinted in book collections. One of these short stories –
“Silenced” holds particular significance for considerations of a feminist voice in
Meade’s writing because, unlike many of her other Strand stories, the narrator of the
co-authored “Silenced” story was a woman. Written with Robert Eustace between
their “Adventures of a Man of Science” and “Brotherhood of the Seven Kings”
serials in 1897, the importance of this storyto the thematic concerns of the later book
is explicit from the outset. “Silenced” is both the first story of the collection and its
namesake, and its feminist implications are also clearly gleaned in the plot, in which
the protagonist Nurse Petrie is “silenced” from betraying the fact that her mentor
plans to neurologically damage his fiancé’s long lost love during surgery. The surgeon
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achieves this by operating on Nurse Petrie, leaving her with an “external opening” in
her skull, one which is positioned “just over the centre which controls the powers of
speech” (39, emphasis added).
The feminist implications of silenced, in which a first-person narrator is
deliberatelydisempowered when their voice is usurped, form just one example of how
the interplay between silence and agency become central to the Silenced corpus.
Indeed, rather than forming a collection of individual stories, both Silenced and The
Sanctuary Club are contextualised under one umbrella story: that of a doctor who has
used new-found wealth in order to create a utopian space within which to nurse
psychologically-troubled patients. Furthermore, the introductions to these two books
both seek to situate the short stories within the same loci: that of a scientific utopia –
even the title words “sanctuary” and “silenced” convey a sense of howutopian spaces
are simultaneously defined and destroyed by the power of voice. Indeed, the
“Sanctuary Club” is just that: it is a segregated space in which individuals are able to
find sanctuary. Likewise, how the stories’ protagonists are “silenced” is actually
revealed to be part of a process in which the exclusion and silencing of voices within
scientific spaces is challenged. This is because each individual narrator is given a first-
person narrative voice, whatever their gender or social position. This means that
Silenced can be seen as a literary space wherein what has been silenced about the abuse
of scientific discourses can nowbe voiced.
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The narrator is also keen to emphasise that the utopian space of sanctuary has
been created as a newscientific environment. Rather than portraying an anti-scientific
attitude, the “victims” of scientific criminals recuperate through the means of an
innovative scientific atmosphere. Similarly to the ethos of Millenium Hall (see Chapter
Two), in both the Sanctuary Club and of Sherwood Towers “[e]very appliance that art
or science could suggest for the alleviation of suffering humanity would be worked”
(The SanctuaryClub 9). This is especially true for the Sanctuary Club, in which climatic
control and the manufacture of mineral water form the basis of the infrastructure of
the sanctuary.
This great institution, of which I had dreamed of for so long,
was for the treatment of all sorts of disease on a hitherto
unattempted scale. Here myfriend Chatwynd and I could put
into execution the boldest and most recent theories that
other medical men, either from lack of means or courage,
could not carry out. One of the chief features of the place
was to be a special department where the latest and most up-
to-date scientific theories could be realized, one in especial
being an attempt at the production of artificial climates [...]
At the Sanctuary Club, we had, by virtue of our modern
scientific knowledge, the means of producing such
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conditions artificially. Mineral waters of the exact
composition of those at the springs of Continental spas
could be reproduced in our laboratory. (9)
To add to this ethos of a scientific – yet nurturing – utopian space (two ideas which
are often seen as anathema to one another), each individual’s story has its own
introduction by the first-person narrator who introduces the book. The affect of this
encompassing narrative is that we automatically contrast the individual narrators’
pejorative experiences with the backdrop of the utopian sanctuary from which it is
“voiced.”
After the initial introduction by the narrator, the short stories all continue from
the perspective of the “patient”, who has also been a “scientist” or expert of scientific
knowledge of some form, such as the “silenced” neurosurgical attendee, Nurse Petrie.
Just as the narrators are often extraordinarily talented women in terms of their
scientific know-how and propensity for voicing their ethical concerns regarding the
use and abuse of knowledge (the latter being a role which is traditionally associated
with men), the role of nurturer (a role traditionally associated with women), is
performed by the narrator doctors. In the same way that Lady Studley subverted the
role of the doctor/detective Halifax, the testimony of the “I” of the patient and the
“eye” of the scientist is blurred because the idea that the role of the “Doctor” is the
onlylegitimate scientist to possess an “I”/eye of authorityis refuted.
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How the complex narrative shifts subvert the gendered nature of authority is
most clearly seen in the short story “The Blue Laboratory.” The narrator introduces
the story in the first person and then shifts to speak in the third person, whereupon this
omniscience is interrupted bythe phrase “TOLD BY MADELINE” and the narrative
perspective then changes completely to that of Madeline’s first-person account of her
experiences (Silenced 267). More significantly, this particular story destabilises the usual
motifs of women as the object or victims of science and not its authors. “The Blue
Laboratory” is set in 1895 in St. Petersburg, and describes the experiences of an
English tutor who has recently been employed by a prolific Russian scientist, Dr.
Chance. Whilst the depiction of a Russian optical scientist during a period in which
there was competition between Britain and Russia in this field is of significance, the
story is mainly concerned with the gendering of scientific knowledge. When she
informs him that she has “studied chemistry a good deal for a girl, and [that she] took
science tripos at Girton”, he asks her to help him write his newexperiment in English
for submission to the Science Gazette, a journal that Madeline has also “studied for
many years” (270). Like Nurse Petrie’s description of the neurosurgeon, Madeline
describes Dr. Chance’s attitude to his work as “a scientist who had not a scrap of soul
about him” (284). This, of course, reflects the attempt to distinguish the irresponsible
scientist from the responsible one, which can be gleaned in Shelley’s juxtaposition of
the caring Clerval as he nurses the irresponsible Frankenstein.
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When Madeline challenges Dr Chance’s negligent attitude, they begin a
dialogue about the gendered nature of scientific knowledge, in which Chance tells
Madeline that she is: “full of curiosity. That which ruined your mother Eve is also
your bane” (292). When he asked her: “What has a young uninformed creature like
you to do with science?”, Madeline replies: “I love science […] I respect her; her
secrets are so precious” (292), inverting the idea that nature is female by describing
science as female as well, just as Loudon genders progress as female in The Mummy! (see
Chapter Three). Increasingly worried by Chance’s inhumane and misogynistic attitude
towards scientific endeavour, Madeline formulates a plan to uncover his experimental
secrets. She discovers that Chance himself has made a ground-breaking discovery,
that: thought can be photographed, wherein “[s]ubjective impressions of thought
cause molecular changes in the cells of the brain [which] then give a distinct
impression on a negative” (313). Furthermore, he has even imprisoned a man as a test
subject. “[F]asten[ing] back his eyes with a specula”, Dr Chance induces vivid visions
with the use of drugs in order to capture the “visual purple” of the test subject’s
thoughts (312-3). The denouement of the story is that by using great scientific
canniness and courage, Madeline is able to “rescue” herself and the experimental
subject (who is, significantly, another example of a male test subject), and she escapes
to the scientific sanctuaryof Sherwood Towers.
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Scientific Fiction 
The photography of thought described in “The Blue Laboratory” draws heavily upon
theories which we term today as the photoelectric effect, and which were discovered
by Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894) around the same time that Meade was compiling
Silenced. Hertz had written an account of this effect in 1887, detailing his accidental
discovery of the influence of ultra-violet light on electrical discharge (Taton 216).
Hertz’s account became influential in the study of the relationship between optics and
electricity, and it is therefore likely to have been the source of Meade’s inspiration too.
What complicates reading Meade’s fiction as utopian and science fiction in this way,
however, is the correlation between science fiction and detective fiction. Lorena Laura
Stookey cites The Medicine Lady as one of the first texts to amalgamate the detective
plot with the concerns of science fiction, an antecedent of twentieth-century “medical
mystery” writers such as Robin Cook (18-19). More importantly, from the beginning
of the second series of “Stories from the Diary of a Doctor” in 1895, the serials were
printed with the authors’ names and a “disclaimer” announcing that any implausible
elements found in the stories were to be considered as being rooted in scientific fact.
Complexly, the disclaimer was therefore intended as an attempt to pre-empt any
readers’ tendencyto classifythe stories as science “fiction” rather than science “fact.”  
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These stories were written in collaboration with a medical man
of large experience. Many are founded on fact, and all are
within the region of practical medical science. Those stories
which may convey an idea of the impossible are only a forecast of
an earlyrealization. (“Creating a Mind” 33, emphasis added)
Chris Pittard and others have argued that this disclaimer is the result of the Strand’s
resistance to criticism from the medical milieu regarding the scientific basis of Meade’s
stories.22 In other words, it is the magazine’s attempt to playdown the classification of
anyand all non-realisticelements of her work, particularlyin terms of futurism or of any
sense of projection. This anxiety regarding the non-realist elements of her stories is
only emphasised by the fact that Meade’s fictional engagement with scientific
discourses became not more naturalistic but less naturalistic after the introduction of
the disclaimer.
This parameter set it apart from Strand Magazine’s other, more fantastical
projections (such as translations of Jules Verne) on the basis that each of her short
stories effectively contained a reminder to the reader to not consider this writing in
terms of speculative fiction, and that it must be thought of as detective fiction instead.
The sudden appearance of claims to realism about the near future/alternative present
of Meade’s scientific fiction indicates that there was just as much anxiety surrounding
                                                          
22 See Pittard for a close examination of this disclaimer in relation to ideas of the detective genre.
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the resolution of the definition of this type of “liminal” fiction for its contemporary
readers as there is within scholarship today. Not “fantasy” like Wells and Verne, and
not “horror” like Shelley, it was instead labelled as “realistic” in order to be
categorised within and alongside the Strand’s Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes
series, which it had run beside. Yet Meade’s work constitutes not so much the praxis
of “revealing” and solving but rather that of troubling and purporting to the “what
if?” After all, the need to clarify Meade’s work as “real” and Verne’s as “fantasy”
within Strand Magazine simply cannot be understood purely within the constructions
inherent in twentieth century science fiction scholarship. However, it must be
remembered that the statement: “[t]hose stories which may convey an idea of the
impossible are only a forecast of an early realization” makes a claim for realism which is
not based not upon real life but upon an ever-shifting possible future of real life
(“Creating a Mind” 33, emphasis added). The crucial point about its basis for realism
is the contemporaneous nature of what constitutes scientific fact itself, through a
temporal projection of what scientific fact could be in the future. In this sense, the
disclaimer clearly draws attention to that which it is trying to cover: the futuristic
element of so-called scientific facts in Meade’s writing. Hence, what it attempts to
cover (but then subsequently draws attention to) is that which is integral to the
utopian and science fiction text.
It is not my intention here to displace one genre topology as superior to – or
indeed, distinctive from – the other, I wish to demonstrate that Meade’s concerns lie
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outside the function of “mystery” and revelation per se. I instead assert that the
majority of her serial short stories and books should be considered as being
contingent upon the praxis of projection, the definitive process within science and
utopian fiction. This also means that one of the key issues to consider when
examining genre formation and evolution is also the issue of historical alterity (Suvin
80). Texts which project from a present or starting point that the reader is not entirely
familiar with, such as writing from an historical period, are harder to define as
“futuristic” or “alternative” to the author’s present. This problem becomes
particularly apparent when trying to map texts which may be projecting into
futures/alternative presents which vary only slightly from the author’s contemporary
society because it becomes harder to then follow the path of trajectory. This is why
historical alterity becomes especially evident when looking at texts which may have
been received by their contemporary society as exploring a near future/alternative
present paradigm, such as Meade’s. If cognitive “othering” is less explicitly marked by
temporal and/or spatial signifiers, it is more likely that scholars will have overlooked
the value of the text’s actual cognitive projection.
Before we insert Meade within a genealogy of science fiction which neatly
adheres to Suvin’s temporally specific novum, it must be stated, however, that he
would argue that, like Frankenstein, fiction such as Meade’s is not science fiction
proper but that of the “science novel, which is specific to murder mysteries, not to a
mature SF [science fiction]” and is, like Meade’s writing: “better suited to the short
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story” (10).23 He goes on to explain that this is because rationalitycannot exist in a plot
which “pretends to explain away the supernatural by reassigning it to natural science
and noble scientists” (23, emphasis added). He also insists that the function of the
novum “entails a change of the whole universe of the tale”, as well as correlating with
a post-Cartesian and post-Baconian scientific praxis. Simultaneously, however, he
concedes that this is, in actual fact, not possible, since something new which is not
based upon present scientific knowledge would be impossible (63-4).
In contrast to Suvin, however, I have argued for a definition of utopian and
science fiction as the critical exploration of the present and/or future of scientific,
technological or ideological knowledge, which involves the function of the novum as
that which is – most importantly – not entirely totalizing. Far from being immature
science fiction, texts such as Meade’s provoke important questions regarding social
practice and ideology without having to make great leaps in space, time and cognitive
understanding. Therefore, the equivocal nature of the disclaimer that was introduced
at the beginning of the second series of Meade’s Strand magazine serial “Diaries of a
Doctor” can, therefore, be seen as facilitating the consideration of her work with a
view to a more encompassing genealogy of science and utopian fiction by women. This
is because, in contrast to Suvin’s dismissal of the “science novel” on the basis that it is
an immature version of science fiction proper, pan-historical utopian and science
                                                          
23 See Suvin Victorian Science Fiction in the UK (1983) for a dismissal of Meade’s oeuvre as a significant work of science
fiction in comparison to his treatment of writers such as Marie Corelli.
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fiction, critic Jane Donawerth argues that science fiction must entail “the satisfaction
of scientific problem-solving” (1, emphasis added). This is perhaps why Meade’s
amalgamation of science fiction and detective fiction work so well together: they both
involve the use of a visionaryeye which disseminates and scrutinises.
 
 
Conclusion 
Frankenstein is a text which is more often than not described as a late-Romantic
response to the “emerging scientific discourses” of the Industrial Revolution (Cranny-
Francis 44). Yet contemporary feminist science fiction critics have lost sight of the
fact that it was not only in the last few decades that writers have returned to the
questions that Shelley raised. Writing by women at the fin de siècle has been somewhat
excluded from pan-historical considerations of Frankenstein’s feminist heritage. The
alienation of writers like Meade from the feminist inheritances of “daughters of
Frankenstein/Frankenstein” can perhaps be seen as being based, at least in part, upon
their non-compliance with the idea that science is a singular concept with a singular
story in which women writers should seek to subvert the inevitable singularity of its
discursive practices. However, this reactionary feminist stance becomes moot if we can
reveal – rather than deny – the negotiations between these positions, which have
already existed throughout history. What is particularly important to recognise, of
course, are the negotiations between men and women of science.
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In contrast to Wells and Verne, Meade’s work has been side-lined in
considerations of fin-de-siècle science fiction, perhaps because its original appearance
in popular fiction within Strand Magazine set an ironic perimeter around the nature of
the futurity of its references to possible future scientific inventions. Even in Meade’s
most realist detective fiction work (which I would define here as those which deploy
little or no scientific/technological innovation), the implicit concern with, and
troubling of, the “what if” notion of science fiction can still be gleaned. I have
referred to this as the visionary “eye” of science fiction, that which is simultaneously
concerned with both the present, the alternative present and the possible futures of
both of these presents. However, much feminist criticism has been concerned with
the idea of the forward-looking “eye” of science fiction in terms of male hegemony.
For many feminist critics, then, the “eye” of science fiction has for the most part
served as the “I” of the male explorer; the “I” of a scientist whose aim is to objectify
(Donawerth xx). Co-writing with two different real-life medical doctors, Meade is
clearly not an obvious figure for feminist science fiction scholars. It could be argued
that Meade is nothing more than the ventriloquist puppet of her two co-writers,
thereby reflecting the premise of Hilary Rose and others that women in science have
traditionally only had a voice by “speaking through men” (qtd. in Donawerth 9).
However, Meade retained the copyright for all of her written work and established a
popular identity as a writer which would suggest that she can be defined as a truly
feminist author.
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Meade’s fiction may indeed be addressing the same questions that Shelley
raised, but she is, nevertheless, answering them in an entirely different way. The
feminist insistence upon a genealogyof science fiction which begins with MaryShelley
is therefore merely counterproductive to an understanding of the historical
progression of genre formation wis es or “as it was.” Torodov argues that genre is “a
socio-historical as well as a formal entity”, in which transformations “must be
considered in relation to social changes” (80). In light of this, we should perhaps
reconsider the historical position of writers, especially women writers who have
deviated from twentieth-century models of Shelley’s male scientist, as being a rich and
necessary part of mapping newgenealogies within women’s science fiction. Indeed, it
is harder to think of a better example of Beaumont’s allegorical laboratory for a
feminist future than a popular fin-de-siècle woman writer, exploring and commenting
upon society through science and scientific spaces, for a largely male readership.24
Although Meade could arguably be seen as creating what Donawerth has termed a
feminist, “utopian science”, what is particularly feminist about Meade’s writing is that
she achieves this in collaboration with real-life men of science and the scientific
imagination, such as Clifford Halifax and Robert Eustace. In light of this, I conclude
that the praxis of women writers such as Meade entirely disrupts the critical
                                                          
24 This is in contrast to writers such as Marie Corelli, who Suvin claims were writing for female middle-class readers. See
VictorianScience Fiction inthe UK.
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antagonism involved with perpetuating the dialectic of woman as nature/alien: man as
eye/explorer.
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- 5 - 
Science in the Fiction of Pat Cadigan s Synners 
and Joanna Russ s The Female Man 
Unlike the hopes of Frankenstein’s monster, the cyborg does not expect its father to save
it through a restoration of the garden, that is, through the fabrication of a heterosexual
mate, through its completion in a finished whole, a cityand cosmos. The cyborg does not
dream of community on the model of the organic family, this time without the Oedipal
project. The cyborg would not recognise the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and
cannot dream of returning to dust. (151)
Science has been utopian and visionaryfrom the start; that is why“we” need it. (192)
(Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women (1991))
How could we ever begin to describe the cultural conditions of twentieth-century
utopian and science fiction by women? For it would be misleading to suggest that one
mode of feeling or historical moment above all others could ever sum up the
proliferation of discourses representing even the vaguest account of “the twentieth
century.” One model of thought that has had an immense impact upon both popular
culture and how recent female subjectivities have been re-defined, however, is
cybernetics and the idea of the cyborg. Pioneered by Nobert Weiner after World War
II, cybernetics theories defined all systems as the flowof “information”, including the
human body, forming the basis of concepts such as the personal computer and
“cyberspace.”1 The term “cyborg” (cyb[ernetic]-org[anism]) was coined in a 1960
military paper entitled: “Drugs, Space and Cybernetics: the Evolution of Cyborgs”,
                                                          
1 See Weiner The HumanUse of HumanBeings: Cybernetics and Society(1950).
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which explored the concept of pilots as machine-men because they processed flight
information in both a “cybernetic” and an “organic” way(Orr 161). Together with the
development of advanced technologies, this post-war definition of the human as an
“information processor” made manifest the fears and dreams of women’s literary
explorations of “hybrid” human bodies since the 1600s (see Chapters One, Two and
Three). In this chapter I examine how Joanna Russ’s The Female Man (1975) and Pat
Cadigan’s Synners (1991) conceptualise the impact of the scientific discourses of the
so-called “Information Age” through the human body. I demonstrate howthese texts
engage with ideas surrounding what it means to be a “cyborg” by focussing
particularlyon the posthumanism of Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto.” I suggest
that Synners, The Female Man and, by corollary, late twentieth-century utopian and
science fiction by women in general, all form a useful approach for understanding and
negotiating theories of the possible technological future, as well as the present.
In order to explore a historical overview of feminist subjectivities in utopian
and science fiction, it must be remembered that the technologies, sciences and
“discursively-aware” nature of postmodernity means that defining female
subjectivities of “Reason” are somewhat problematic. To negotiate this complexity,
therefore, it might be useful to return to Survin’s basic definition of utopian and
science fiction as the “literature of cognitive estrangement” (Metamorphoses of Science
Fiction 4). After all, this seminal definition served to highlight the fact that cognitive
estrangement – like the human bodyitself – can be manifested in many forms. This can
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be the estrangement to arise from the presentation of a new development within
technology or science (known as extrapolation), as well as the presentation of a space,
place or time of alterity. One example of this is the notion of “cyberspace” and virtual
reality technologies. Cyberspace is depicted in both fictional and factual writing as the
hypothetical “space” for storing, and “interacting” with, electronic information. The
questions the concept of “cyberspace” raised even became the central focus of an
entire wave of utopian and science fiction; following the critical acclaim of William
Gibson’s novel Neuromancer (1984), such fictions were referred to as “cyberpunk”.2
Cyberpunk writing combines the futuristic settings and technologically-
orientated plots of science fiction (“cyber-”) with the narrative exposition of the
maverick detective figure of early twentieth-century urban detective pulp novels, and
the late-twentieth century countercultural “punk” aesthetic. It is predominantly
concerned with exploring the human interaction with electronic information, the
possible evolution of electronic information into an autonomous Artificial Intelligence
and the socio-economic divide between “hackers” or “punks” and large corporate
organisations. With its focus on how technological interaction brings about the
protagonists’ states of “virtual” and “material” reality (“real life”), cyberpunk
interrogates what it means to be human in the (inter)face of advanced technologies.
Cyberpunk therefore functions in the same way as the most socio-politically “useful”
science fiction, that is: through the exploration and depiction of the new or the
                                                          
2 It is also used to describe works of art, literature and music influenced by postmodern punk See Larry McCaffrey
Stormingthe RealityStudio (1991).
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novum, it operates as a means for social dreaming and thinking, for social critique,
and for social change. In doing so, it can be seen as a development of the
philosophical and material concerns of “feminist science fiction”, despite the fact that
critics such as Andrew Ross have defined it as merely a reflection of “the urban
fantasies of white male folklore” (Strange Weather 145). Describing cyberpunk as
“white folklore” undermines its role as a political genre; after all, Suvin’s Metamorphoses
distinguishes these socio-politically useful genres from the hegemonic functions of
formulaic folklore. This critical divide is somewhat exacerbated by Donna Haraway’s
claim in her seminal article “Manifesto for cyborgs: science, technology, and socialist
feminism in the 1980s” (1985) that “feminist science fiction” was the form of
theorising and writing the cyborg tout force, which she refers to as “cyborg writing”
(Simians 175).3 Yet, as Samuel Delaney has noted, cyberpunk developed out of the
aesthetics and politics of some of the very same 1970s-influenced feminist science
fiction texts that it has been described as anathema to (Hollinger 210). Likewise, my
examination of “feminist science fiction” text The Female Man alongside “cyberpunk”
novel Synners aims to reveal that “feminist science fiction” and “cyberpunk” are
inevitably concerned with the same issues of the impact of technology upon the
human body.
By utilising the fictional cyborgs of feminist science fiction as a means for
theorising women’s relationship with real-world technology, Haraway’s “Cyborg
                                                          
3 In this chapter, references are taken from its reprinting in Simians, Cyborgs and Women (1990), rather than the original
article.
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Manifesto” became one of the most influential critical applications of utopian and
science fiction to date. Published in the Socialist Review specifically to demonstrate an
innovative leftist feminist approach, the “Cyborg Manifesto” suggested that whilst all
women are cyborgs (150), onlysome women in the world epitomise what is needed in
order to fully understand the newly-technical post-humanist world (Simians 177). In
deliberate opposition to historical, “white” humanisms, “it is this chimeric monster,
without claim to an original language before violation, that crafts the erotic,
competent, potent identities of women of colour” (174-5).
Haraway argues that her paradigm of the socially-marginal-woman-as-cyborg is
“indebted to” the 1970’s utopian science fiction of writers such as Joanna Russ and
Octavia Butler (196) because their revolutionary way of writing the self – “cyborg
writing” (175) – demonstrates how “the boundary between science fiction and social
reality is an optical illusion” (149). When considered in the light of previous chapters,
Haraway’s “woman as cyborg” mayappear upon first reading to be simplyyet another
manifestation of “Woman” as Frankenstein’s Monster (see Chapter Three). But, as Jay
Clayton has noted, Haraway’s cyborg is “not Frankenstein” because, crucially, its
purpose is to reject the illusions of the completed “Self” (Charles Dickens 136-7,
emphasis added). More specifically, “unlike Frankenstein”, Haraway’s cyborg can
never be “whole” because it can never be represented by – nor representative of – the
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creation of a utopian family and a città felice (happy city), utopia manifested as “a city
and cosmos” (151).4
As discussed in previous chapters, defining utopian and science fiction by
women as the irrational act of one who occupies, and argues from, the position of a
“monstrous” or “alien” being is ultimately limiting. Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto”
seeks to interrogate the “deepened dualisms of mind and body, animal and machine,
idealism and materialism” (154). This is important for our discussions so far because it
is the perpetuation of these dualisms that I have sought to challenge throughout this
thesis, such as Carolyn Merchant’s The Death of Nature. Indeed, Haraway’s cyborg
appears to resist defining feminist engagements with science and technology through
the concept of woman as other (or “others”),5 especially in relation to scientific
discourses. Haraway’s cyborg is “not-Frankenstein” because it does not expect “its
father to save it through a restoration of the Garden” or Eden. Therefore it resists the
patriarchal history of epistemological thinking (in which language has been used to
define “Reason” through logocentric paradigms of law and morality alike). Whether
these paragons are defined through a Judeo-Christian notion of “God”, althea or truth,
then, they are inevitably symbolised by the figure of a patriarchal “Father”, the Imago
or some other form in which the cultural “Same” becomes reified.6 Haraway’s
                                                          
4 See Nicole Pohl’s “Sweet Place” and Women, Space and Utopia for more details on the significance of architecture and
the utopian city.
5 Here I am using Freud’s basic definition of “other” as inextricable from “otherness” (der Andere and das Andere). For
the critique of this as the positive (same) and a “posited” (other) pole, see Luce IrigraryThis Sex Which Is Not One (1977).
6 For a definition of the “Law of the Father”, wherein language is both patriarchal and representative of social
machinations, see Jacques Lacan The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: the Psychoses (1973).
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feminist-orientated definition of the cyborg as woman – yet categorically not
Frankenstein – could therefore contribute significantly to challenging the fallacy that
because the reasoned human has been seen historically as synonymous with the figure
of “universal man”, reason itself can never form a contingent part of neither
historical, contemporary, nor future models of female subjectivities. In doing so, the
cyborg simultaneously might rebuke the idea that the prerequisite for feminist
challenges to dominant discourses is to define Woman’s subjectivity as external to,
and alienated from, those same discourses.
Rather than merely examining the role of the “Other” as a signifier of late-
twentieth-century forms of interaction with technologies and sciences, however, I am
concerned here with examining the role of the human body more holistically. Whilst
Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto” may assert that “feminist science fiction” made
possible the idea of a feminist science, few critics have acknowledged the actual
scientific concerns of these writers. Therefore, rational feminist subjectivities are stifled
by the fact that feminist engagements with discourses such as cybernetics have been
defined as criticising or negating scientific rationale. This is strange when we consider
the fact that Haraway’s cyborg comes to us as the direct result of scientific theory,
rational models of thought and her critique of the “dualisms” deployed when
feminists such as Carolyn Merchant depict women as “nature”, as anathema to
technology (154). This leads us to ask the question: if debating the notion of selfhood
through the cyborg self involves interrogating depictions of human interaction with
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advanced technologies and sciences, where is the feminist analysis of “science” in
these so-called feminist science-fictions? In the remainder of this chapter, I address this
question byaccounting for some of the ways in which Joanna Russ’s “feminist science
fiction” novel The Female Man (1975) and Cadigan’s “cyberpunk” novel Synners (1991)
explore the feminist potential of scientific narratives. More importantly perhaps, I
examine howthese texts can be read as positing rational feminist subjectivities.
The Whileawayan flowers 
Unlike some of the writers explored in the previous chapters, Pat Cadigan’s and
Joanna Russ’s contributions to the genre have been recognised by their numerous
science fiction awards, and their writing is the subject of much feminist science fiction
criticism. Yet their uses of science have often been neglected in feminist readings of
their work. For example, exploring the “Many-Worlds Theory” of quantum physics
through the depiction of several cyborgian subjectivities, Russ’s The Female Man quite
explicitlydraws upon cybernetics and quantum mechanics paradigms. As I shall go on
to discuss, Hugh Everett’s “Many-Worlds Theory” was a response to the problems of
observing phenomena raised by Erwin Schrödinger’s 1935 thought experiment,
coined “Schrödinger’s cat.”7 In fact, when Russ was writing the novel, Many-Worlds
                                                          
7 For a definition of cybernetics as the attempt to define the world in a more positivist light after Quantum Physics see
David Porush “Cybernetic Fiction and Postmodern Science.”
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Theory was actually being revived by Bryce S. DeWitt.8 This theory suggested that
there could be many outcomes to experiments and that if they are all observed, they
are all existent and all part of a many-branched tree of events (“Quantum Mechanics”
161), referred to sometimes as the “multiverse” (James 43), a concept which is similar
to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s “rhizome.”9 The “Schrödinger’s cat” thought
experiment had imagined what would happen if a cat was placed inside a sealed box
with radioactive material and a phial containing poison. This imaginary experiment
revealed the continuity problem of transferring quantum physics from the micro to the
macro level – from the particles that may or may not decay to the cat in the box. The
observer’s paradox, then, is that the cat cannot be, empirically speaking, both alive
and dead at once. ManyWorlds theorysuggested that one wayin which to resolve this
paradox was to suggest that both events could occur, creating another two of the
infinite realities of “outcomes” existing in parallel universes. In one outcome the cat
lives: in the other outcome, the cat dies. If both outcomes are recorded, then each
event must “exist” in its particular universe. Russ’s The Female Manplays upon the idea
that we can in fact expand the usual quantum level of Many-Worlds Theory in order
to consider the concept of “history” itself as a single linear outcome, revealing how
history can be conceptualised as a many-branched tree, in which all the events that
could occur did occur.
                                                          
8 DeWitt’s article was so popular that it was reprinted, alongside Everett’s original research in a book edited by DeWitt:
The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (1973). For a brief history of “Many-Worlds Theory”, see Elizabeth
Kraus “Real Lives Complicate Matters in Schrödinger’s World: Pat Cadigan’s Alternative Cyberpunk Vision”.
9 See Rhizome: anIntroduction (1976).
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The Female Man explores the multi-verse as a way of viewing the historical
development of Western society by describing how four genetically-identical “selves”
from different universes (known as “genotypes”) meet one another. These genotypes:
Jael, Janet, Joanna and Jeannine, can be therefore seen as representing four “realities”
of feminist history and how these “versions” of a human might engage with each
other’s existing world-views when they meet in person. Indeed, the text’s main loci of
concern are the juxtaposing historical contexts that have given rise to the genotypes’
various “genealogies” of feminist politics. Following this rational a posteriori evolution
of feminisms, the text in particular examines howgendered bodies are constructed by
– and through – engagements with technologies and sciences. Russ therefore uses the
Many-Worlds concept in order to explore various visions of feminist consciousnesses
in their different “historical” contexts. This may have been exactly what Haraway’s
Cyborg Manifesto referred to when she asserted that Joanna Russ was one of the
feminist science fiction writers who enabled the emergence of feminist ideas of
scientific praxis. Yet the Cyborg Manifesto actually rejects the exploration of “[p]op
physics books […] on the consequences of quantum theory and the indeterminacy
principle”, on the basis that they are the “scientific equivalent to Harlequin romances
as a marker of radical change in American white heterosexuality: they get it wrong.”
Haraway does argue that there is indeed a clear dialogue between “pop[ular] science”
and writing about cyborgs, but it is one which is based upon feminists’ fictional
critiques of these sciences (153). Russ’s interrogation of feminism, history and
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subjectivity is, nevertheless, entirely dependent upon the Many Worlds’ Theory as a
means for demonstrating that the cyborgian subjectivities of the genotypes are all part
of a rhizomatic premise of “multi-verse” history.
This “multi-versal” sense of history is conveyed by the continual shifts in the
narrative point of view, which moves between first and third person descriptions of
no less than four multiple “selves” from alternative universes. Jael is from
“Womanland”, a separatist female utopia/dystopia at war with the men of “Manland;”
Janet is from a separatist “utopia” in which men no longer exist, Joanna is from a
depiction of “our” world in 1969; and Jeannine is from a world that resembles a
“dystopian” vision of our world, one which never recovered from 1930s economic
depression. Jeannine and Joanna are therefore from the same time (the year 1969), but
they are also from entirely different realities. Likewise, Jael and Janet both hail from
more technological advanced universes than the others, but they will never be part of
Jeannine’s, nor Joanna’s, future. As Jael explains to them when theyall meet:
Genetic patterns sometimes repeat themselves from possible
present universe to possible present universe […] Here is Janet
from the far future, but not myfuture or yours; here are the two
of you [Jeannine and Joanna] from almost the same moment of
time (but not as you see it), both of those moments only a little
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behind mine; yet I won’t happen in the world of either of you.
(161)
Therefore, what motivates the narrative is how ideas of quantum “indeterminism”
and the rhizomatic uncertainty of (historical) outcomes can be a powerful means for
negotiating discourse itself, especially in terms of developing an effective feminist
consciousness.
If we extend this idea, The Female Man can also be seen as applying the Many
World’s Theory to the formulation of a rational feminist praxis. This is because the
“genotype” selves can be seen as Joanna Russ’s semi-autobiographical narrator, the
character who is referred to as “Joanna”, and who has been split into the various
forms of her gendered consciousnesses. These range from political apathy
(represented by Jeannine) to an aggressive feminist consciousness (represented by
Jael). Russ’s use here of the Many-Worlds structure for thinking through the minefield
that was the proliferation of feminist identities in the 1970s is captured by Jael’s
introduction of the so-called “selves” to each other: “welcome yourselves; look at me
and make me welcome: welcome myself, welcome me, welcome I” (158-9). This pre-
empts Haraway’s definition of the cyborg as a figure of “irony.” If “the cyborg is also
the awful apocalyptic telos of the “West’s” escalating dominations of abstract
individuation” (Simians 150-1), there surely can be no more of an ironic depiction of
the postmodern hyper-individuated self than a narrative voice figuratively split into
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four gendered identities and histories? More importantly, this allows Russ to
demonstrate how important technology is to the construction of one’s feminist
consciousness, since the “J’s”, as they are called in the text, are clearly distinguishable
through their differing solipsistic relationships and interactions with science and
technology (Yaszek 158). For example, in Jael’s more technologically advanced world
there is a violent activist resistance to patriarchy; Jael herself is an aggressive assassin, an
embodiment of feminist rage. In Janet’s matriarchal world, there is no need for
feminist resistance; equality is absolute because a plague wiped out the entire male
population. By corollary, Jeannine is the most “oppressed” and apathetic woman of
the four in terms of a feminist consciousness; her 1969 world is the realisation of an
alternative version of our world history, one in which the women’s movement never
started and post-war cybernetic technologies (amongst others) never developed.
Joanna, however, lives in a realistic depiction of “our” world as it was in 1969. The
narrative therefore presents a “sliding scale” of the relationship between technology
and patriarchy: feminist resistance and equality is portrayed as that which is made
possible bythe individual’s increased access to technological and scientific narratives. 
The genotypes’ differing feminist consciousnesses are, however, all juxtaposed
to male subjectivity. In this sense, all four “selves” can be described as “female men;”
Janet, for example, is a “female man” because she dresses androgynously and behaves
in a more masculine manner than the women described in Joanna’s (our) world in
1969. Her surname is also somewhat ambivalent; “Janet Evason” (1) can be read as
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either Ev[er]-son (“ever”-a-son) or “Ev[e]”-a-son. Janet is neither “ever-a-son” nor
“eve’s son”, however, because the concepts of men and women have not existed in
“Whileaway” for centuries (5). Likewise, the narrator describes Joanna as “turning
into a man” and as being a “female man” due to her need to posit male characteristics
in the workplace in order to be accepted as the equal of her male co-workers (20). In
antithesis to Joanna and Janet’s masculine posturing, Jeannine’s describes feeling a
sense of “sisterliness” between herself and the hyper-feminine Manlander “female
man” Anna. Anna is described as a “female man” because she is one of many
transvestite/transsexual prostitutes who work for the misogynistic “men” in the all-
male separatist colony of Manland (173). Constantly aligned with male constructions of
beauty, Jeannine and Anna epitomise Joan Riviere’s idea of the “travesty” that is the
“mask of womanliness” (Heath 45-9). At this point, however, I would like to focus
more specifically on Jael’s body and biography, which not only raises the most
complex questions regarding the relationship between feminism and science for the
reader, it can be seen as demonstrating Russ’s idea of the disillusionment surrounding
women’s increased interactions with technology, particularly in relation to Jael and the
creation of a “feminist” body.
Formerly known as the girl called “Alice Reasoner” (212), Jael is described as a
“creatrix” because her body is the result of many surgical procedures (166). Jael is
described as being “as skinny as a beanpole” underneath her “grafted muscle” (19,
181). In fact, her job is highly significant in terms of how she can be seen as an
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embodiment of masculinised feminist rage: Jael is an assassin, but she only kills men.
Furthermore, in order to undertake assassinations, she often has to impersonate men,
a role which ranges from “impersonating one of the Manlanders’ police (for ten
minutes)” to “taking the place of a Manlander diplomat for eighteen months” (187-8).
Indeed, the physical alterations to her body that have made these impersonations
possible reflect the concerns surrounding sex re-assignment surgery, which had only
recently become available to the public during The Female Man’s composition.10 For
example, the “Adrenaline” that Jael injects herself with in order to induce aggression
can be seen as reflecting pre- and post-operative transsexual medical hormone therapy
(180). Jael also drinks a foul-tasting “super-bouillon”, the taste of which “nobody
could stand” (163), which suggests that it is medicinal and, given the numerous
descriptions of her body as rejecting her synthetic implants, it also signifies as an anti-
organ rejection drug (181).
Jael’s “hairpin-shaped scars under her ears” from her “new face”, which has
been “laid over the old [face] in strips of plastic” (19), also recall the feminist concern
with how the proliferation of plastic surgery procedures during the 1970s tended to
perpetuate mainstream models of female beauty. The deadly, retractable metallic
“silver”, knife-like “Claws” imbedded in her hand, which she poignantly refers to as
her “erection”, also evoke the image of surgical knives (159). Indeed, Jael’s claws are
reflected later in the deadlyprosthetic razor nails of another infamous female assassin,
                                                          
10 See Billings and Urban “The Socio-Medical Construction of Transsexualism: An Interpretation and Critique.”
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Neuromancer’s Molly Millions. Rather than being a sex object herself (as one could
argue Neuromancer’s Molly is), Jael has her own male cyborg sex object, called Davy,
who’s body has an “eerie malleability” because he is part-chimpanzee “germ plasm”
and part-“machine” (198-200). Davy’s identity as that which has an “outside soul”
could be aligned with Haraway’s premise that the cyborg epitomises the end of
Western ideas surrounding the metaphysically sacred, were he not also Jael’s sex slave,
an algorithm with no autonomous function, consciousness or political identity of his
own (199).
Davy’s relationship with Jael is therefore based upon his objectification, an
oppression which, complexly, can only be considered negligible if Davy can be
defined as a machine and not a man or any other being with a sense of consciousness.
This, in turn, raises further questions about the nature of human and non-human
definitions of subjectivity, recapitulating how the feminist struggle for equality
historically began with the counter-argument that women are not equal to men and
are, somehow, not quite as “human” as men either. Yet he is just one of many
cyborgian bodies portrayed in The Female Man that can be defined as failing to uphold
the ironic dream of cyborgian potentiality and/or feminist idealisms. Arguably, the
Manlander trans-woman Anna, the feminine male cyborg Davy, and the
Womanlander male impersonator Jael are not figures that Russ foregrounds as
politically useful cyborgs. She instead portrays these “female men” as simultaneously
tragic and monstrous – literally splitting at their surgical seams, Frankensteinian
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monsters for whom the desire to even attempt to claim a liberated selfhood is lost.
This is especially true for Jael, who, like the monster, begins life as a “Reasoner” but
becomes murderous and gives in to a rage that is ultimately counter-productive.
Simultaneously Russ is rejecting the cyborgian potential of the surgical body, whilst
still pre-empting the idea that the transgendered/transsexual body is a key motif for
advanced technology.11 Since Haraway rejects this notion of the cyborg as
Frankenstein’s monster, it is therefore difficult to align The Female Man as either
indebted to, or as an accurate pre-cursor for, the post-gender bodies of the Manifesto’s
ironic “utopian dream” (Haraway 181). This is because, for Russ, it is not their post-
gender consciousness which renders them monstrous but their physical gender
ambiguities as female men.  
When Jael asks the genotypes to “Look at yourselves again”, she is also asking
us too to: “look at [ourselves] again.” Whilst Haraway’s notion of the “woman as
cyborg writing” is seemingly heterogeneous in nature, a disruption of the dialectics at
play in apparent binaries, such as man/woman, human/machine, cybernetic/organic,
white/coloured, Western origin/non-Western origin, it is ultimately more reflective of
the materialist concerns of feminists. These are materialist concerns that can be seen, in
part, as the attempt to recoup the Cartesian dialectic in which women are posited as
the “material” half of the mind/body severance. After all, the idea that the history of
                                                          
11 See Germaine Greer The Female Eunuch (1970) and The Whole Woman (1999) for a critique of the figure of the trans
woman (male to female transsexual). For a discussion of the transgendered body as Frankenstein see Laura Kranzler,
“Frankenstein and the Technological Future” and MaryDaly, “BoundaryViolation and the Frankenstein Phenomena.” 
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attempting to define the human subject has been inevitably characterised by highly
gendered language is a key axiomatic within Western discourses.12 As Rosi Braidotti’s
“Cyberfeminism” suggests:
it is more adequate to speak of our body in terms of
embodiment, that is to say of multiple bodies or sets of
embodied positions. Embodiment means that we are situated
subjects, capable of performing sets of (inter)actions which
are discontinuous in space and time. Embodied subjectivity
is thus a paradox that rests simultaneously on the historical
decline of mind/body distinctions and the proliferation of
discourses about the body.13
What must not be forgotten is that it is Jael’s surgical alterations which allow her to
become a transgendered, trans-universal traveller and that this is the very means
through which she has been able to connect with her three “other” genotypes or
selves. Jael’s role as a trans-universal traveller (as opposed to a transgendered cyborg)
is particularly important when we consider the fact that it is she who voices how the
concept of the “genotype” links feminism, history and science. The Female Man
                                                          
12 See Phyllis Rooney’s “Gendered Reason: Sex Metaphor and Conceptions of Reason.”
13 http://www.let.uu.nl/womens_studies/rosi/cyberfem.htm
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therefore operates as a complex “thinking project” itself, a fictional case study
reflecting some of the questions surrounding the plurality surrounding the historical
realities of the nature of selfhood given the increasingly hybrid nature of technologies
of the body.
The denouement of the narrative is when Jael announces that utopian
Whileaway is, in fact, the historical outcome of an androcidal war lead by time-
travellers such as herself. In doing so, Jael destabilises our understanding of
Whileawayas an unequivocally ideal feminist separatist world because she reveals how
history has the power to re-define the present (and vice versa) by exposing Whileaway
as the outcome of dystopian endeavour.
The world-lines around you [Janet] are not so different from
yours or mine or theirs and there is no plague in any of them,
not any of them. Whileaway’s plague is a big lie. Your ancestors
lied about it. It is I who gave you your “plague”, […]; I, I, I, I
am the plague, Janet Evason. I and the war I fought built your
world for you, I and those like me, we gave you a thousand
years of peace and love and the Whileawayan flowers nourish
themselves on the bones of the men we have slain. (211)
Jael therefore posits the utopian symbol of the “Whileawayan flower” as allegorically
carnivorous: it is a monstrously feminist flower, which feeds upon men’s bones. This
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not only alludes to the “Garden of Eden” as the utopia of Christian Western telos, it
renders new our understanding that “the cyborg would not recognise the Garden of
Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot dream of returning to dust” (Haraway 151).
Instead it is the Whileawayan men who have “returned to dust”, forming a tragic and
irreversible parody of Haraway’s truly “post-gender world” (150). If prior to this
knowledge Whileawayans could supposedly live “outside” of such “sacred” narratives
– able to (literally) construct an ironically post-gendered world because the concept of
“men” did not exist there – history, causation and rational logic have now rendered
this impossible.
The paradigm of separatist feminism (contemporary to Russ’s writing of The
Female Man) is here revealed as inevitablyfailing, since it creates worlds which are built
upon the mistaken pursuit of inequality in an attempt to find Equality. This same
failure of post-genderism is also represented by the separatism of the “Womanland”
and “Manland” colonies in Jael’s world. All-female Whileaway thereby becomes
ambiguously utopian: a women-only world is not a post-gendered world, in the same
sense that feminist praxis should never be exclusively “for women” and rational,
scientific discourses the privilege of men alone. This, after all, contradicts the
foundation of the Cyborg Manifesto, that: “dichotomies between mind and body,
animal and human, organism and machine, public and private, nature and culture,
men and women, primitive and civilised are all in question ideologically” (163).
Gendering language and culture on the basis of separation and binary can therefore
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only ever lead to the creation of a no-where land of historical accounts – “utopia”
through transliteration (see Introduction). Therefore the allegory which can be
gleaned here is that it is Jael’s trans-gendered voice which ultimatelyreveals the gendered
nature of how feminism and rationality (or non-feminist paradigms) have been
accounted for throughout history. Jael highlights how endeavouring to uphold
separation myths antagonises the progression of feminist thought because, like
Whileaway’s faux history, it is to believe in “big lie[s]” (211).
It is both through the abject body of Jael and Jael’s voice that The Female Man
foregrounds the concerns of critics such as Haraway and Lisa Yazsek. They posit the
cyborg as a way of articulating ideas of socially hybrid subjectivities in which the real
“utopian dream” (Haraway 181) is of a future in which we “both build and destroy
machines, identities, categories, relationships, [and] space stories” (189) in the process
of a Deleuzian “becoming” (Deleuze, Essays xxx). This emphasis upon the
proliferation, instability and translation of identities and subjectivities here all relate to
Russ’s exploration of the Many-Worlds interpretation, rather than Haraway’s own
definition of “cyborg writing.” Yaszek’s assertion that The Female Man presents the
idea that “utopic high-tech futures can only develop through this messy or impure
engagement with technology” underestimates its astute and accurate dialogue with
scientific discourses (158). After all, Russ’s gendered subjectivities are not “messy”
simply because the bodies she depicts are messy, grotesque, self-made “Frankenstein
Monsters”, who instead of hoping to be saved by a transcendental “God” or truth,
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uncover feminists “truths” of their own in an attempt to save themselves as free
subjects.
Unfortunately one of these so-called “feminist” truths is the nature of feminist
violence – a violence ironically enacted in order to oppose patriarchy. As terrified of
the assassin Jael as the other genotypes are, they are nevertheless persuaded that the
best feminist approach is to make the same mistakes as have been made in
Whileaway’s history. In other words, they plan to continue to fight patriarchy in the
physical sense of the word: they continue to argue that identifying as a man and
advocating violence in the name of feminism is the best way of addressing social
patriarchy. Formerly pacifist Joanna of “our world” in 1969 has a “Frankensteinian
rebirth” by being the conduit for a circuit, only to emerge with a reanimated
masculine consciousness (Yaszek 74), asserting: “I am a man” and “you will think of
me as a Man [...,] if you don’t, by God and all the saints, I’ll break your neck” (140).
Instead of Russ’s cyborgs critiquing the universal “Man”, they realign themselves in a
humorous (but ultimately serious, rather than ironic) manner with the worst historical
qualities of Western masculinity: violence, hostility, dominance and subjective
singularity. 
One question remains unanswered, therefore: when exactly is “cyborgian”
subjectivity post-humanist enough to advocate a potentially utopian figure, when it
cannot even be clearly gleaned in the exact texts which have, according to Haraway,
inspired its creation? For Russ demonstrates only the failure of the cyborgian body, in
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and of itself, as a means for the utopian progress of our future selves. Just as
Whileaway’s utopian history has fallen apart, it is in Jael’s decaying and dilapidated
body that The Female Man presents the usefulness of cyborgian subjectivities as
problematic. What is useful about The Female Man, however, is that it ultimately
demonstrates that the cyborgian body can never be, as Haraway suggests, a figure of
“post-history” for women: like the novum, the cyborg must always knowand understand
the historyof its subjectivities in order to conceptualise its future. In this sense it must
be like and not “unlike” Shelley’s monster in Frankenstein: it must learn its “Western
origins” after all, in order to find – like Shelley’s monster does – its own voice and its
own sense of Reason. Like Jael, the Harawayian cyborg represents a failure to grasp
the power of Reason over the power of death. It is here that The Female Man ends – at
the beginning of a collectivist project, fraught with the difficulty of accounting for
everyone’s experiences and histories in order to move forward at last. The Female Man
teaches us that the cyborg can neither effectively constitute, nor practice, the negation
of history, nor historical discourses – scientific discourses, for example. The cyborg,
and the cyborgian, must instead recoup and re-work them in order to articulate both
its rights to a utopia of its own and claim a means with which to uncover a concept of
utopia in the first place, especially if it has forgotten the Garden and exactly how the
Whileawayan flowers grewin the first place.
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Schrödinger s World 
Like The Female Man, the title of Pat Cadigan’s cyberpunk novel Synners demonstrates
its concern with embodiment and technology from the offset. Set in a near-future or
“alternative present” world, Synners explores the embodiments of the “synners” in
much the same way that Russ’s The Female Man presents its many “female men:” like
the “female men”, Synners (short for synthesizers) are also humans exploring the
socio-historical impact of interfacing with technology. Written more than a decade
after The Female Man, however, Synners is particularlyconcerned with the dissemination
of cybernetics technologysince the 1980s, known as the “Information Age”, and what
would happen in the dawn of an “Instant Information revolution” (269).14 What
would happen, for example, if humans could connect their brains directly into
cybernetic systems through the means of skull sockets? Would it “all be happening at
the speed of thought, before it could actuallyhappen, so that nothing would ever have
to happen again” (228)? The term synners is key here, and the fact that the synners
refer to themselves as “original synners” because “[e]very technology has its original
sin” (435) reveals the novel’s explicit engagement with Haraway’s definition of the
cyborg as that which represents the death of all that is “sacred” about Western society
whilst paradoxicallyencompassing its hierarchical structures of power (Simians 150-1).
                                                          
14 For a description of implant technology see Jeremy Strangroom “Cybernetics and a Post-Human Future: in
Conversation with Kevin Warwick.”
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The main storyline of the novel is howthe synner Visual Mark begins to reject
real life experiences in the body, such as sex with fellow synner Gina, in favour of
creating non-physical “connections” with cybernetic hardware through his newly-
acquired brain sockets. This reveals how Synners is not simply concerned with
resisting, subverting and recapitulating Western telos as the Harawayian cyborg does
but also inverting it. Whereas Gina defines life as a state of “being” that is inextricable
from that sacred object, the human body, Visual Mark’s disgust for “carnal sin” (in
other words, original sin in the biblical sense) is encapsulated when he likens life “in
the flesh” (in the human body) to two gutted sides of beef brushing against each other
on their waythrough a processing plant (331). He desires electronic transcendence – a
state in which “he wasn’t going to need [his body] anymore” (233). In doing so, Visual
Mark can be seen as representing postmodernist theories of the metaphorically
“disappearing body”, which suggest that “the mind is on its wayto being exteriorized”
(Kroker and Kroker 20-1). Body “obsoletism” (the desire to transcend the body) can
be seen particularly from the 1980s onwards, in Stelarc’s futurist robotics and body
artwork such as “The Obsolete Body”, as well as online forum debates as early in the
rise of internet culture as 1988 (Terranova 270). Drawing upon Anne Balsamo’s
Technologies of the Gendered Body (1996), critics such as Elizabeth Kraus have suggested
that Visual Mark represents patriarchal ideology’s inability to understand the inscribed
nature of the human body in late twentieth century culture, the male anxiety
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surrounding the corporeal inscription of the body within postmodern culture.15
Because Visual Mark succeeds in “uploading” his consciousness into the city’s
cybernetic systems in order to escape a stroke, however, his actions also reflect the
“transhumanist” theory that humans will evolve out of the limitations of their
biological bodies and become “post-human” by transferring their consciousnesses
into machines (Baofu 2). Cyberpunk’s images of social disconnectedness are part of
late twentieth-century concerns of the vulnerability of the human body as a material
entity and are therefore inextricable from the linguistic strategies at play within the
discovery of AIDS and the moral panic surrounding the first computer “viruses.”16
Synners can therefore be seen as exploring to the extreme the dialectics of Descartes’
Deus ex machina, the Greek idea that the human consciousness or soul is a soul or spirit
in the “machine” that is the human body, “god in the machine” from his Discourse on
the Method (1637). In the 1990s, transhumanism came to mean a realisation of the neo-
Cartesian dualism when More founded the Extropy Institute, wherein Extropy refers
to system expansion, the antithesis of entropy as system breakdown following the
Second Law of Thermodynamics in cybernetics.17 What is important about the
connection between cybernetics and neo-Cartesian theory is that it reveals how it is
ultimately liberal humanism which informs the late twentieth and early twentieth
                                                          
15 See Kraus.
16 See Andrew Ross “Hacking Away at the Counter Culture” and Thomas Foster’s “Meat Puppets or Robopaths?
Cyberpunk and the Question of Embodiment.”
17 See Weiner’s The Human Use (1950). For further reading, see Hans Moravec’s Mind Children (1988) and Robot: Mere
Machine to Transcendent Mind (2000), Peter Baofu’s The Future of Post-Human Consciousness (2004) and Max More’s “Self-
transformation: Expanding personal extropy.” For information regarding “Transhumanism’s Extropy Institute”, see
http://www.extropy.org/.
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century transhumanist desire to escape the body. In contrast, Haraway’s Cyborg
Manifesto exemplifies how “posthumanism” is defined as the attempt to subvert the
humanist project’s concept of the individual as “One.”18
Visual Mark’s desire to transcend the flesh defines the body as the problematic
site of mortal vulnerability and permeability, in which the need to be whole or “One”
is simultaneously a drive to transcend the material body, exposes the humanism at play
in transhumanist debates. Although transhumanism purports to being part of
posthumanist discourses, posthumanism is often defined instead as a debate about the
rejection of Western telos. In other words, posthumanist discourses often critique the
way in which logocentrism valorises the role of cogito at the expense of theorising the
relative conditions of the material world (Weinstone 15). Theorising the material,
however, is often reduced to the allegorical within abstract principles – the Aristotlean
shadows on the cave wall. The paradox here is that if we follow transhumanist
theory’s definition of the post-human as the human consciousness freed, at last, from
the constraints of the mortal and vulnerable human body, such posthumanist theories
actually undermine what it means to be “post”-human after all. Rather than “post”-
humanism proffering the transgression of humanist ideals, the use of cybernetic
technology here can be seen as fulfilling that very humanist desire to transcend the
body. As RoyAscott has noted:
                                                          
18 It must be noted that Ihab Hassan also addressed this a decade earlier in a keynote address. See Anne Weinstone’s
Avatar Bodies: A Tantra for Posthumanism (2004).
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computer networking responds to our deep psychological
desire for transcendence – to reach the immaterial, the
spiritual – the wish to be out of body, out of mind, to exceed
the limitations of time and space, a kind of bio-technological
theology. (86, emphasis added)
If the extreme point of the humanist project is what Haraway describes as “an
ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a man in space” (Simians 150-1,
emphasis added), the figure of the “post-human” paradoxically represents the failure
to resolve the humanist project (that of learning to live in the human body) at the
same time as it becomes its apt signifier. In the very moment that we see the desire to
escape from the body as a posthumanist endeavour, we paradoxically reify the
human(ist) endeavour after all.
As the plot of Synners continues, Gina and Visual Mark begin to reflect the
antithetical concerns of posthumanist materialist feminisms, such as Haraway’s, and
transhumanism respectively. Even their physical appearances are representative of this
contrast: muscular and physically aggressive – rather than verbally articulate – Gina
privileges the physical body in her definition of human connectedness, whereas Visual
Mark becomes increasingly emaciated because eating means having to “unplug” his
mind from the corporate informatics systems at Diversification, Inc. In contrast to the
transhumanist endeavours of Visual Mark, Gina views her forced employment as a
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synner for the conglomerate Diversification Inc., as an opportunity for activist and
collectivist ventures. Rather than seeking to amalgamate with the information systems
as Visual Mark does, Gina uses cybernetic technology as a means of pursuing visceral
experiences with “real” people and physical activities, such as bungee-jumping off a
building. Even the first music video Gina makes with a group of musicians, who also
have sockets in their skulls, depicts Gina’s point of view as she runs along a beach.
Her creative endeavours therefore always involve people and physical experiences
through the idea that: “You can. We can” (229). This approach is extremely similar to
howproductive group activity and social activity (or activism) is often based upon the
balance between individual subjectivities and the collective. Connected to hardware
through their skull sockets, Gina and the musicians therefore signify as both an apt
metaphor for, and a more literal manifestation of, the collective utopian
consciousness. Visual Mark and Gina therefore playout howtechnological interaction
can serve the juxtaposing desires for a connection with humans or machines alike. In
doing so, they recapitulate the difference between transhumanist projects and those
feminisms that are concerned with the real material conditions (including
technologies) of equality.19
In contrast, the posthumanism of the “Cyborg Manifesto” defines
transhumanism’s attempt to escape the body as a “deadly fantasy” (Ross and Penley
                                                          
19 For further details on howequal rights and social awareness movements use Computer Mediated Communications in
order to raise social awareness see Anna Everett “On Cyberfeminism and Cyberwomanism: High Tech Mediations of
Feminisms Discontents.” For a detailed reading of Visual Mark and Gina as representing the difference between
patriarchal bodyobsoletism and materialist feminist activism, see Kraus.
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20) because it is based on the myth that the human body was ever “whole” to begin
with (Simians 177). As Dunning and Woodrowobserve:
We think of ourselves as separate to the world – our skin as
the limit of ourselves. This is the ego boundary – the point
at which here is not there. Yet, the body is pierced with
myriad openings. Each opening admits the world – stardust
gathers in our lungs, gases exchange, viruses move through
our blood vessels. [...] We project our bodies into the world
– we speak, we breathe, we write, we leave a trail of cells
and absorb the trails of others. The body enfolds the world
and the world enfolds the body – the notion of the skin as
boundaryfalls apart. (qtd. in Kennedy331, emphasis added)
Feminists have argued that, for centuries now, women’s bodies have instead been
“written” upon, and have never been defined as the pure, whole human in the same
way that the male body has been. Feminists have therefore interpreted dualistic
models, such as the Cartesian self, as positing women as the flawed and corruptible
“body” in society, and therefore as the antithesis of the true signifier of the human
(cogito, for example). According to this logic, if being of “whole” (mind and body) is an
illusion, this is also an “illusion” that women have never had the privilege of
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entertaining in the first place. If the female body has also been subjected to having
meaning metaphorically (and sometimes literally) “inscribed” upon it, it can be seen as
more contingent with negotiating the complexities of postmodern subjectivity.
According to Russ: “[y]ou can’t unite woman and human anymore than you can unite
matter and anti-matter (The Female Man 151); positing woman as “matter” and the
human (read: universal man) as “anti-matter”, Russ voices the feminist concern with
defining women as human against a history that sees women merely as bodies. One
approach to this has been for feminisms to focus instead upon all that is “material” in
order to recoup women as the “material body” part of this dialectic, through the
argument that materialist concepts are a more politically astute approach to cultures
and texts. Although this means that the material “body” of woman in this dialectic
might be temporarily more empowered, however, this is ultimately at the expense of
remaining bound within a dualism that has been defined in the first instance as one
which never deemed women to be part of culture and humanity.20
Synners initially appears to present a similar materialist feminist critique of
transhumanism to Russ’s, with Gina and Visual Mark signifying these two
oppositional discourses. For example, the hacker Sam uses her body as a battery to
fuel a computer, which enables Gina and Gabe (Sam’s father) to enter cyberspace and
prevent the world from descending into life-threatening chaos after a computer virus
called the “spike” infects all online technology. Yet despite the fact that this type of
                                                          
20 I suggest that Michel Foucault’s various accounts of the body as spectacle challenges this, regardless of the fact that it
could be argued that the bodies of deviant men can also be read as having been “feminised.”
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battery power as a life-saving device is an interesting twist on the more usual dystopic
depictions of bodilybatterypower in science fiction, critics have often interpreted this
to be a signifier of woman’s role as the “matter” half of the Cartesian dualism, the
biological body which nurtures but never innovates within technological revolutions.
However, just as Haraway’s contemporary version of the Pythagorean Table argues
for feminism through materiality, to argue that Synners is feminist simply because it
privileges matter over mind is to merely recapitulate the binary language of Cartesian
dualisms and reductive logic. Understanding the permeable nature of the body as
revealed by Sam’s “battery” role – that it enfolds and is enfolded by the world – is
particularly important to a nuanced understanding of the usefulness of Synners. In this
sense, the novel can be seen as a critical commentary of twentieth-century discourses
of embodiment, one which provides a useful tool for negotiating their more
dichotomous imperatives.
In fact, at no point in the text is Visual Mark’s uploading of his consciousness
portrayed as being directly responsible for the deaths, it is merely the catalyst of the
“spike” virus’ inevitable expansion. To the contrary, the narrative clearlystates that he
tries to send a message of warning to the synner Kerry in order to save everyone
before the spike reaches him. Since Kerry is one of many synners being held prisoner
by Diversifications Inc, a more accurate interpretation of the text is that Synners
highlights the irresponsibility involved with the capitalist control of new technology,
not the dangers of attempting to escape the material conditions of the world through
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this technology. Indeed, the novel posits independent and physically strong women
alongside men, machines, Artificial Intelligences, “synthesized” human and
“synthesizing” human alike as part of an underground, marginalised collective, who
work together to rescue the technological infrastructure of the world from destroying
what little civilisation is left in their dystopian cityscape. In doing so, the synners
inevitably subvert the way in which feminists have argued that woman is matter,
whilst interrogating the utopian escapism of the “transcended” universal human
without rejecting the need to consider non-human subjectivities. Gina may be
physically strong and aggressive, for example, but her sense of group consciousness
and caring disposition stand in marked contrast to Jael’s explicitly androcidal
feminism – the murderous impulses of the shunned Frankensteinian monster.
The material signifiers of the bodyin Synners remain, however, as integral to the
narrative as the depictions of Jael’s decaying body are within The Female Man. Whereas
many feminist critics have argued that Cadigan is only concerned with aspects of
material and “person-related” feminisms, what is important about her fiction is how
she challenges the critical assumption that cybernetic (dis)embodiment, as opposed to
the material body, is synonymous with the mind half of the mind/matter dichotomy.
Yet as the play on words emphasises, the material “visual marks” on the synners’
bodies are key to interpreting the text as an encompassing dialogue of reason that also
challenges the usefulness of the cyborgian body (407). Visual marks in the form of
“encrypted tattoos” even come to form a cognitive map of the formal developments
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in the A.I. Art Fish – a schematic of the development of its so-called “subjectivity”
(347). This is because Art’s role as a floating, non-material body, whose subjectivity is
reflected in his interactions with humans, is in turn a reflection of how human
subjectivity is not merely an inscribed site but a site of dialogic relation. The
breakdown of the virtual and the material in Synners therefore demarcates the very
process of this interaction. For example, it is the remembrance of the physical pain of
a punch from Gina that stops the cybernetic “spike” virus from killing Gabe’s
“physical” body when he is lost in cyberspace. Subsequently, when he remembers
Gina’s punch, a swelling appears on his face at the same time as a welt appears on the
clenched fist of Gina’s otherwise inert body. Monitoring their statuses, Keely refers to
these spontaneously emerging marks as “the best case of stigmata [he had] ever seen”
(407). The marks signify the fact that Gina and Gabe have remembered a real life
argument at the same time; they have connected with one another in cyberspace.
Cadigan emphasises the fact that it is the human body in its material form (male or
female), which ultimately allows access to electronic technology and that, moreover,
different individuals will utilise technologies in idiosyncratic ways.
Synners demonstrates that to place the idea of mind and matter in dichotomy
with one another is a misleading way to understand how discourses such as
cybernetics could operate outside of historically binary terms. Similarly, the main
theory opposing Schrödinger was “von Neumann mechanics”, which was based upon
“a Cartesian dualism dividing mind and body”, which argued that “we must always
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divide the world into two parts, the one being the observed system, the other the
observer” (Cooper and Van Vechten 219). In fact, this is precisely what DeWitt
argued the Many-Worlds interpretation of Heisenbergian indeterminism brought to
our concepts of reality:
No longer, says Everett, are we to be bamboozled into
believing that the chief issues of interpretation are
epistemological rather than ontological and that the quantum
realm must be viewed as a kind of ghost world whose
mathematical symbols represent potentiality rather than reality.
(De Witt “The Many-Universes Interpretation” 168)
Both Synners and The Female Man therefore seek to draw attention to the fact that we
have not, as yet, sufficiently challenged the use of binary thinking in order to
understand the world around us. Although my comparison of Keely’s “observation”
of Gabe and Gina’s “stigmata” and the negotiation of quantum problematics through
observation is purely metaphorical, it is useful for highlighting how cyberspace is far
from being a “ghost world” that can do no harm. The cyberworld has instead had a
veryreal impact upon “reality”, and certainlyupon Gabe’s face.
Initially Synners’ depiction of a world in which there are “two species of human
now, synthesizing human and synthesized human” (386) appears to play out the
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mind/matter dialectic through the idea of “doing” synning as opposed to “being”
synthesized (386). Yet the concept of “synthesized”/“synthesizing” human is soon
revealed as encompassing a myriad of both human and non-human subjectivities, all
of which are interdependent. For example, the A.I. Virtual Mark “amalgamates” with
is called Art Fish, whose attempts to recapitulate human subjectivities reveal the
constructed nature of social interaction when he appears as electronic copies of real
people, such as the hacker Fez. He even highlights the ambiguity of differentiating
between sentient beings and objects of technological artifice; his nickname is “Artie”:
“you get it faster if you sayArtie Fish” or artifice (173). In observing the quasi-familial
social group of the synners, Artie Fish is like Frankenstein’s monster watching the
Delacey’s: he is not quite outside, nor inside, oikos. This comparison is emphasised by
Sam when she remarks: “Art Fish? What’s wrong with the good old names, like
Frankenstein?” (173). But as an autonomous, androgynous entity with no knowable
origin, Art Fish is more representative of Haraway’s ironic cyborg dream, for there are
not two binaried species nowbut at least “three species” (386), and “Visual Markt” is
described as the “bastard offspring of both” the “spike” virus and the A.I. Artie Fish
(387).
Ultimately Visual Mark is not therefore the neat signifier of transhumanist
disembodiment that he would at first appear to be. Describing Visual Markt as the
“offspring” of cybernetic entities emphasises how he has experienced a form of
rebirth: “[C]urled up in the fetal position” in a pit-shaped workshop that Gina
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describes as a “tomb”, Visual Mark epitomises the conflation of the desire for a non-
sentient form of being as simultaneously signifying the death of the physical body and
the rebirth of the mind.
He lost all awareness of the meat that had been his prison for
close to fifty years, and the relief he felt at having laid his
burden down was as great as himself. His self. And his self was
getting greater all the time, both ways, greater as in more
wonderful and greater as in bigger.
The sense of having so much space to spread out in – a
babyemerging from the womb after nine months must have felt
the same thing, he thought. (232)
His definition of synthesising as a means for escaping his loneliness, despite this
rejection of human contact also resists the assumption that posthumanism is
synonymous with the loss of wholeness and a “Cartesian” split self. This is
emphasised further when he endeavours to aid the other synners as they attempt to
eradicate the spike virus from inside the city’s I.T. systems. Hence Visual Mark is not
merely uploaded and “freed” in a utopian sense, nor “trapped” in cyberspace in a
dystopian sense: his experience is merely different, and one which allows him to
highlight how“none of them in their physical world was capable of rapid shifts in pov
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[points of view]” (382). Like the gender ambiguities exposed by Russ’s “female men”,
Cadigan seeks to highlight the need to rethink the boundaries between human and
hardware and, more importantly, howeach might learn from the other.
As the synners struggle to form effective subjectivities within the march of
technology, philosophical considerations of self-determinism come to replace
Cartesian dualisms, and the paradigm that there is “a multitude of lifetimes in an
instant” (381). Returning to the same questions that the quantum mechanic Erwin
Schrödinger asked in 1935, Synners charts howsynners can “determine” the world (or
not) through their respective scientific principles. As discussed earlier on in the
chapter, Schrödinger had developed his “cat in the box” paradigm in order to
demonstrate his scepticism of the idea that the world was entirely indeterminable and
that things could never be half alive/half dead simultaneously. The characters even
refer to their lives as increasingly that of the “Schrödinger’s World” (211, 322). An
example of how the synners use quantum principles to clarify or make “determined”
the ambiguities of life in their “Schrödinger’s World” is when the tattoo artist Gator
finds her friend Jones apparently dead after he has had cranial “death implants”,
which allow him to commit suicide time and time again after experiencing a brief
comatose state.
Jones was dead. No, Jones wasn’t dead. No, Jones was dead,
but only sometimes. Schrödinger’s Jones. What was
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Schrödinger’s Jones? Putting cats in boxes with vials of poison
gas; strange habit. No stranger than Schrödinger’s video,
though, the one that [Visual Mark] kept making over and over
because he couldn’t get it right, […] we are not in a natural
habitat anymore. We’ve become denizens of the net. Homo
datum. (386)
This reference to Schrödinger’s thought experiment explores how technological
advancements render ambiguous both a classically-determined view of the world and
an “indetermined” viewof the world. Continuallymoving awayfrom binarydialectics,
the narrative seeks to focus upon the one which underpins them all: that of the dialogic
relationship between material realityand virtual reality.
As a highly ambiguous utopian state in which virtual reality can be moulded by
the individual because “you can make it into what you want it to be, instead of the
disappointment it turned out to be” (410), cyberspace is perhaps the most
indeterminable state of being. Its utopian/dystopian realities could even be seen as a
manifestation of the infinite possibilities of the “multi-verse.” However, there is one
important exception to this multi-verse theory in Synners, that is: when two people are
online, they are not observed as occupying the same “place” in cyberspace together.
Hence the denouement of the novel is that Gabe and Gina have to “locate” each
other in cyberspace in order to contain the spike virus and restore the city’s systems.
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In other words, they have to attempt to find each other within the space of an infinite
number of hyper-individuated and separate worlds within cyberspace: they have to
overcome the pull of hyper-individuation itself and utilize Gina’s feminist “You can.
We can” approach to teamwork. Crucially, they must do this through their
consciousnesses, rather than their material bodies. In other words, they must
amalgamate the principles of transhumanist discourses and material feminist
movements.
The conclusion of the novel is that: if it is “only a damned Schrödinger world
when you were meat” (in other words, when one is bound within a world of classical
determinism), we cannot always approach cyber-technologies using the determined
principles of a classical, positivist reality (254). This sentiment is reflected in the
narrative when Keely questions the term Schrödinger’s world by asking: “Schrödinger
or Heisenberg? […] To be or not to be, you are or aren’t you – can’t be sure of either
one till somebody opens your box” (271). In other words, one’s sense of self and
subjectivity is a struggle to recognise until somebodyelse confirms this for you, just as
the cat is confirmed as alive or dead only after someone opens the box. Yet human
conscious is much more than thinking alone: it is also about feeling; feeling as in the
philosophical, cognitive and emotional, as well as the sensory and visceral experiences
of the material body in the material world.21 In fact, it is “being” through “feeling”
that links body and the mind together above any other concept in Cadigan’s novel,
                                                          
21 Martin Heidegger famously referred to this as the weltlichkict of Dasein – the “Being-in-the-worldliness” of Dasein. See
Beingand Time (1978).
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which may be the reason why, according to Anne Weinstone, theorists who posit the
figure of the “post-human” as the key utopian state of being often neglect to “speak
of care, of responsibility” (16).
Like Schrödinger’s “grounded” indeterminacy, Synners negotiates the issue of
technological interaction in a waythat Cadigan herself describes as: “neither dystopian
nor utopian”, “the middle-ground”, “the cautionary but plausible line of thinking”
(qtd. in Kraus 130). In other words, Synners demonstrates neither a determined, nor
“indetermined”, approach to epistemological thinking. The characters also
demonstrate that “feeling” can be defined as a rational approach towards
understanding the world. Cadigan’s position therefore clearly reflects Schrödinger’s
rejection of both Heisenberg’s extremely indeterminist reality principle and the totally
determined materialism of some scientific praxes. By corollary, this plays out a
rejection of both the indeterminate nature of reality associated with the Extropian
post-human vision of the future and the feminist recuperation of women as the
“matter” half of a binary, as that half of the human which transhumanists, allegorically
speaking, are so keen to transcend, to leave behind, evolutionarilyspeaking.
Harawaystates in the “Cyborg Manifesto” that: “[s]cience has been utopian and
visionary from the start; that is why “we” need it” (192). Because the “we” in this
sentence is qualified by printed quotation marks, it suggests that, for Haraway, science
is not for “us” (women) after all. She argues that feminist science fiction has allowed
women to see that there is a feminist science that is “for women”, whereas
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traditionally all science has been “for men” only. Complexly, then, although Haraway
criticises the feminist rejection of science’s rational “objectivity” (as I too have done
throughout this thesis), she also regards scientific discourses as those which conform
to a determined, “reality” principle (197). In contrast, Synners does not dismiss
quantum theories as a non-radical popular science. Far from not being “radical”
enough, then, quantum praxes do actuallyprovide useful metaphors for contemporary
discussions of advanced technologies, such as sex re-assignment surgery or the
emergence of cyberspace. This is because they enable us to call into question the very
nature of determined meaning and axiomatic thinking. Whether or not the
continuation of binary assumptions has feminist associations, the rhizomatic
paradigms of quantum physics can, as Cadigan has demonstrated, help us to think
through some very real problems on the macro – or social – level of the world. We
create only impoverished understandings when we are not judicious enough to take
into account the fact that not all scientific discourses are based upon the same world-
model. After all, rational thought does not have to follow the exact same models of
conceptualising the world in order to be logical if we define processes of Reason as
relational practices.
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Conclusion 
Many critics have argued that “a viable this-worldly collective and public utopianism
simply is not within the horizon of the cyberpunk structure of feeling” (Suvin “On
Gibson” 358). I have demonstrated that Synners continues the feminist project of The
Female Man in a more rational and negotiating way, answering the question of how
feminist thought progresses in the aftermath of the postmodern proliferation of
subjectivities, without the need to resort to a feminist rage. Byinterrogating the hybrid
and cyborgian nature of The Female Man and Synners, I have demonstrated that these
genres are not only feminist when they are simply critiquing technological and
scientific progress. The novels’ numerous depictions of the cyborgian subjectivity
demonstrate that the cyborg is, after all, as Haraway suggests: the loss of the sacred in
which “[n]o objects, spaces, or bodies are sacred in themselves” anymore (163). But if
cyborgian subjectivity is definitively the loss of the sacred, we have to accept that we
cannot talk of writing “the cyborg” either, or rather, no more than we can talk of
theorising “the human”, for to articulate the cyborg as a singular concept is merely to
re-create yet another “sacred” body. For cyberfeminists this would be an electronic
self, free from societal constraints when communicating via the internet; for Peter
Baofu this would be a non-sentient existence; the Extropians would instead see the
cyborg as an evolved human, a trans-human, integrated entirely with technology and,
for Haraway, cyborgs are ultimately women of colour working with machinery and
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technology in a global economy. Feminist utopian and science fictions may have been
seen as the main source for Haraway’s definition of the cyborg but they have
nevertheless been a useful means for interrogating whywe label bodies as “cyborgian”
in the first place.
In literary engagements with technology or, in earlier literatures, such as
mythical narratives, the heterogeneity of human bodies, as opposed to “the human
body”, is also that which can be “monstrous” in terms of its material nature. It is only
in examining and comparing the similarities across literary history that women’s
endeavours to highlight the many heterogeneous visions of how we define what is
“human” in contrast to what has been deemed to be, or simply treated as, “non-
human”, can fully emerge. To put this in terms of Haraway’s theory: Frankenstein’s
monster, the animal scientists of Margaret Cavendish’s Blazing World (1666) and the
circus monsters in Scott’s MilleniumHall (1762) are still cyborgianeven if theylong to be
accepted in a society that represents the “Garden of Eden”, a utopian place that
Haraway’s definition of the cyborg – “unlike Frankenstein” – rejects (151). After all,
the idea that the cyborgian monster would not “recognise” Eden means that it would
not recognise this as arcadia. Ultimately, can we define the cyborg as “cyborgian”
simply because it cannot recognise a classical, albeit Western, utopia? This is a
problematic manifesto for social change, for it negates the fact that the history of
“cyborg writing,” from the detective novel to the ergonomics of architecture, is a
patchwork of utopian paradigms and women’s engagements with, and subversions of,
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models of Reason throughout history. Far from being an ironic dream that negates
Eden, “cyborg writing” is a fundamental part of the tradition of women’s role in the
critique of societal issues by re-imaging utopia (Eden) over and over through the
extrapolation of technological and scientific discourses.
The danger of attempting to define and represent Haraway’s cyborg is that this
inevitablycomes to represent a perpetuation of the conditions of woman as the Other
after all. Its prerequisite of the relevance of non-Western origin stories and
heterogeneous bodies unwittingly recapitulates the dialectics of Same and Other
through its exclusion of two key concerns: the articulation of white (especially female)
voices and the fact that all bodies are heterogeneous and permeable. Non-Western
origin stories cannot provide an all-encompassing means for considering how
Western literatures, cultures and histories help us to continue to work through the
gendered language of those feminist histories, for these are the histories that we have
assumed that we understand but which we are yet to learn from. To re-open howand
why women writers and practitioners sought to contribute to male-dominated
scientific discourses and other narratives of “Reason”, and to celebrate further those
women writers who have attempted to deploy the politics of rational discourse for
feminist means, might all proffer a more fulfilling project. To commit to a process of
merely “dissolving Western selves” – and no other selves at the same time – is simply
a perpetuation of binary logic (157). It is important to note that, in contrast to
Haraway’s cyborg, the depictions of hybrid bodies (both textual and biological) that
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have characterised utopian and science fiction bywomen were all more or less astutely
aware of the importance of models of empathy and feeling. Considering this, I
conclude that, in spite of its attempts to “suggest a way out of the dualisms in which
we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves”, Haraway’s concept of the
cyborgian is not as illuminating or useful for a rejection of the “woman as alien”
paradigm as it would at first appear to be (181).22
Joanna Russ’s “Whileawayan” flowers in The Female Man, therefore, can be seen
as an apt allegory for us here; they represent the fact that the eco-feminist rejection of
scientific praxis can be problematic. Perhaps even more useful to us here is Pat
Cadigan’s negotiating, empathetic and reasoned approach to utopian subjectivities in
late twentieth-centuryculture. Synners does not end with the disavowal of online life or
the technology that has caused disaster. Nor are we, as readers, left with technology-
free spaces and paradoxically-utopian “Whileawayan” flowers: the use of skull sockets
in Synners may have caused damage but they also “open up all new possibilities for
healing brain damage” and mental disorders (434). Technology is recuperated for a
socially-responsible utopian means after all, and it is this responsible use of
technology which becomes the utopian paradigm itself. This is epitomised by Gabe,
who, like the cyborg that does not dream of Eden, finds his own utopia by defining
his own acceptable level of appropriate technological interaction.
                                                          
22 See Weinstone for a consideration of the avatar self as opposed to the cyborg, since “Avatāra” has roots in Eastern
concepts of the processes betweenpolar meanings.
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[H]e had an unobstructed view of the ocean. Someone was
operating an underwater farm a few hundred yards out; with
binoculars he could watch the dolphins popping up and down,
hard at work at whatever dolphins did on underwater farms. On
some days he did nothing else but watch them. (429-430)
The message of the synners is clear: we have to think about the philosophical
questions that will emerge, as well as those which are currently emerging, from the
dissemination of scientific advancement in non-dualist terms. For while it is inevitable
that technology will increasingly destabilise and make our understanding of the world
“indeterminable”, that we will only be able to swim with the dolphins on a dolphin
farm should not be a dystopian future, merelya different one in which we will have to
rethink our principles, of both reason and realityalike.
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Daughters of Reason: Women Writing as 
Rational Subjects 

I find a deep affinity between myself as a transsexual woman and the
monster in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. Like the monster, I am too often
perceived as less than fullyhuman due to the means of myembodiment; like
the monster's as well, my exclusion from human community fuels a deep
and abiding rage in me that I, like the monster, direct against the conditions
in which I must struggle to exist.
(Susan Stryker “My Words to Victor Frankenstein Above the Village of
Chamounix -- Performing Transgender Rage.” States of Rage 196.)
 
It can perhaps be taken as read that the image of Shelley’s monster has facilitated the
claim to a “utopian subjecthood” for centuries and that it has had an immense impact
upon the scholarly consideration of marginalised voices within history – inspiring
transgendered writers, queer writers, black writers and women writers alike. In the
previous chapters, I have revealed howsome of the associations with women and the
cyborgian and/or monstrous body are not necessarily helpful, whereas others are
more useful. In Chapter Five I explored the possibility that Joanna Russ’s depictions
of the transgendered bodydemonstrated howDonna Haraway’s cyborg could be seen
as a more useful image for women writing utopian science fiction than that of
Frankenstein’s monster. I would like to begin my conclusion by considering Laura
Kranzler’s argument that late twentieth-century technology is reflected by the
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hybridityof the male to female transsexual’s material body more explicitly and that
this, in turn, is a recapitulation of the bodyof Frankenstein’s monster.
Drawing on Kranzler’s argument that the male to female transsexual represents
the technological origins of Shelley’s monster, transgender theorist and activist Susan
Stryker interrogates the question of woman and female subjectivities in the aptly titled
first person performative monologue: “MyWords to Victor Frankenstein.”1
Shelley's text is informed by -- and critiques from a woman's
point of view -- the contemporary reordering of knowledge
brought about by the increasingly compelling truth claims of
Enlightenment science. The monster problematizes gender
partly through its failure as a viable subject in the visual field;
though referred to as “he”, it thus offers a feminine, and
potentially feminist, resistance to definition by a phallicized
scopophilia. The monster accomplishes this resistance by
mastering language in order to claim a position as a speaking
subject and enact verbally the very subjectivity denied it in the
specular realm. (“MyWords” 200)
                                                          
1 This was performed at the “Rage Across the Disciplines” conference at California State University, San Marcos, 10th-
12th June in 1993.
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Likethe work of Susan Stryker, this study has sought to open-up and interrogate the
ideas surrounding how women have posited various senses of subjectivity, within
both social structures and structured discourse. It has especially considered female
subjectivities, and how women writers have endeavoured to “enact verbally the very
subjectivity” that they have been “denied” through extrapolative visions of alternative
worlds (200). However, as can be seen in the above quotation, Stryker’s identification
with the monster is based upon her interpretation of its resistance through the
cadences of “the dark, watery images of Romanticism” (211). In contrast, the writers
considered within this study have created an alternative visual field of ideal female
subjectivities through fiction by charting – not negating – the impact of innovative
discoveries, discourses and technologies. In other words, like Frankenstein’s monster,
theyhave laid claim to a rational subjectivitythrough narrative voice.
What is interesting about Stryker’s position here is that the feminist, queer and
transgendered rage presented in Stryker’s “words to Victor Frankenstein” uses a first-
person monologue structure in order to articulate the alienation from female
subjectivity on the grounds that she cannot claim a female or feminist subjectivity as
part of “womanhood.” Her isolation signifies a lack of identification too; like Shelley’s
monster, Stryker identifies herself as an “artificial” being but more poignantly, as a
woman who has been created by the very scientific discourses which feminists rile
against: that of an apparently patriarchal medical science. From this we could
conclude that “rational” thought processes should be subject to criticism for
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recapitulating the discourses of universal man. Which raises the question: can
“rational” feminisms ever truly escape the patriarchal processes which have
themselves been justified by, and have, in turn, served to justify, so-called “rational”
discourse? The identification with an idea of “womanhood” is inaccessible for Stryker
precisely because it is deemed to be a homogenous subjecthood and, furthermore,
one whose gendered history can be seen as inextricable arising out of Enlightenment
models of humanity and the purity of the “natural.” Stryker’s voice is yet another
example of laying claim to a female subjectivity by positing all empirical discourses as
inherently problematic in order to negate the social use value of science. Indeed, this
paradigm becomes even more ironic when we consider the fact that it is the
application of scientific knowledge (in this case: medicine) which has ultimately
allowed Stryker’s trangendered subjectivity to become visually-realised in her material
body.
As discussed in the Introduction, because rage is said to have characterised the
wave of “feminist science fiction” from the 1960s onwards,2 this study has sought to
challenge the idea of women writing utopian and science fiction as the “daughters of
Frankenstein.” By corollary it questions why the “history” of women should be
defined through the irrational aspects of Frankenstein’s monstrous creation. Stryker’s
concern with the alienation from the natural definition of woman therefore reflects
L.J. Swingle oxymoron that the monster is an ““artificial” natural man” because he is
                                                          
2 See Elaine Showalter LiteraryWomen (1977).
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likeRousseau’s Noble Savage, an innocent tabula rasa of a child at one with Nature
(51). In contrast, howI would define the monster as an artificial “natural man” would
be in the sense that he is a natural man because is able to speak from the position of a
human and thereby to claim his status as having the subjectivity of a natural, wholly
human being. This distinction is important: if women are like the monster this is not
because of their liminal position or the post-Enlightenment concept of women as
“abject.” What, in fact, makes Frankenstein’s monster unique is that in spite of his
outward appearance – that which is antithetical to “Enlightenment”, “universal” or
“capitalist” man (or Same) – he is able to make plausible claims for his status as a
creature of rationality, compassion and articulation. Women are not Frankenstein’s
daughters: they are the daughters of the monster’s unique position, and as such they
are able to use Enlightenment Reason in order to critique the notion of purityand the
“universal man.”
This is all very well, but what exactly does it mean to write and speak as a
“rational” subject? After all, as Phyllis Rooney notes, the inescapably gendered nature
of reasoned discourse – from antiquity onwards – has meant that language is imbued
with the gendered tropes of the our philosophical forbearers (94). But this is not
necessarily the case, after all, the feminist rejection of science is based upon the
seventeenth-century tendency to align Greek philosophy with Christianity.3 Feminist
readings of the scientific appropriation of Greek metaphor have therefore been based
                                                          
3 For more details, see Phyllis Rooney“Gendered Reason: Sex Metaphor and Conceptions of Reason”.
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upon seventeenth-century interpretations of it. On a similar note, feminists often treat
even the absence of gendered metaphors or the marked break from Greek metaphysics
(as in Descartes), as the very signifier of the permeation of patriarchal imperative.
Because linguistic theories such as we see in Roland Barthes’ Mythologies (1957) have
suggested that the disappearance of the metaphor signifies its capitulation into societal
norms, feminists have argued that the point at which Greek metaphysics seems to
“disappear” in European discourses is actuallywhen their dominance is, finally, utterly
beyond question. In other words, that if the sexual, material bodies of women are no
longer evoked when speaking of the “soul” after the emergence of Descartes and La
Mettrie’s mechanical souls and the colonial conquering of “land” in the Western gaze
to the West, then this is simply because the metaphor has been subsumed so much
that it need no longer be explicitlystated.
The bodyof woman, metaphoricallyspeaking, does indeed seem to “disappear”
from natural philosophical writing in the latter half of the seventeenth-century and,
indeed, it is no longer prevalent in the earlier vitalist-mechanic debates of the nature
of the soul and the mechanical order of the universe either, such as we see in the work
of Descartes and his contemporaries. Hence contemporary feminist critics posit
Descartes as presenting a “gendered” sense of reason through the infamous
mind/body split, in which the gendered sense of male “reason” is synonymous with
that of public “mind:” in contrast, female “matter” and the “reason” of women is
confined to that of the private “body”, and, later, the enclosure of the private writing
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cabinetand the epistolarynovel (Rooney82-3). In doing so, they forget that Cartesian
materialism was the one seventeenth-century discourse in which women were
extremely vocal. In Paris, the discussion of Cartesian philosophy was so prevalent that
feminist historians have had to rename these spaces Salonistes when referring to these
women-only spaces.4 Indeed, Descartes’ materialist challenge of the bipartite
Aristotlean soul into its morally-weaker/“female” half and its morally-
stronger/“male” half would also seem to purport to a more egalitarian definition of
the human. It is not my intention here to argue that Descartes was a proto-feminist,
nor am I arguing that his works have not been seen as the very basis of that
mind/body split recapitulated by a male/female split, which can be seen, somewhat
spuriously, as the definitive essence of the very nature of the human being as a
complex living entity (see Chapter Five). I cite the scholarly interpretation of
Descartes merely as an example of howthinking about philosophy and science always
in gendered terms will impoverish our understanding of other, perhaps more
pertinent, debates. For example, the question of what the human being will be like in
the future is not, ultimately, progressed by only debating whether or not Descartes
mind/body magnum is tantamount to a male/female split of gendered aspects of
humanity.
Throughout the history of utopian and science fiction, women have also been
using the “tools of the Master” in order to build their own “houses”, rather than to
                                                          
4 For general information on what Hunter and Hutton term the “Salonistes”, see Women, Science and Medicine 1500-1700
(1997).
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reactwith rage against, or, indeed, to “deconstruct”, patriarchal discourses.5 It might
be useful to build again upon what these fictional engagements have unearthed and to
examine more closely the ideas of reason upon which they are founded more
generally, by examining non-fictional feminist dialogues with science throughout
history. Scholarly work into comparing the rational discourse of Descartes and
Margaret Cavendish in more detail or by examining historical definitions of the
mind/body dialectic other than that of the dichotomy of man/woman, for example,
would go some towards this project. We must also not forget, of course, the fact that
one of the main reasons why Frankenstein remains popular today is precisely because
of the discrepancy between how the monster is treated because of his outward
appearance (“his” body) and his more formidable qualities (“his” mind) – a Cartesian
dialectic.
This study has attempted to draw upon cultural history in order to interrogate
the binary of feminist and so-called anti-feminist tropes in women’s writing in order
to invert the binary of the history of woman as having been, on the one hand,
hysterical (as the monster or Bertha Mason) and, on the other, as a conservative,
Enlightened woman (that which Stryker is rejecting above). I hope to have
demonstrated that we can extract an idea of non-gendered rationalityand reason from
the history of women’s utopian and science fiction. Indeed, it must not be forgotten
that what is deemed to be the origins of modern feminism is inextricable from the
                                                          
5 See Audre Lourde “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House” (1984) for a description of how
woman’s own “voice” cannot consist of the Master’s tools (patriarchal language and structural epistemologies).
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inescapable rationality of that infamous feminist critique of Rousseau: Mary
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Yet these fictional histories do more
than corroborate Wollstonecraftian reason: they are dialogues based upon the
relationship between reason and empathy. As Rooneysuggested:
We have been able to talk about the power of reason but
not about the power of empathy. We can talk about the
insight and understanding that rational knowledge brings,
but we cannot talk about the understanding a deepening
sense of compassion brings. Just as we have at best a
caricature of reason, we also are left with a caricature of
feeling, feeling robbed of any claim to rationality and
understanding. [...] And yet we get the clear sense that the
most creative insights in the history of thought emerge in
part out of a special and rare ability to go beyond the
caricatures of such enforced divisions. (Rooney 97-8,
emphasis added)
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Inforegrounding the responsibility of “Same” to “Other”, these writers have rendered
“empathy” a rational logic of feminism, a reason to write.6 I would argue that what is at
play within all the texts examined within this study is the operation of a rational logic
of social inclusion and empathywhose basis deploys and problematises the idea of the
language of the “Same” as spokenbythe “Other.”
The point at which this thesis ends is therefore ironically at the beginning, that
is to say, the beginning of hopefully new dialogues in which feminist rationality is
explored as a discourse of Enlightenment utopian good by asking the question anew:
what were those moments in history in which women have not reacted against, but
engaged with, discourses of science, technology, architecture and philosophy in order
to improve the world and its terra incognita? Such discourses are central to the progress
of ideals, much like Frankenstein’s concentric epistolary narrative forms the centre of
this thesis. And, furthermore, at its centre is not Frankenstein’s testimony, his claim
on the outskirts of the Village of Chamounix, but rather the question of whether or
not the monster’s testimony is rational, highlighting the inevitably dialogic nature of
knowledge dialectics. Like this thesis, and the project of forming a “history of
Woman” in the same way that Shelley had once thought to, Frankenstein is written in
the form of a letter addressed to his sister, Margaret Saville, by Captain Walton, or,
more precisely, what he can recall of it from Victor Frankenstein’s “re-telling” his
story. Like the reader of the letter, ultimately we are distanced from the historical
                                                          
6 See also LucySargisson on the feminist consciousness of rational feminine emotion.
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realityof what actually happened (and hence what the real motivations and intentions
of these women writers were). The history of woman is also like Frankenstein’s multi-
layered and highly-artifice narrative because its sense of “retelling”, and hence its
historical distance, only adds to the sense of engineering involved in its attempt to
revise, re-assess and re-build narratives of knowledge. Similarly, Frankenstein’s
continued centrality within any revision of women’s writing demonstrates that
responsible scholarship should always attempt, like Christine de Pizan had, to build
upon and acknowledge the foundations it seeks to revise. It should never simply
endeavour to tear them down or negate them altogether, nor blindly recapitulate their
historical trajectories. As I suggested earlier in the Introduction, this study is, after all,
the story of how women writers have built upon one another, however knowingly or
unknowingly, in a process of feminist edification that begins, for now at least, with
The Cityof Ladies (1405).
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